

SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

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JANUARY 1994

SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

RAFIQ AHMAD

Editor

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Quantitative Analysis of Impact of Women's Status on Fertility

M. A. RAZZAQUE

Abstract

In this article relationship between the status of women and their reproductive behaviour is studied for Bangladesh based on the data from the Bangladesh Fertility Survey 1989. The status indicators used are Educational level of the respondents and their husbands, Family type, Interspousal age difference and Female independence score.

The relationship between the status variables and demand, supply and Regulation of fertility are obtained from : (i) The analysis of the effect of individual status variables on the intervening variables, Months spent in marital state, Desired family size, Birth interval, Number of contraceptive methods known, Contraceptive use status and Proportion of child mortality. (ii) The direct effects of the intervening variables on the fertility variable children everborn.

The results suggest that the effect of women's status indicators are in fact related in the expected directions to both fertility enhancing and fertility depressing intervening variables. It is revealed that Female education, Family type and Female independence score are the most consistent determinants of each set of intervening variables of fertility.

INTRODUCTION

Recent studies have suggested that the status of women may be the single most important element in explaining the fertility transition.^{1,2} In this paper relationship between the status of women and their reproductive behaviour is studied for Bangladesh. In early days a young woman's prestige was a function of her reproductive performance, and particularly the number of sons she had produced. Early, arranged and exogamous marriages, extended family residence, physical and social segregation, disapproval of education and unemployment were the socio-cultural mechanisms through which women were

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put to economic dependence and domestic subordination. At present laws and cultural changes have increased age at marriages, and have fewer restrictions on education for women. Though there are restrictions on occupational choice, now a days, women enjoy fewer social restrictions and exercise more freedom of movement and greater participation in decisions affecting the household. Reproductive performances are not viewed as the only means available to raise a women's domestic prestige.

Women's status in Bangladesh have undergone changes, suggested by improvements in such measurable indicators as literacy and work force participation recorded over the intercensal period 1981-91. The female literacy rate increased from 16 per cent to 20.3 per cent and labour force participation rate from 5.1 per cent to 63.4 per cent. Among the demographic indicators, the population growth rate has fallen from 2.32 per cent to 2.17 per cent and contraceptive prevalence has risen from 18.6 per cent to 40 per cent. Total marital fertility has declined to 4.2 compared to 5.4.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

All data used in this study are from the Bangladesh Fertility Survey (BFS) 1989, which was conducted on behalf of the government of Bangladesh by the National Institute of Population Research and Training (NIPORT) in Bangladesh from December 1988 to April 1989. A two-stage probability sample was used by BFS to select 11,906 evermarried women younger than 50 years of age. Data for this study pertain to currently married women aged 35-49 years for a total of 2914. These are the oldest cohorts, with approximately complete fertility experience.

The methodology to study the relationship between the status variables and fertility behaviour follows the system model which is described below:³

The proximate determinant equation is :

$$B = a + \sum \alpha X + U \quad 1$$

Where X's are intervening variables and B is the number of children everborn.

The backward determinants of intervening variables equation is:

$$X = a + \sum \beta Y + V \quad 2$$

Where Y's are status indicator variables.

STATUS INDICATORS FOR WOMEN

The socio-economic and domestic dimensions of the status of women are measured by many indicators in demographic literature. Based on our available data we focus on a set of available indicators whose mean values are given in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Mean and Standard Deviation Values for Woman's Status, Fertility and
Intervening Variable Indicators. (N = 2914)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
Intervening Variables		
Months in Marital State (MSM)	317.86	64.03
Birth Interval (BI) in months	38.52	18.37
Desired Family Size (DFS)	4.18	1.87
Number of Methods Known (NMK)	6.74	2.12
Contraceptive Use Status (CUS)	.68	.71
Fertility Variables		
Children Everborn (CEB)	5.32	2.62
Living Children (LC)	4.89	2.11
Status Variables		
Women's Schooling (SC)	1.67	1.07
Husband's Education (HE)	2.32	1.34
Family Type (FT)	1.44	.74
Female Independence Score (FIS)	2.82	2.01
Interspousal Age Difference (IAD)	11.23	6.54

These indicators are :

1. Level of education of the respondent women which is a categorical variable having value 1 = No School, 2 = Madrasha, 3 = Primary and Secondary, 4 = College and Higher Education. The mean value of this variable is 1.67 representing majority are illiterate or of low educational status.
2. Husband's education, which is also a categorical variable with the categories as mentioned in the level of education of the respondent women. The mean value of this variable is 2.32, represents majority husbands have at least primary or madrasha education.
3. Family type indicate the number of generations residing in the household. That is family type is nuclear when the value of our variable is 1. When

the value exceeds 1 the family is of extended type. The mean value of this variable is 1.44 representing most families are of extended type.

4. Inter spousal age difference is the difference between the husband's age and wife's age. The mean value 11.2 indicates almost all husbands are considerably older than wives.
5. Female independence score measures here the extent of freedom of movement which was measured by sum of the positive responses which was coded as 1 for eight questions regarding freedom of movement. The mean values of this status variable is 2.82, with the highest 8. As evidenced from the interspousal age difference and cultural reality the value of this variable clearly indicates that our women experience less domestic autonomy and freedom of movement.

STATUS VARIABLES AND FERTILITY

Bangladesh Family Survey 1989 data shows that the level of ever use of contraceptive method is 68 per cent and the total number of births per woman which is a measure of fertility is 5.32 children. The mean number of surviving children is 4.89.

Bivariate correlations are given in Table 2 presents the association between women's status indicators and both fertility control and fertility. The results indicate that all the included status indicator variables are very important determinants of fertility behaviour. Improvement in female status are associated with increased deliberate fertility regulation. The negative correlations between status variables interspousal age difference and family type with intervening variables number of modern contraceptive methods known clearly shows their negative effects on fertility behaviours ultimately having fertility enhancing effect. These negative effects on fertility behaviours is reflected by the insignificant values $-.0175$ and $.0103$ of the correlation co-efficients of these variables with children everborn. The status variables women's education, husband's education and female independence score show highly significant positive effect on knowledge and use of contraceptives and highly negative effects on the fertility variable children everborn. The correlation matrix reveals insignificant effects of schooling of both husbands and wives on number of living children but female independence score shows highly significant negative effect on living children clearly explaining females having more family autonomy desires less children. The highly positive significant effect of the variable family type on living children reveals the fact women in joint families have more children than those in nuclear families. The

results of multiple regression analysis of children ever born on women's status variables are presented in Table 4, which confirm the above observations. From our analysis it reveals that other things being equal, for the positive relationship between the status of women and fertility control there exists a correspondingly negative relationship between women's status and fertility. Certainly we have crossed the earlier stages of fertility transition, where women who have practiced contraception also tend to have experienced higher levels of natural marital fertility.⁵

TABLE 2
Correlation between Status Variables with Contraceptive
Knowledge and Fertility Variables.

Correlations	NMK	CUS	CEB	LC
SC	.3220 **	.1810 **	-.0761 **	-.0348
HE	.2641 **	.1466 **	-.0503 *	-.0060
IAD	-.1093 **	-.0983 **	-.0175	-.0360
FIS	.3083 **	.1531 **	-.0744 **	-.1374 **
FT	-.0520 *	-.0293	.0103	.0925 **

No. of Cases: 2914

1-tailed Signif: *-.01 **-.001

The effect of female status variables on fertility acts through intervening variables.^{4,5} So we can decompose the effect into two parts :

1. The direct effects of intervening variables on fertility behaviour.
2. The effect of individual female status indicators on intervening variables.

Table 3 presents the relationship between intervening variables and fertility behaviour by way of the proximate determinants equation (1). All the co-efficients except that of number of method known are significant. By and large, coefficients show the expected signs for all the variables.

TABLE 3
Regression of Children Everborn on the Status Variables
Adjusted R Square .27650

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig. T
PCK	.88931	.03252	.45464	27.350	.0000
DFS	.28524	.02047	.23759	13.935	.0000
BI	-.01748	2.06284E-03	-.13969	-8.475	.0000
MSM	6.59556E-03	5.84707E-04	.19029	11.280	.0000
NMK	.03169	.01801	.03024	1.760	.0786
(Constant)	2.95288	.26602		11.100	.0000

TABLE 4
Regression of Children Everborn on the Status Variables
Adjusted R Square .02053

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig. T
FIS	-.09248	.02199	-.08448	-4.206	.0000
IAD	-5.48387E-03	-6.52350E-03	-.01616	-.841	.4006
FT	.04921	.05743	.01639	.857	.3915
HE	-.05439	.03749	-.03301	-1.451	.1469
SC	-.15803	.04843	-.07705	-3.263	.0011
(Constant)	6.39852	.15247		41.966	.0000

STATUS VARIABLES, DEMAND, SUPPLY AND REGULATION OF FERTILITY

To identify the specific aspects of women's status that influence the demand side intervening variable desired family size, supply side intervening variables marital duration, birth interval, proportion of child mortality and regulation cost measured by number of contraceptive methods known, regression of each of these demand, supply and regulation cost variables on women's status variables are run.

From the standardized coefficients and their level of significance we note significant negative effect of husbands and wife's education on desired family size as shown in Table 5. Female independence scores also have negative effect on desired family size. But family type has significant positive effect on desired family size. So it is revealed that education and female independence play very significant role in limiting the family size thereby reducing the overall fertility, while in joint families fertility trend is higher.

TABLE 5
Regression of the Intervening Variable 'Desired Family Size'
on the Status Variables
Adjusted R Square .06685

Variable:	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig.T
FIS	-.19100	.01788	-.20948	-10.684	.0000
IAD	7.620675E-03	5.30359E-03	.02696	1.437	.1509
FT	.11424	.04669	.04569	2.447	.0145
HE	-.03248	.03048	-.02367	-1.066	.2867
SC	-.12808	.03938	-.07497	-3.253	.0012
(Constant)	4.74031	.12396		38.242	.0000

Regression of marital duration on status variables, Table 6 shows that wife's education and female independence score have highly significant negative effect on marital duration while husband's education have insignificant negative effect. Interspousal age difference and family type have significant positive effect on marital duration. So we can infer that more female education and more independence of female will have fertility reducing effect by shortening the value of the supply side variable marital duration. But joint families and aged husbands have fertility enhancing effect by lengthening the period of marital duration.

TABLE 6
Regression of the Intervening Variable 'Months Spent in Marital State'
on the Status Variables
Adjusted R Square .08539

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig. T
FIS	-3.88360	.61305	-.12296	-6.335	.0000
IAD	.62467	.18188	.06380	3.435	.0006
FT	15.87795	1.60104	.18332	9.917	.0000
HE	-1.28604	1.04518	-.02705	-1.230	.2186
SC	-6.70030	1.35033	-.11323	-4.962	.0000
(Constant)	311.47750	4.25088		73.274	.0000

The standardized regression co-efficients of the status variables on the intervening variable number of modern contraceptive methods known which is a measure of regulation cost, Table 7 shows that all the co-efficients are significant with interspousal age difference and family type have negative effect and other status variables have positive effects. Schooling of both the women and their husbands as well as female independence score contribute positively in acquiring knowledge about modern contraceptive methods.

TABLE 7
Regression of the Intervening Variable 'Number of Methods Known'
on the Status Variables
Adjusted R Square .17680

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig. T
FIS	.24972	.01924	.23905	12.982	.0000
IAD	-.02462	5.7074E-03	-.07620	-4.314	.0000
FT	-.09272	.05024	-.03237	-1.846	.0651
HE	.19108	.03280	.12153	5.826	.0000
SC	.35125	.04237	.17947	8.920	.0000
(Constant)	5.44649	.13339		40.832	.0000

Regression of birth interval on status variables. Table 8 shows that all the co-efficients except husbands education have insignificant effects. Husbands education has negative significant effect on birth interval. So we can infer that educated husbands are more eager to complete the family size with a shorter span of time.

TABLE 8
Regression of the Intervening Variable 'Birth Interval'
on the Status Variables
Adjusted R Square = .00021

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig. T
FIS	-.04959	.17753	-5.670E-03	-.279	.7800
IAD	-.2437	.05267	-8.989E-03	-.463	.6436
FT	-.12671	.46365	-5.283E-03	-.273	.7847
HE	-.61009	.30268	-.04635	-2.016	.0439
SC	.42746	.39104	.02609	1.093	.2744
(Constant)	39.47915	1.23102		32.070	.0000

Regression of proportion of child mortality on status variables. Table 9 shows that effects of interspousal age difference, husbands and wives education are insignificant. Female independence score has unexpected significant positive effect and family type has significant negative effect. The results of the regression of status variables on proportion of child mortality are unclear and the direction of causation ambiguous.

TABLE 9
Regression of the Intervening Variables 'Proportion of Child Mortality'
on the Status Variables.
Adjusted R Square .00286

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig. T
FIS	.02878	.01134	.05142	2.537	.0112
IAD	3.823966E-04	3.36496E-03	2.2042E-03	.114	.9095
FT	-.06370	.02962	-.04151	-2.150	.0316
HE	-.01853	.01934	-.02200	-.958	.3380
SC	-6.74677E-03	.02498	-6.435E-03	-.270	.7871
(Constant)	.04110	.07865		.523	.6013

Regression of the status variables on the intervening variable contraceptive use status. Table 10 shows that interspousal age difference has significant negative effect and family type has insignificant effect. So we can infer that more age difference between husbands and wives produces fertility

enhancing effect. The highly significant positive values of the regression co-efficients of the variables female independence score, education of the women and of their husbands clearly shows that these variables have fertility depressing effect.

TABLE 10
Regression of the Intervening Variable 'Contraceptive use Status'
on the Status Variables.
Adjusted R Square .05245

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig. T
FIS	.04007	6.92671E-03	.11428	5.784	.0000
IAD	-.8.73200E-03	2.05497E-03	-.08034	-4.249	.0000
FT	-.01314	.01809	-.01367	-.727	.4675
HE	.03635	.01181	.06889	3.078	.0021
SC	.06391	.01526	.09730	4.189	.0000
(Constant)	.50486	.04803		10.511	.0000

In general the findings confirm that women's status variables are significantly related to both fertility enhancing and fertility depressing intervening variables. Female education is by far the most consistent determinant of supply, demand and regulation cost variables. Particularly strong are the effects of education on desired family size, awareness of fertility control methods and marital duration. The interspousal age difference, one measure of domestic autonomy is revealed to have insignificant effect on most of the intervening variables. Husbands education revealed insignificant effects on the intervening variables except for the finding that women with more educated husbands possess more knowledge about contraceptive methods but have shorter birth interval revealing that these subset of husbands desire to complete their family size within a shorter span of time. Finally, family type is a consistent determinant of supply, demand and regulation cost of variables. Particularly significant positive effect on desired family size, marital duration and negative effect on PCM and NMK suggests that extended families continue to have fertility enhancing effect.

These results suggest that the effect of women's status indicators are, in fact, related in the expected directions to both fertility enhancing and fertility depressing intervening variables. A look at the relative magnitudes of the co-efficients confirm that female education, family type and female independence score are the most consistent determinants of each set of intervening variables.

CONCLUSION

From the relationship between the selected factors associated with women's status and fertility behaviour in this study it is clear that all of the indicators of status used in this study generated differences in the expected directions in the set of intervening variables desired family size, number of contraceptive methods known and marital duration. In contrast relationship with the intervening variables proportion of child mortality is erratic. The negative effect of status variables clearly indicates that uprising the status variables specially the education of the women will surely bring a dramatic reduction in their fertility. So recent steps for enhancement in the educational status of women taken by the policy-makers will evidently bring a positive effect in the curbing process of our population problem.

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The Impact of Poor Women's Participation in Village Based Development Programmes on Fertility : Evidences from a Recent Survey

M. KABIR and RUHUL AMIN

Abstract

The paper investigates the poor women's participation in village based development programme on their status and reproductive changes in rural Bangladesh. The data for the paper were derived from the three (BRAC, BRDB and GB) village based development agencies. The present study shows that participation in income generating projects by poor rural women has led to increased level of contraceptive use and to decreased level of desire for additional children. Women's development projects provided opportunities to bring poor women together in a forum outside the traditional family and allowed group members to learn first hand about women's problems and concerns. The group meeting provides members opportunities to discuss and share their problems and learn from the struggle of their peer members. Logistic regression analysis suggests that discussion of family planning in the group meeting, income from economic activities and participation in decision making on household matters are important correlates of desire fertility. This findings imply that because of limited mobility of women, knowledge and awareness about family planning through village based group meeting of members is a culturally appropriate strategy in raising contraceptive prevalence rate.

INTRODUCTION

Like many other developing countries in the world, women of Bangladesh are beset with many socio-cultural problems which act as hindrance in achieving equal status with men. Women's social status in Bangladesh is directly related to the institution of *purdah*. This social system, which insists upon strict segregation of the sexes, allocates to men control over resources.¹ Bangladeshi women generally have no direct control over the means of production or other social and economic resources, but must seek security through their husbands, sons or other male kin.^{2,3,4}

Women's participation in the development projects were targeted to ensure the awareness building among them about their status opportunities of making own decision especially in the reproductive behaviour and health care practices. It is well known that in Bangladesh women are not accorded equal status with men, and that compared to men, women have very limited opportunities in most spheres of economic and social activities. However, it is being increasingly recognized that there is a close association between various aspects of women's status or position in a society and demographic patterns of fertility, mortality and migration.^{5,6,7}

The most important issues facing policy makers in Bangladesh is whether there are prospects for additional programme and policies for improvement in the existing programmes and policies to bring about an accelerated decline in fertility. This paper examines it that such work economically empowers women. At present little is know about the effects on women on informal enterprise work. Our specific aim is to know "Does a woman's outside the house contacts and her ability to earn money change her reproductive behaviour and norm independent of her socio-economic attributes. What is the perceived and objective change in women's social status as a result of the new employment opportunities? Does the broadening outlook of contact with outside world together with economic necessities compel a woman of lower-socio-economic stratum to seek new opportunities of income generation, to restrict fertility, and to reduce infant mortality?" The present paper will make an effort to address these questions.

DATA SOURCE

The survey was designed to investigate the impact of participation of women in village based development programmes on fertility and health, consists of three separately selected sample areas. The sample areas are Grameen Bank (GB), Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB). These samples were selected using two-stage stratified random sampling technique. In the first stage, a random sample of branches of each organization was selected from four administrative regions. Once areas are selected for each of the village based development programmes, currently married women between the age 15 and 49 were selected randomly from the list of the members. For comparison purposes, another group of women where there is no community based development projects were selected from the neighbouring areas. That is a non-equivalent comparison group post-test only design was used for comparing the data for the study.

The three programmes were treated as a separate stratum. From each stratum about 800 beneficiaries and 400 non-beneficiaries were selected. The ultimate sample sizes for the programme area and the control area were 2269 and 1130 respectively.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Since our aim is to investigate the effects of village based development programmes for women, rather than to compare the effects of different programmes, we have shown the information on aggregate level. The mean age of the respondents is 32 years in the programme area as against 25 years in the control area. Education has been identified as an important characteristics which affect demographic and health behaviour. Many phenomena such as reproductive behaviour, use of contraception, health of children and the hygienic practices are related to the education of household members. About two thirds of the respondents in the programme area and about 79 per cent respondents of the control area had no education. The mean education was low with only 1.6 years and 0.8 years respectively. Husband's level of education is almost double in both areas with 3.2 and 1.7 years of education respectively. Occupation of the husbands in both areas are also shown in Table 1.

TABLE I
Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Characteristics	Programme Area	Control Area
Mean age of respondents	31.9	25.2
Mean education of the respondents	1.6	0.8
Mean education of the husbands	3.2	1.7
Major Occupation of the Husbands :		
Agri own land	16.2	11.3
Business and trade	32.4	20.4
Day labour	20.8	41.5
Service	12.4	8.9
Others	18.2	17.9
Mean age at marriage (in years)	14.3	14.4
Average income of the family per month (in Tk.)	2820	1500
Mean number of children everborn	4.0	3.3
Mean number of children living	3.3	2.7
Current use of contraceptive	61.0	38.1
Current Pregnancy Status		
Yes	5.0	12.3
No	94.0	86.9
Unsure	1.0	0.8

There is a considerable difference in the occupational composition of the husbands in the programme area. In the programme area the most stated occupation of husbands was business and trade (32.4 per cent) followed by agriculture of own land (16.2 per cent) day labourer (20.8 per cent) and service 12.4 per cent, while the most dominant occupation in the control area was day labourers (41.5 per cent) followed by business and trade (20.4 per cent) and agriculture of own land (11.3 per cent) and service (8.9 per cent).

The average age at marriage is low in both areas with little over 14 years. The current contraceptive use rate is 61 per cent in the programme area as opposed to only 38 per cent in the control area. This difference in current use of contraception might have differential demographic impact in the programme as well as in the control areas.

ACTIVITIES OF THE SAMITY

Various information relating to women's group were obtained through specific questions. The average duration of members who are in the samity was about 7.5 years at the time of survey, as shown in Table 2. Ninety per cent of the respondents mentioned that there was regular meeting of the samity members and 85 per cent of those reported that group meeting was usually held weekly. Over three fourths attended the group meeting weekly. In the meeting they discussed a wide range of topics. These included discussion on family planning, income generating activities, maternal and child health, nutrition environment, sanitation, education of the children and investment of loan money to the productive activities.

TABLE 2
Percentage Distribution of Respondents by Activities of the Mahila Samity

Characteristics	Percentage
Average duration of membership (in years)	7.5
Whether attend regular meeting	
Yes	90.0
No	10.0
Frequency of group meeting	
Weekly	85.1
Fortnightly	0.5
Monthly	4.4
Not stated	10.0
Whether discuss FP in group meeting	
Yes	82.2
No	5.0
NA	12.9

Only a quarter of the respondents mentioned that they received training after joining the samity. The areas of training were income generation projects such as poultry raising, handicrafts, cattle raising, environment, health, nutrition plantation. They also received training on maternal and child health, preparation of oral saline, cleanliness and family planning.

TRADITIONAL OUTLOOK AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN THE HOUSEHOLD MATTERS

Attempts were made in the survey to measure social attributes of the women's involvement in their decision-making power and their mobility. These topics were selected because of the likelihood that they influence desired fertility, family planning and health related behaviours. The decision-making power was measured by asking each respondent whether she, her husband or both of them jointly decided on the following matters :

- (i) Children's Education.
- (ii) Children's Marriage.
- (iii) Visit to friends and relatives.
- (vi) Use of family planning to avoid pregnancy.
- (v) Treatment for a sick family member.

Table 3 shows the distribution of respondents according to their decision-making process on various aspects. In most instances husband and wife's decision dominate. In some instances relatively more respondents in the programme area take decision. For instance, in case of purchase decision relatively more wives in the programme area take decision independently. This may be attributed to their exposure because of their involvement in income generating activities. In case of visit to relatives or friends husband's decision dominates. This information clearly suggests that in all the instances joint decision dominates indicating husband and wife interaction has increased due to their involvement in group activities.

TABLE 3
 Percentage Distribution of Respondents according to decision
 taken on Different Household Matters

Decision	Programme Area	Control Area
Children's Education		
Respondent	12.4	10.2
Husband	5.9	6.7
Joint	81.7	83.1
Visit to Relatives		
Respondent	15.7	9.7
Husband	44.1	48.2
Joint	40.2	42.0
Purchase Decision		
Respondent	30.4	17.5
Husband	30.4	42.4
Joint	39.2	40.1
Family Planning Decision		
Respondent	11.3	7.3
Husband	22.6	29.7
Joint	66.1	62.9
Health Decision		
Respondent	45.7	31.3
Husband	23.1	34.6
Joint	31.2	34.1

In order to assess further traditional outlooks and behaviours, information on various aspects of women's autonomy such as whether women can move alone; whether they take tours or visit alone; talk to an unknown men; go to cinema alone; go shopping alone; attend a political meeting alone; visit a health centre alone. Table 4 shows that women can tour alone and can talk to unknown men more freely. More than half of the respondents and 42 per cent respondents respectively from programme and control areas mentioned that they can move outside their villages. Only 22 per cent and 32 per cent women from programme area can go cinema and shopping alone. The comparable figures in the control area are 9 per cent and 19 per cent respectively. Beside religious ground, distance, communication skills with outsiders and availability of transportation may also affect mobility of women.

TABLE 4
Percentage Distribution of Respondents according to their Mobility Outside House

Decision	Programme Area	Control Area
Whether travel alone in village		
Yes	97.1	93.0
No	2.9	7.0
Whether travel alone outside village		
Yes	57.3	42.0
No	42.7	58.0
Whether can talk to unknown person		
Yes	88.4	82.0
No	11.6	17.6
Whether visit Health Centre alone		
Yes	78.0	52.7
No	22.0	47.3
Whether can go group meeting alone		
Yes	21.9	8.7
No	78.1	91.3
Whether can go Mahila Club alone		
Yes	95.5	54.1
No	4.5	45.9
Whether can attend political meeting alone		
Yes	41.7	28.2
No	58.3	71.8
Whether can go shopping alone		
Yes	31.7	18.8
No	68.8	81.2

ASPIRATIONS TOWARDS THEIR CHILDREN AND OPINION ABOUT ECONOMIC SITUATION

Respondent's expectation and aspiration about their children's education and preferred age at marriage of their children have changed. Over 43 per cent of the respondents from the programme area desired that their sons should have graduate level and above education as against about 12 per cent for daughters as shown in Table 5. The desire for higher education is expected because of their exposure and awareness about the need for children's education. This percentage is considerably lower in the control area. Although the average age at marriage for the respondents is low but they expect that their daughters should get married late. According to their opinion, the

average age at marriage for their daughters should be about 19 years and 17 years in the programme and control areas respectively.

TABLE 5
Percentage Distribution of Respondents Regarding Attitudes of their Children's Education and Preferred Age at Marriage for Daughters

Decision	Programme Area	Control Area
Attitude toward level of education for son		
No education needed	0.5	2.0
Primary Level	7.8	19.1
Secondary Level	33.7	35.9
Higher Secondary	14.6	13.5
Degree and above	43.4	29.5
Attitude toward level of education for daughter		
No education needed	1.9	7.5
Primary Level	33.5	53.9
Secondary Level	45.7	29.2
Higher Secondary	6.7	3.9
Degree and above	12.3	5.5
Preferred Age at Marriage of daughters	18.7	16.7

About 82 per cent respondents think that their economic condition improved and they feel this has an influence on their status. The reasons for perceiving such status were also investigated. They think that the influences on their status are attributed to better economic condition, purchase of valuables for the family, better treatment for the family members, consultation for household matters, access to loan, community people's respect as before, and attendance of group meeting.

FERTILITY AND FERTILITY PREFERENCES

In the survey, information on fertility was gathered on the number of live births. Besides, information on births, from a truncated birth history (births occurred five years preceding the survey) were collected. Survival status of the children were also investigated. For dead children, the age at death was recorded. Information on whether currently married women were pregnant at the time of survey were also gathered. The average number of children everborn and living were estimated to assess the life time fertility. The fertility measures presented here are derived directly from the truncated birth history data. This type of information has several limitations. First, interviews were conducted only with surviving women; there is no information on the fertility

of women who did not survive. The fertility rates would be biased if the mortality of women in the child bearing ages was high and if there was a significant difference in fertility between surviving and non-surviving women.

The measure of current fertility presented in this paper is the Total Marital Fertility Rate (TMFR). The TMFR is calculated by summing the age specific marital fertility rates. Table 6 shows age specific marital fertility rates for the two areas. It is important to note that the rates for the two areas are not strictly comparable because of differing sample sizes. In addition, year to year fluctuations caused variations in fertility rates which become difficult to compare. Despite limitations such as misplacement of births, recall lapse errors, they serve the purpose of reflecting recent fertility trends in the two areas. Table 6 also shows the age specific fertility rates for programme and control areas for four years preceding the survey. Although there is a fluctuation particularly in the control area, there is a difference in fertility between programme and control areas. Women in the programme area have, on average half a child less than women in control area. There is a strong evidence that fertility in both areas have been declining but the pace of decline in fertility has varied across time.

TABLE 6
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates (1988-1991)
by Programme and Control Areas

Age	Marital Fertility Rates Programme Area				Marital Fertility Rates Control Area			
	1991	1990	1989	1988	1991	1990	1989	1988
15 - 19	.289	.265	.181	.060	.181	.198	.110	.055
20 - 24	.214	.228	.275	.256	.230	.182	.270	.239
25 - 29	.143	.181	.189	.223	.181	.108	.203	.267
30 - 34	.078	.124	.136	.168	.161	.065	.196	.166
35 - 39	.059	.064	.113	.105	.055	.110	.158	.137
40 - 44	.035	.049	.092	.078	.071	.048	.131	.071
45 - 49	-	.029	.041	.072	.077	.077	.026	.103
Total	.818	.940	1.027	.917	.956	.788	1.094	1.038
TMFR	4.1	4.7	5.1	4.6	4.8	3.9	5.5	5.2
Average								
TMFR		4.6				4.9		
(1988-91)								

Since information is derived from the truncated sample, caution should be taken when interpreting data, i.e., because of possible recall lapses resulting in omission or incorrect dating of events, especially by older women and for

distant time periods. In the survey the total number of children everborn was determined by a sequence of questions to avoid recall lapse errors. Lifetime fertility reflects the accumulation of births over the past years. The information on average number of children everborn shows that it is higher in the programme area than that of control area. How could we account this difference? Although average age at marriage of the respondents in both the areas is the same, the current age of the respondents at the time of survey was not the same. Women in the programme areas were almost seven years older than the women in control area at the time of survey. This difference in age might have attributed to the difference in the average number of children everborn per woman in both the areas.

Table 7 shows the percentage distribution of currently married women by desire for additional children. The desire for additional children is more than double in the control area than in the programme area (36.9 vs 17.2). Similarly, the average children desire is higher in the control area than that of the programme area (1.27 against 1.63). In both areas preference for son is strong.

TABLE 7
Percentage Distribution of Respondents according to whether they desired additional Children and their Opinions about desired Family Size for Nearest Relatives.

Decision	Programme Area	Control Area
Whether want additional children		
Yes	17.2	36.9
No	80.6	58.8
Uncertain	2.2	4.3
Mean Desired		
Boy	.71	.90
Girl	.40	.55
No Preference	.17	.18
In case of only one child		
Boy	79.7	81.6
Girl	4.3	2.7
No Preference	16.0	15.8
Current Pregnancy Status		
Yes	5.0	12.3
No	94.0	86.9
Unsure	1.0	0.8

Current pregnancy status is also considerably lower in the programme area compared to the control area. For instance, only 5 per cent currently married women reported that they were pregnant as against over 12 per cent in the programme area. The higher use of contraception in the programme area also supported why pregnancy rate is lower in the programme area.

We also attempted to assess the respondent's view on the average desired children for their nearest relatives. In ascertaining the average desired children for their relatives, the respondents is required to perform the more difficult task of considering, abstractly and independently of her family size. Despite the likelihood that some rationalization occurs; respondent frequently state desired family size for their relatives that are lower than their actual number of living children. As evident, there is no significant difference in the average desired children for their relatives in both areas (2.24 programme area, 2.38 control area). However, there is an indication that, respondents in the programme area stated lower average desired children as compared to the control area. In both instances, the preference for male children are strong than the female children.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS

It has been argued that enhancement of women's access to income generating programmes is likely to influence her attitude towards reproductive life; her access to credit, peer communication, group meeting, access to decision making in the household matters and access to mobility are likely to influence her desired fertility. It has been claimed that economic participation contributes to the emancipation of women, because they gain greater independence through earning opportunities which enhances their decision making power within the family. In order to investigate the extent of influences on the desired fertility, we used logistic regression analysis. The variables considered in the analysis are :

- X₁ : Age of the respondent;
- X₂ : Religion of the respondent;
- X₃ : Number of living sons;
- X₄ : Whether currently using any FP method;
- X₅ : Number of months ago joined the group;
- X₆ : Whether attend group meeting regularly;
- X₇ : Whether discussed FP in the group meeting;
- X₈ : Whether bought radio after joining the group;
- X₉ : Income from projects;
- X₁₀ : Whether can visit alone relatives or friends;

- X₁₁ : Who takes FP decision;
 X₁₂ : Whether can tour alone outside village;
 X₁₃ : Whether can talk to unknown persons;
 X₁₄ : Age difference in age at marriage gives better mental adjustment;
 X₁₅ : Age difference in age at marriage produce healthy baby;
 X₁₆ : Attitude towards level of education of the daughters; and
 X₁₇ : Whether participate in the household decision making process.

The results of logistic regression analysis is given in Table 8. Among the variables in question, the important predictors of desire fertility are number of living sons, current use status of contraception, membership duration, possession of radio after membership, participation in the household decision matters and income from the activities.

TABLE 8
Logistic Regression Analysis
(Dependent Variable Desire for Additional Child).

Variables	Regression Coefficients	Odds Ratio
X ₁ : Age		
< 35	-	-
35+	-3.0617**	.0468
X ₂ : Religion		
Others	-	-
Muslim	.0946	1.0992
X ₃ : Number of living sons		
No living son	-	-
Atleast one living son	-2.2231**	.1083
X ₄ : Current use status		
No	-	-
Yes	-.5795**	.5602
X ₅ : Duration of Membership		
< 36 months	-	-
36 months and above	-.3432*	.7095
X ₆ : Whether attend group meeting		
No	-	-
Yes	.0651	1.0673
X ₇ : Whether discuss FP in the group meeting		
No	-	-
Yes	-.0659	.9362
X ₈ : Whether bought radio after joining the group		
No	-	-
Yes	.3488*	1.4174
X ₉ : Income from the projects		
Tk. < 2000	-	-
Tk. 2000 and above	-.4273*	.6523
X ₁₀ : Whether can visit alone friends or relatives		
No	-	-
Yes	.1175	.8892

X11 : Who takes FP decision		
Others	-	-
Respondents	-.1748	.8397
X12 : Whether can tour outside village alone		
No	-	-
Yes	-.1229	.8843
X13 : Whether can talk to a unknown person		
No	-	-
Yes	-.1586	.8534
X14 : Age difference in age at marriage gives better mental health		
No	-	-
Yes	-.2467	.7814
X15 : Age difference in age at marriage produce healthy		
No	-	-
Yes	.0969	1.1017
X16 : Attitudes towards level of education of the daughters		
No Education	-	-
Education	.2062	1.2289
X17 : Whether participate in the household decision matters		
No	-	-
Yes	.1411*	1.1515
<hr/>		
- 2 log likelihood chi-square	976.883	p < .000
Model chi-square	376.654	p < .000

** Significant at $p < .01$

* Significant at $p < .05$

The variable desire for additional child is negatively associated with the current use of contraception suggesting that the lower is the desire for additional child, the higher is the likelihood of using contraception. Similarly, the number of living sons is also the strongest correlate of desire for additional child. The higher is the number of living sons the higher is the probability that she will adopt contraception.

It is assumed that women who earn independently give them some say in the household decision matters and it is likely that their desire fertility will be lower. The regression coefficients of the membership duration suggests that the longer the duration of membership of a member the higher is the likelihood that her exposure to modern views will be higher and consequently her desired fertility will be lower. Women's participation in income earning activities also give them opportunity to move outside the homestead and their regular participation in group meeting exposed them to different new ideas including rising expectations and aspirations towards their children's education and age at marriage which may have positive effects on the desire for a additional child. Women's mobility outside the village give them empowerment and this consequently affect their reproductive behaviour.

CONCLUSION

The status of women in Bangladesh is low while their workload is heavy. In addition to performing housework, many women work in agriculture related activities. Desertion, domestic violence and physical abuse among men, as well as husbands taking second wives to procreate sons, are common problems faced by women in Bangladesh. Women own little land or property. Decision making concerning household matters is, therefore, almost always the exclusive preserve of men. Over the last decade there has been growing interest in strategies to enhance the economic status of poor women through promotion of small and informal sector enterprises. Each of these programmes provided opportunities to bring poor women together in a forum outside the traditional family and allowed group members to learn first hand about women's problems and concerns. The group meeting provides members with an opportunity to discuss and share their problems and learn from the struggle of their poor members. One of our major aims is to know economic and social changes of these women and their impacts on fertility. What has been the impact of development programmes on the women who are involved with the activities? What has begun to happen in their lives and in their villages?

Available information provides evidences that changes have occurred in the life of the poor members. Before they had little access to or control over cash incomes, now they are earning personal incomes. Most women members spend their earnings on the most immediate need of their families—food, clothing, education of the children and for treatment of the family members. As a result of their contribution to the family income they think they began to earn more affection and respect with their own families.

Because of their involvement they have been exposed to various modern views and ideas. Their attitudes towards age at marriage, expectation for higher education for their children and desired family size have changed. Knowledge about family planning and cultural belief changed. This has affected their reproductive lives. These have been revealed from the analysis of fertility and mortality and health care knowledge. We found that infant mortality is substantially lower for the women who are involved in development programmes than those of women who are not involved in any development programme. Women in the programme area had almost half a child less than women in the control area. Similarly, current use of contraception and knowledge and utilization of health care services are higher for women in the programme area than that of the control area.

Logistic regression analysis suggests that the variable desire for additional child is correlated with a number of variables which are hypothesized to have significant effects on the fertility of women. Discussions of family planning in the group meeting, income from economic activities and participation in decision making on household matters are also important correlates of desire fertility.

The findings demonstrate that peer communication in the group meeting is an important source of obtaining family planning information. Beside, female village based workers are means of access to family planning information. Because of limited mobility of women, delivery of family planning services through village based workers is a culturally appropriate strategy in raising contraceptive prevalence rate. This strategy builds upon and is reinforced through women's informal networks. This findings imply that women's participation in income generating activities increase mobility and this in turn brings autonomy and empowerment as well as changes in their outlook which consequently affect desire fertility and contraceptive behaviour. When a woman talks to her peer group — such communication can create strong networks for family planning as supported by the relationship between the discussion of family planning and the desire for additional child.

On the basis of preceding analysis we can argue that women in development projects create income generating opportunities for women in informal sector that brings some low or irregular income. A major question this study investigates is that impact on the decision making pattern of women within their families and the large society. Several factors are considered of which one is the control women have on spending the income they generate. This is indicated in part by their participation in household decision matters and partly it is revealed in other kinds of decisions they are able to take within the home. Our analysis indicates informal sector enterprise and opportunities to work outside homestead are likely to empower women. This study suggests that informal sector work provides opportunity for women's mobility and decision making power in the family and it also probably enables them to regulate desired fertility. Women's involvement in economic activities beyond home surroundings and cash generation would likely to have more positive impact on fertility decline endeavour. Women's sense of collective power is enhanced by opportunities for women to move around not only outside their homes, but also beyond their villages as well. Attendance of outside meetings can foster women's self confidence to speak out in larger gathering and to assume leadership. These findings led to us to believe that there may have been an increase in female status and autonomy. It is also likely that there has been

a gradual erosion of traditional subordination and seclusion of women. The increasing participation of women is perhaps a sign that the climate of opinion has changed. For example, the relatively high age at marriage as well as higher education of their daughters may be a reflection of change in perceived status of women involved in income generation projects.

Women acting on behalf of the family are seen as agents of change in virtually every aspect of population and development policy, be it adopting family planning, providing health care for children, or acquiring independent livelihood. However, women can not bring about the demographic change alone, given the existing family structures and gender relations. The extent of women's autonomy and men's family responsibility will likely dictate the pace at which economic and social change and population policy can affect demographic behaviour.

A number of lessons can be learned from the findings of the study. In the cultural setting of Bangladesh, socio-cultural factors are limiting the women's business opportunities. Most of the income earning opportunities for women are largely confined to individual enterprises within the informal sector. These activities do not always lead to increased mobility in the form of business expansion, because of constraints imposed on women by family institutions and prevailing gender ideologies. For example, women, limited physical mobility required them to depend on men to perform business transaction. Women turned over their income to the men. Therefore, before undertaking economic programmes for women, their particular circumstances, their skills, their priority needs and problems should be assessed.

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The Shaping of India's Nuclear Policy : Indira Gandhi Years

MOHAMMED B. ALAM

India's nuclear policy has been a subject of serious discussion by a number of scholars both inside and outside of the country. Ever since India became successful in exploding a nuclear device on the Rajasthan desert on May 18, 1974, critics and analysts have been speculating about the future course of India's nuclear programme. On her own, India has persistently maintained that the intent of the Pokhran explosion was peaceful. Some believe it as professed, but most do not. To most of those observers, India's capability in the nuclear field so far, is bound to take her to a position where the country can produce nuclear weapons and thus become the sixth nuclear weapons nation in the world.

Traditional Indian views on this matter can be classified into two types. The first set of opinions centre on the concept of nuclear deterrence and the likely advantage of India going nuclear. The second group believes in the strengthening India's conventional forces along with its other industrial and technological advancement. There is also a third group that believes in Gandhian principles of pacifism extended to the issue of nuclear disarmament. Out of this two important lobbies have formed, one pleading its case for nuclear weapons acquisition and the other arguing against it.

Those who argue that India must not acquire nuclear weapons base their opinions on four factors. These are :

1. The massive cost of a nuclear weapons programme would impede the socio-economic developments of a developing nation.

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2. By going nuclear, the policy makers would be violating the legacy of Gandhian principles.
3. The major wars and crises in the 50's and 60's such as the Korean War, the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, occurred without the use of any nuclear weapons. There is no reason to think that a future Sino-Indian conflict will take the shape of a nuclear war.
4. There is no immediate threat from any of the Super Powers to India's national security. If anything, the presence of Soviet and American naval fleets in the Indian Ocean have acted as a deterrent against another nuclear weapons power, China.

The pro-nuclear weapons analysts base their arguments on three aspects : Prestige and influence, security and economic gains. Firstly, there is a belief that the acquisition of nuclear weapons enhances a nation's prestige and status. It is widely that the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964 enhanced that country's status to a very high level. The urge to become a nuclear power and be heard and respected by everybody in the various world organizations led France and Charles de Gaulle to go nuclear. Secondly, the pro-nuclear group believes that by acquiring nuclear weapons, India will have a stable deterrent relationship with China. Moreover the nuclear weapons for India will act as a good bargaining chip in exercising her options and strategic goals. Thirdly, India can have a lot of economic gains by choosing to exercise nuclear option. Nuclear energy is regarded as a relatively cheap source of power and it is likely to reduce India's dependence upon external sources of energy. At the same time it will give India a greater leverage *vis-a-vis* industrial countries of the West.

None of these schools of thought pay much attention to the domestic motivation behind the nuclear policy. A country facing grave economic, social and political problems may feel tempted to make a technological breakthrough by going nuclear. The impact of such a decision by a government ruling at the centre will have some far-reaching consequences in a federal set up. There is a greater possibility for the ruling party in New Delhi to enhance its political base by gaining instant popularity. The domestic consideration can operate in another way, too. The country's civil and military bureaucracy can build up sufficient momentum so as to exert influence upon the government to go nuclear. In that case, the government in power may be inclined to go along with that momentum. In addition to that, India, being a country of tremendous scientific manpower, might like to exert its influence through its scientific

community for enhancing scope of atomic energy research and development. Eventually, the scientific school of thought might succeed in persuading the government to opt for a nuclear weapon technology. The initial objectives of the late Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, India's foremost leading scientist on nuclear technology, was in fact to generate bureaucratic support for the nuclear programme and to get his schemes and appropriations approved by the Indian parliament and the Nehru cabinet.

My research attempts to analyse the nuclear policy of India by looking into the role played by the Indira Gandhi Administration at the centre from 1966-77 and 1980-84 in shaping the country's nuclear objective. The study may also help to unravel the complex nature of India's nuclear decision-making structure and to speculate on the future directions of India's security in the 1990's and beyond. This aspect is particularly significant as Indian policy-makers view with utmost suspicion Pakistan's nuclear programme and the China-Pakistan collaboration on this field.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi Period : 1966-77

Mrs. Gandhi had a tough time in the first few years of her administration. For a while, she continued the search for an effective nuclear guarantee from the super powers. This endeavour however was not well reciprocated by the two super powers. Later, Mrs. Gandhi was even skeptical of the credibility of a nuclear guarantee by the super powers. On June 17, 1967, Mrs. Gandhi informed the Lok Sabha : "In the final analysis the effectiveness of a nuclear guarantee will depend upon the vital interests of the givers and not upon the spirit in which the protected accept it."¹ Mrs. Gandhi, by 1967, was very much aware of China's nuclear weapons progress and missile development. On the domestic front, she was facing an acid test. From 1966-69 she was to play a second fiddle before a powerful caucus within the Congress Party. This group had preferred Morarji R. Desai to succeed Lal Bahadur Shastri. But ultimately, with the persuasion of K. Kamaraj, the then Congress President, Mrs. Gandhi was named as the consensus candidate. Morarji Desai was given the post of Deputy Prime Minister and other important Congress leaders of Desai's group such as T.T. Krishnamachari, Atulya Ghosh, S.K. Patil, N. Sanjeeva Reddy were given important positions either in the government or in the party hierarchy. Mrs. Gandhi's stock went down further with the serious reverses to the Congress Party fortune in 1967 General Election of the Parliament and State Assemblies. The Congress Party lost its majority in more than half of the states for which elections were held. The opposition parties, for the first time in the independent India, assumed leadership in many states.

Mrs. Gandhi had even a herculean task in getting Congress nominee, Zakir Hussain elected to the office of President of the Indian Republic. In 1969, the official Congress Party suffered a split. Mrs. Gandhi headed one splinter part of the Congress organization. From 1969 to 1971, Mrs. Gandhi's party at the centre was reduced to a minority status and was able to run the government only with the help of some friendly opposition parties such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the Communist Part of India (Moscow), the Muslim League and other independent members.

All these domestic developments had influenced Mrs. Gandhi's overall policy objective. New development took place in the world. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed on July 1, 1968. The main features of the Treaty are :²

- (a) The nuclear powers shall discourage the non-nuclear weapon nations to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. They will also not supply or transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives to the non-nuclear weapon nations.
- (b) The non-nuclear weapon nations shall neither manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons nor accept any transfer of such weapons.
- (c) In order to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to non-peaceful purposes, the contracting states will accept the safeguards set out by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

When the draft was ready for signature, India turned it down on four grounds :

1. This Treaty prevents the non-nuclear weapon country to have peaceful nuclear explosion.
2. This Treaty causes discrimination in the application of international safeguards by creating two different sets of standards, one for the nuclear weapon states and the other one for the non-nuclear weapon states.
3. This Treaty creates imbalance of obligations between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.
4. There is an inadequate nature of the security assurances in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in this Treaty.

Mrs. Gandhi's decision to stay away from the NPT was supported by most of the opposition parties. The only National Political Party to advocate joining the NPT was the Swatantra, with its urban influence, private sector business interests, and former princely families.³ India's decision in not signing the NPT was motivated by her interest in the development of the peaceful application of the nuclear energy. Mrs. Gandhi was simply following the traditional patterns of India's nuclear policy as had been outlined before by two of her predecessors, Nehru and Shastri. In a statement to the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) on March 5, 1970, the Prime Minister held the view :

The Indian government believes that the present policy of developing our scientific and technological capability and expanding our programme for the peaceful uses of atomic energy and space research is in the best overall interests of the nation. In this matter as in others, the government keeps the policy under constant review taking into account the needs of our national defense and security.⁴

In keeping with the sentiment expressed in the above statement, Mrs. Gandhi initiated a series of steps designed to bolster India's nuclear energy programme. The launching of the Sarabhai ten-year plan for the advancement of atomic energy and space research and the testing of an underground nuclear explosive device in Pokhran, Rajasthan in 1974 were definite efforts in that direction. The Sarabhai plan might have been motivated by the vociferous demands of the pro-bomb lobby and a sizeable section of the public opinion. The public opinion surveys of nuclear policy attitudes in India's major metropolitan cities reflected this change sentiment. On October 1968 random sample suggested that 79 per cent of the population in these cities (Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras) favoured an independent nuclear capability. A survey in December 1971 during the Bangladesh conflict showed a lower, but still high, average level of 63 per cent support for nuclear capability.⁵

By the late 1960's the pacifists holding the Gandhian views had lost grounds. The mainstream opinion in the country was in favour of India choosing the nuclear option. The call for a nuclear weapon programme received tremendous support from the intellectual and academic circles. Nonetheless, the official positions of the Indian government was to downplay the enthusiasm of nuclear weapon options by emphasizing the heavy costs of a nuclear weapon programme.

In the early 70's, certain development took place in and around India :

- (a) India entered into a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971. Under the Treaty the two parties undertook to refrain from any kind of assistance to any third party engaged in armed conflict with the other party. It also provided that in case one of the contracting parties was attacked or there existed a serious threat to territorial integrity, they would consult each other with a view to taking effective steps to ensure the security of their countries.⁶ The Treaty assured India of the Soviet support for her South Asian policy. Such a support proved decisive in giving a big psychological help to India in the India-Pakistan War of 1971.
- (b) There was also a flowering relationship between Washington and Peking. The United States helped the People's Republic of China to membership as well as a permanent seat in the United Nations. The specter of a perceived alliance relationship between China and the United States was viewed with utmost suspicion by the Indian policy makers.
- (c) After the December 1971 war between India and Pakistan, India arrogated to itself as if it had achieved a dominant position in the sub-continent matters. The secession of East Pakistan, the emergence of the independent state of Bangladesh and unilateral cease fire in the Western sector, caused a severe blow to Pakistan's prestige both at home and abroad. The war however had some disquieting moments for India. The Nixon-Kissinger 'Tilt' policy towards Pakistan and the dispatch of the U.S. Nuclear task force Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal made India think afresh about her nuclear programme.

It is quite possible that Mrs. Indira Gandhi was influenced by one or all of the above events before taking the final decision on the Rajasthan explosion. At the domestic level, Mrs. Gandhi by 1972 was at the peak of popularity. The landslide victory for her Congress Party in 1971 Parliamentary Election and 1972 State Assembly Election strengthened her domestic base considerably.

Indian nuclear scientists were known to have been pressing for an underground explosion as far back as January 1965.⁷ The intention of the 1974 explosion, must also have been to demonstrate to the world that India could in fact make the bomb if it were so decided at the highest level. It is also possible that, the final green light to go ahead for the explosion was the result of a purely *ad hoc* decision. Mrs. Ghandi was in power for three more years after the Rajasthan blast and yet, no further tests were undertaken. The explanation

for no further tests might be that thereafter, Mrs. Gandhi was too much involved with political difficulty such as anti-price rise agitation, demand for dissolution of the Gujrat Assembly, student unrest in Bihar, which ultimately forced her to impose internal emergency in the country. It is also possible that Mrs. Gandhi could foresee the adverse reaction of Canada and the United States, the two main supplier countries for India's reactors, should India decide to go for further Pokhran-type explosions.

Janata Interlude : 1977-80

The Janata Party came to power in March 1977 and chose Morarji Desai as its leader. It was the first non-Congress government at the Centre since India became an independent nation in 1947. Desai was known to be a staunch follower of the late Mohandas K. Gandhi and his policies on pacifism and non-violence. Desai also held important portfolios in the Cabinets of Pandit Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi. One of the first things Janata government had to take up after its installation in power was to review Mrs. Gandhi's nuclear policy.

Desai referred to it in the policy statement to the Parliament and the press. Broadly, it was a reiteration of the policy of peaceful application of atomic energy. But it had certain basic features :⁸

- (a) India will not acquire nuclear weapons.
- (b) India will not undertake any more nuclear explosions. While maintaining India's option to conduct experimental explosion, he again qualified it : "If necessary, we can always do it in consultation with other people." (He did not identify the 'other people.' But subsequently in his statement in the Lok Sabha he was categorical).
- (c) The assessment of Mrs. Gandhi's government in regard to PNE's was 'wrong.'
- (d) He denied that he had agreed to any inspection of India's atomic power plants. His condition was that "until they allow us to inspect their plants, we will not allow ours to be inspected by them."
- (e) India will not sign the NPT, "whatever may be the consequences." He also insisted on reducing nuclear weapons, destroying existing stockpiles and concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Prime Minister Desai, while stating the government's views on this matter, was aware of India's nuclear policy as it had evolved from the period of Jawaharlal Nehru. Desai had to take into consideration :

1. India's significant progress in the field of nuclear science and technology.
2. India's stand for not signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
3. The Rajasthan explosion of 1974 and its domestic and international impact.
4. The pressure exerted by the pro-bomb lobby.

Desai had been trying to evolve Janata's nuclear policy on a credible line without sacrificing any of those basic elements of India's nuclear policy.

Desai's nuclear policy stood on five negatives.⁹ India, he had affirmed with all the emphasis at his command, would not manufacture nuclear weapons. It would not carry out any more nuclear explosions unless absolutely necessary for its peaceful nuclear programme even then, it would not be an explosion conducted in secrecy. India would not sign the NPT until the nuclear powers have taken definite steps towards nuclear arms control. India would not throw open its nuclear facilities to international inspection except on a reciprocal basis and finally, India would not submit to international pressure to accept a nuclear policy that would hurt its national pride and its indigenous nuclear energy development programme. From the fifth negative followed Desai's assertion in the Lok Sabha on March 28, 1978, that in order to avoid the closing down of the Tarapur Plants (TAPS), the government would turn to other sources of supply of enriched uranium if the United States broke its contractual obligations before the period of expiry in 1993.

The Prime Minister asserted his opposition to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Despite these assertions not to manufacture atomic weapons and to halt the testing of further underground nuclear devices, Desai did not foreclose completely the option of peaceful application of nuclear energy. On October 21, 1977, Desai stated in his Kremlin speech :

Atomic energy, like many a scientific inventions has its constructive and destructive potential. It is up to us to ensure that through it we seek the victories of peace and not the disastrous triumphs of war. It is my conviction and that of the people of India that the world must totally eschew the use of the atom for military purposes. This can only come if we can bring about total disarmament of existing nuclear weaponry. It is with this faith that I publicly declared that India shall not use nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes.¹⁰

Within one year of the Janata administration, Desai had to face serious political opposition to his leadership. Two ambitious cabinet members of his team, namely, Chaudhury Charan Singh and Babu Jagjivan Ram were aspiring to become Prime Minister through intra-party manoeuvring. The Jan Sangh and Socialist factions within the Janata Party were critical of the apparent flexibility shown in Desai's stand on the nuclear issue. The Swatantra faction was supporting Desai's stand only reluctantly. With the resignation of Charan Singh and Raj Narain in December 1978, credibility of Janata government to handle major policy decisions was seriously affected.

Desai was also having problems with the United States administration regarding the supply of enriched uranium for India's Tarapur Plant. In 1978 the U.S. Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which forbade the supply of vital nuclear materials to any country that had not signed the NPT or had refused to accept full-scope safeguards.¹¹ The U.S. legislation imposed conditions that India could not possibly accept without abandoning its entire nuclear option forever. The legislation was made effective retroactively and therefore covered the supply of enriched uranium to Tarapur Atomic Power Station which has been built with U.S. assistance in 1963. President Carter during his state visit to New Delhi on January 1978 was willing to use his special powers to make a waiver in India's favour.¹² This was due to his recognition of the importance of India in South Asia and the ill effects on Indo-US relations of stopping the supply of enriched uranium and partly also his trust in the statements made by Morarji Desai that India would not hold any further nuclear tests. However, Desai was not in a strong position domestically in order to give such a commitment. With intra-party squabbles at its peak and Jansangh Party's insistence, Desai backed out of his earlier promise of not holding any further underground tests.

Desai's government fell in mid-1979. Under the interim Charan Singh government, Desai's apparent flexibility was abandoned in favour of a hard-line policy. India also started believing that Pakistan was busy in building a uranium enrichment plant and reprocessing plant and all this make belief argument helped them to view that Islamabad might be making substantial progress towards acquiring a nuclear explosive capability.¹³ Charan Singh declared in his independence day speech on 15 August 1979 that if Pakistan went nuclear India would review its nuclear policy.¹⁴ His stand was also supported by C. Subramaniam, the Interim Defence Minister, who hinted that India might face a decision to go nuclear before long, and identified Pakistan as the most likely stimulus.¹⁵ The Charan Singh administration thus introduced

a qualitative change in the nuclear policy by linking the Pakistani factor into the future orientations of India's nuclear programme.

Indira Gandhi Comes Back : 1980-1984

Mrs. Indira Gandhi returned to power in the aftermath of a massive mandate given to her Congress Party by the Indian electorate in the January 1980 election. Mrs. Gandhi was faced with two events : (i) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. (ii) The widespread reports about Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. Mrs. Gandhi tried to continue India's nuclear policy which she herself initiated after the 1974 Pokhran explosion. She stated on several occasions that India would not give up its interest in explosion technology. In reply to a question at a press conference held in Trivandrum on 17 February 1980, she said that India did not believe in making nuclear bombs, but added that India "should be free to carry out experiments."¹⁶ Later, answering a question in Rajya Sabha, she reiterated this position and said that there could be nuclear explosions "in the national interest" as India "should not be caught napping."¹⁷

The Indian policy makers were particularly concerned about Pakistan's nuclear activities. India was also critical of Pakistan's efforts to forge a security relationship with the United States and the high build up in the Indian Ocean by the super powers. The Ghandi government found it increasingly difficult to accept Pakistan's offer of a non-aggression pact to India in September 1981 in the light of the agreements reached between Pakistan and the United States on a six-year, 3.2 billion dollar aid package which also included the purchase of forty advanced F-16 aircrafts. Mrs. Gandhi was deeply suspicious of Pakistan's nuclear programme and especially its efforts to have a nuclear weapon capability.

Pakistan's desire to have a bomb could be traced back to an important statement made by the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In his death cell treatment, Z. A. Bhutto, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan said :

We know that Israel and South Africa have nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have the capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.¹⁸

It is possible to argue that Bhutto's quest for Pakistani nuclearization was motivated by his strong desire to make Pakistan the centre of resurgent Pan-Islamism. It is also very likely that Bhutto knew quite well that by invoking 'Islam' he could hope to get huge financial support for its economic and

military programme. This policy of India was intended to isolate Pakistan and force U.S.A. and Europe to stop aid to Pakistan.

On a broader context, the incentives for Pakistan to 'go nuclear' were based on the following points :¹⁹ to deter a militarily superior and expansionist rival and increase risks of uncertainties for a potential aggressor; to offset an enemy's conventional military superiority; to acquire superiority over India so as to increase Pakistani bargaining power and reopen the Kashmir question; to strengthen the Pakistani bargaining position also on wider issues; and to reduce military independence on other powers. This was what India was propagating. It refused to listen to Pakistan's stand that all her efforts in the nuclear fields were intended for peaceful purpose and energy needs.

The claim of Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, a leading Pakistani nuclear scientist and head of the Pakistani Uranium Project, increased the suspicion in Indian official circles about the nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme. But his views were distorted to justify what India was attempting in the field of nuclear advancement.²⁰ To this one could add the claims made by U.S. Senator Alan Cranston in June 1984 about the military orientation of Pakistan's nuclear activities, in which he stressed the Chinese assistance to Pakistan with weapon design.²¹ Pakistan, however, denied all these reading of the situation.

In a statement made in the Lok Sabha, Mrs. Gandhi said, "My government is aware of Pakistan's efforts to acquire uranium enrichment capability to assemble a nuclear weapon. This does not, however, mean that Pakistan is ahead of India in atomic energy development. Indian scientists are keeping abreast of 'all aspects' of research and development connected with enrichment technology."²² The use of the term 'all aspects' seemed to be quite ambiguous. It is quite possible that Mrs. Gandhi had already instructed the scientists and other people involved in the nuclear programme to keep 'all aspects' including that of nuclear weapon technology open.

Mrs. Gandhi wanted to pursue India's nuclear policy with greater vigour by playing the Pakistani card while blaming Pakistan, India carried on its nuclear programme. She wanted to show to the outside world India's need for increased alertness in view of Pakistan's preparations for making the bomb. By doing so, she expected to gain greater leverage over Washington by trying to put pressure on the United States into not selling sophisticated weapons and other armaments to Pakistan. In plain words, India wanted Pakistan to be militarily as weak as possible.

India under Mrs. Gandhi had four options.²³ First, it could continue to drift and thus acquiesce in Pakistan's nuclear programme in the hope that it would not succeed or that Islamabad would not abuse its newly acquired power or that it would not be allowed to do so by the international community. Secondly, India could make a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan's nuclear installations. Thirdly, it could strengthen security ties with the Soviet Union and rely on it to protect it against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan. If possible, the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the two countries could be amended and thus invoked in this particular circumstance. Finally, India could launch its own nuclear weapon programme. The real Indian intentions were clear. They would not tolerate any interference in their nuclear programme. Pakistan was used as a scape-goat.

There were also reports leaked out by the Central Intelligence Agency of India's secret plan for destroying Kahuta enrichment plant. The India government officials had, however denied it vehemently. The third option would have detracted from India's claim to be genuinely non-aligned. Moreover, Soviet Union being a super power, had a number of commitments some of which would have priority over India's security. The fourth option was vigorously supported by the pro-bomb lobby in India. According to K. Subrahmanyam, one of the main proponents of this lobby and the Director of India's Strategic and Defence Studies :

In the current global strategic environment in which, against our opposition, nuclear weapons have been made an international currency of power and surrounded by three nuclear weapon powers of the world, it is absurd for a country of India's size, population and resources to talk of non-alignment and keeping her options open by renouncing nuclear weapons.²⁴

Mrs. Gandhi seemed to have elected the first option with some modifications. By doing so, she reiterated India's nuclear policy which had been evolved over the years. She was also hopeful that the United States administration would use its influence in restraining Pakistan from its nuclear weapon activities. It is also possible to argue that, by 1984, Mrs. Gandhi had a lot of problems on the domestic front. The Punjab problem and 'Operation Blue Star' (storming of Indian troops of the Amritsar Golden Temple), the foreign national issue in Assam, increase in insurgent activities in Mizoram and Nagaland, emergence of strong regional parties in Andhra Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram were the burning issues which she had to tackle.

On balance, Mrs. Gandhi preferred to have a 'wait and see' attitude. In view of the urgent domestic issues before her, this seemed to be a prudent step. The analysis indicates that India was working on plan of acquiring a capacity of nuclear power long before Pakistan entered this field. Pakistan's peaceful programme was exploited to provide cover to India's advancement after the May 1974 explosion. Whether India would listen to the U.S.A in days to come is yet to be seen. The past, if provides any guide, India would pay heed only if given stern warning by U.S.A. Only then India could be contained in this field.

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Foreign Affairs Coverage : The Case of US Media

MUGHEES-UD-DIN

RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

Democracy is participatory system of government. People participate in a democracy through electing representatives of their own inclinations. After elections, the people do not have access which is necessary to watch their elected functionaries how they serve the public interests. This is where the media comes in. The media tries to guarantee that these representatives of the public's interests do in fact serve the people. It has been generally believed that in a democratic society the press acts as a watch dog on the government. For the press to be able to keep an eye on the government, therefore, it must be free of the governmental control. Most participatory democracies confer this freedom on the press as a constitutional guarantee. Hence the normative relationship between government and press in a democracy is mainly an adversarial one. However, 'actual' government-press relations differ widely from the norm. Because it is consistent with the libertarian notion of rational man made perfectible through his own reason, the adversarial press role is treated in the United States (a democracy) as the ideal model, especially by press practitioners.

The notion of 'adversarial' has been defined by Dennis's (1991) in *Media Debates* :

Granted, adversarial may be an overly dramatic term to describe the ideal relationship between press and government, but the concept has come to have legitimate meaning and, in fact, as it is commonly understood, it is

quite desirable. Adversarial simply means that the media should be critical, argumentative, and contentious in their relationships with government. He further argues that the libertarian idea (not to be confused with the Libertarian Party) allows multiple voices in the marketplace and keeps the press as free as possible from government involvement.¹

This study explores the relationship between the US media and its foreign policy within the framework of Libertarian Theory of the Press. This concept stresses that the media plays the role of a watch dog and portrays an objective picture of events. It is assumed that the press of the US is free from the governmental control. According to Siebert et al. in a libertarian society like United States, media-governmental relationship is adversarial.² In discussing the relationship between the media and foreign policy, the impact of government on media output as well as the impact of media on foreign policy would be examined. Hachten (1981) argues that the "Western news media, although relatively independent of their own governments, will tend to report foreign news from the view point of their country's foreign policy concerns."³ But some others are of the opinion that the press is dependent on governmental sources to provide focus for and information about world events.⁴

Although there is a scholarly disagreement about the definite nature of the power of the press over either the public opinion of the foreign policy,⁵ the belief in media influence remains intact. The press plays a critical role in the formation of elite opinion, and it is for this reason that media coverage of foreign affairs remains a topic of a heated debate.

Most of the literature reflects the relationship between the media and internal policies of a state. A few studies have been conducted in this direction. The effort would be directed to find out how the US media (*New York Times* in particular) portrays the image of other countries from the perspectives of its country's national interests and policy.

According to Cohen, reporters need a storyline as the foreign policy events are complex and seemingly incomprehensible.⁶ As a result, in analyzing foreign policies in their formulation and execution stages, journalists rely heavily on the foreign policy consensus and assumptions emanating from Washington. Reporters talk to the same officials and then talk to each other. Thereafter, a storyline emerges. Reporters presented the idea that Castro was vulnerable, that US troops could stabilize South Viet Nam, that COSVN existed in Cambodia, that pressure would move Khoemini, and that the Marines in Lebanon were peacekeepers.⁷

Stuart James Bullion in his research describes that the more authoritarian the society, the more compatible or complementary are the press and the diplomacy, and the more the press serves as a policy instrument. Foreign policy officials in both authoritarian and liberal societies have a professional tendency to close or control even public diplomatic communication. In liberal societies, 'the press fourth estate' ideology encourages disclosure and fosters constant tensions between the press and the foreign policy establishment.⁸

Each press system is influenced by the economic, political, and military interests (in other words, foreign policy interests) of the system country.⁹ The researcher pointed out that no South Asian country appeared on the front page of any US newspaper in the sample. Only one story from Hong Kong (a statement by a UK official on Vietnam refugees) was published and no South Asian or Southeast Asian country appeared on the front page of the US papers except Iran and Japan. Countries or units that occupied the top twelve ranks in the US press system were the United States, Poland, France, Iran, USSR, Canada, China, Israel, Great Britain, Nicaragua, Japan and Italy in that order.

US MEDIA AND THE THIRD WORLD

A substantial number of studies have been done on Third World countries in the Western media — especially in the *New York Times*. I selected a few for the purpose of my study.

In the case of El Salvador, the guerillas were castigated as Marxist terrorists, and the official line, as laid forth in the *New York Times* editorials, was that things were improving under the democratic government of "the honorable Mr. Duarte, "the honest, reform-minded Christian democrat," who is desperately trying to lead his people to a better life while "best by implacable extremes", though he may have been "less than rigorous in bringing death squad operatives to judicial account" (in translation: he has done nothing to curb the security forces he praises for their "valiant service alongside the people against subversion," while conceding quietly that "the masses were with the guerrillas" when he assumed the role of front man for the war against the population). News reporting was similar in style Duarte was portrayed in the major media as a victim, not as the willing agent whose role was to ensure adequate congressional funding for the state terrorists whom he protected. In analyzing over 800 articles in the major dailies from March 1984 through October 1985, journalist Marc Cooper found a consistent pattern of suppressing massive atrocities and "singing the praise of Administration policy." The *New York Times* editorialized that the United States had "on the

known record . . . only the most peripheral responsibility in the downfall of Dr. Allende. To pretend otherwise is simply to obscure the basic reasons for the Chilean tragedy.¹⁰

The *New York Times* repeated the State Department line that the 'moderate' Salvadorean government was implementing "the most sweeping land reform — and fastest-ever carried out in Latin America" — so fast as to soon become indiscernible.¹¹

Millions of Americas who have an unfavourable view of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua came to hold that opinion through exposure to press reports rather than from direct contact with the Nicaraguan revolution. Here is an original implant; people are prepared to hate and fear a foreign government on the basis of what they read in the newspapers or see on television and hear on the radio. But this negative view is persuasive to them also because it is congruous with a long-standing and largely uncriticized anti-communist, cold-war propaganda that has shaped the climate of opinion for decades.¹² Thus the press can effectively direct perceptions when people have no information to the contrary and when the message seems congruent with earlier notions about these events (which themselves may be in part media created). In this way the original implant is also a reinforcement of earlier perceptions.

In 1961 Cuban right wing militants, trained and financed by the CIA, invaded Cuba. In the words of one of their leaders, their objective was to overthrow Castro and set up 'a provisional government' that "will restore all properties to the rightful owners."¹³ Reports of the impending invasion circulated widely through Central America. In the United States, however, where there reputedly existed the freest press in the world, few people were informed.¹⁴ The mounting evidence of an impending invasion was suppressed by the Associated Press and United Press International and by all the major newspapers and news weeklies, seventy-five of which — in an impressively unanimous act of self-censorship — rejected a story offered by the editors of the *Nation* in 1960 detailing US preparations for the invasion.¹⁵ Fidel Castro's accusations that the United States was planning to invade Cuba were dismissed by the *New York Times* as 'anti-American propaganda,' and by *Time Magazine* as Castro's "continued towards little melodrama of invasion."¹⁶ When Washington broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961, the *New York Times* explained, "What snapped US patience was a new propaganda offensive from Havana charging that the US was plotting an 'imminent invasion' of Cuba."

In addition, ten years after the military coup in Chile, CBS news stated that the Chilean army now felt "change would not bring democracy but a return to Marxism. CBS never explained why this was a bad thing. Similarly when the Sandinistas embarked upon a programme of socialist reconstruction, the American press saw the emergence of a 'Marxist' regime — again with no explanation as to why this was so terrible.¹⁷ Nor need the press offer any explanation. After almost a century of propaganda, designations like 'Marxist', 'Communist', 'leftist,' or 'leftist guerillas' create their own automatic negative framing. Thus, in regard to the invasion of Grenada in 1983, a *New York Times* editorial decided that the fear was 'real' that Grenada could "infect the Carribean region with militant leftism."¹⁸ But the *Times* offered not a word about the actual programmatic content of Grenadian 'militant leftism'. Such instances do not publicize the main stream capitalist ideology as such, they just assume it.

The study by Haji Ismail Bokhary (1989) reveals that the US press, especially the *New York Times* gave respectable coverage (35 %) to Asian affairs. He also points out that the US press gave substantial coverage to those Asian countries where the American political, economic and military interests were occurring, e.g., China, Korea, Philippines, Japan and Pakistan.

The studies of Weaver and Wilhoit (1981), Agbese and Ogbondah (1988) and Bokhary (1989) — conclude that US press gives substantial and favourable coverage to the countries where its political, economic and military interests lie.¹⁹

US MEDIA AND ISLAMIC/ARAB WORLD

The study of Dorman and Farhang raises a series of questions asking why the press conformed to official Washington in its reporting on Iran. Their answer identifies a shared ideology as the principal culprit. In essence, the press bought Washington's foreign policy because it was too uniformed about Iran to envision alternatives. The demands of professional objectivity also ensured a deference to authority because 'unbiased' news comes from what news makers say and do.²⁰

Pirouz, Shoar-Ghaffari²¹ analyses the performance of the *New York Times* and the *Times of London* in covering Iran from 1968-78. Using content analysis, the selection, emphasis, treatment and sources of coverage were comparatively examined against a background of the United States and Great Britain's policies and interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf. The findings of Shoar-Ghaffari's study showed that Iran's international coverage focussed on

topics and issues related to the interests of the newspaper's base countries. Both the *Times of London* and the *New York Times* relied heavily on official sources of information in their coverage.

Daugherty and Warden²² compared the editorials of the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Christian Science Monitor* and *Wall Street Journal* with respect to their treatment of Israel and the Arab states from 1967 to 1977, to determine extent and nature of any biases in the construction of images. With respect to conflict, the *Monitor* was most neutral and attentive to opportunities to resolve conflict. The *Post* and *New York Times* were the most frequently critical to the Arabs.

Victoria B. Hammond²³ describes that in case of US arms supply to Saudi Arabia (an ally of the US), the *New York Times* highlighted the Israeli fears that arms sold to Saudi Arabia could be used against Israel. Hammond (1987) argues that the arms coverage is also misleading when Saudi arms purchases (paid for at high prices as a means of 'recycling petro-dollars') are termed 'aid' while Israeli arms (subsidized by US tax dollars) are termed 'purchases'.²⁴ Arms sales were such a continuously contentious topic, (due to strong opposition from the Israeli lobby) that Saudi Arabia eventually turned to other countries for many of its arms purchases.²⁵

Rachty's study²⁶ concluded that the *New York Times* was most pro-Israel and *Los Angeles Times* most pro-Arab. In only two of eleven years did coverage of the Arabs exceed the favourability shown to Israel. Both events were attributable to Sadat — once when he succeeded Nasser as President and in 1977, they year of the peace initiative. Several other studies show that both magnitude and direction (favourableness/unfavourableness) of the US foreign press coverage of a country has often coincided with US foreign policy toward that country²⁷ (France, 1967; Mills, 1969; Houghton, 1965; Liu, 1969; Kam, 1979; Dewey, 1967 and Kriesberg, 1946).

On the other hand, there are examples which indicate that the media never knowingly followed government directives without careful consideration, and in several cases Administration requests for secrecy were turned down. For instance, the President and many of his advisers were infuriated when NBC negotiated a deal with the militants whereby an interview with the hostage William Gallegos was aired on the condition that the Iranian students could present their claims. Four years later, Brzezinski still refers to the NBC interview as "an instance of an American network collaborating with unfriendly interests with kidnapers." Harsh criticism by the government, and the implied demand for future restraints, were met with no sympathy in the

press.²⁸ On December 13, 1979, the *Washington Post* editorialized that "the press should not be expected to conduct some kind of propaganda control on its coverage."²⁹ Similarly, in March 1980, the *New York Times* reported that high ranking White House officials personally requested CBS executives to delete a portion of the '60 Minutes' news programme which dealt with American relations with the Shah and with the activities of SAVAK (the Shah of Iran's secret police). This attempt to suppress the news was flatly rejected by the television network.³⁰ The study of Ramaprasad indicates that in a free press system, the press is not supposed to be an actor in inter-governmental interactions, only an objective observer of these interactions.³¹ He quotes Sanderson³² that there is in fact very little likelihood of coming across any direct statement of support for any advocacy relationship between the press and the government in a democratic country like the US; for a journalist to be obligated both to the government and the public at the same time would be against its libertarian philosophy of the press as democracy. She further cites Manning's (1968) opinion that "the conflict as it affects foreign affairs is far less clear cut, far more elusive."³³

In her trend study, Ramaprasad describes :

"In the case of coverage of India in the 1970's, the *New York Times* adopted a stand independent of government policy. The results of this study level support to the arguments that an advocacy press-government relationship in foreign policy/affairs coverage is not common today. Even more important, they caution is not common today. Even more important, they caution against making any generalization about the nature of media-government relations in foreign policy/affairs coverage."³⁴

Ramaprasad's study contradicts the arguments of Hatchen (1981) that "the Western news media, although relatively independent of their governments, will tend to report foreign news from the viewpoint of their country's foreign policy's concerns." Her study (1984) confirms Becker's study that the *New York Times* does not necessarily follow the governmental policy.

Lee B. Becker (1977) examined how the news organization was influenced by change in governmental policy. He studied the relationship of press coverage to a shift in the US government policy away from India and towards Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Although the governmental policy was favourable to Pakistan in the war between India and Pakistan (1971), the researcher's findings suggest that the US government was unsuccessful in the attempts it made to get the *New York Times* to change its

viewpoint as the nation's policy shifted. Instead the *New York Times* actually shifted its news perspective in a direction opposite that of the leaders in Washington. Becker found that the *New York Times* actually shifted its news perspective away from the official one, while the *Times of London's* coverage remained relatively constant. Becker regarded the change in the US foreign policy towards India at the beginning of the war as the 'manipulation' of the press.

The study of Kuan-Hsing Chen (1983) reveals that both the public and the press advocated official US governmental policy toward the Peoples Republic of China throughout the years 1972 to 1978. However, on the issue of the Taiwan question, public opinion, opinion of the press and official position were all quite different.³⁵ In a broad sense, the opinion of the press and official policy were more similar than were public opinion and the official policy. Thus it seems that the press took a middle path between the official policy and public opinion. In his study of American Foreign Policy-Makers and Journalists, Cohen (1963) notes repeatedly that in a democracy, especially, there are tensions between the two (and little official enthusiasm for 'uncontrolled' public diplomacy).³⁶

GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL AND MANIPULATION OF MEDIA

The interactive relationship between press and government can also result in manipulation of the press by the government. Rosenblum (1979) writes that when "reporters are forced to rely on official American dispatches, they are no longer watch dogs."³⁷ Diplomats will depict events to push political line or hide their mistakes. Further, official information collected in Washington is usually 'relayed uncritically'. In fact, because of this routine dependence, Fishman (1980) believes that "Manipulated journalism presupposes routine journalism."³⁸ This phenomenon has also received attention from Bullion³⁹ in the context of diplomatic communication.

In general, libertarian society is supposed to be free from all kinds of control. The picture of governmental influence on the American media immediately becomes clear when one considers how and where reporters find the news. Government officials tried to control the US media as much as possible. The Administration's attempt to shape press coverage in connection with the April 1980 sent to Iran to free the Americans kept as hostages is particularly interesting because it provides an interesting effort to maintain absolute secrecy during the planning stages of a sensitive maneuver and, later, to minimize public perception that a blunder has been committed. Government attempts to minimize the diplomatic damage done by the mission's miscarriage

were somewhat less successful. *Newsday* reporter Susan Page comments that "The Carter Administration was not so adept at damage control, backing up off a story, getting away from it."⁴⁰ The Administration's strategy for down playing the failure of the rescue mission involved convincing the American public that military action, although apparently fruitless, actually had accomplished important general aims. Therefore it is hardly surprising that journalists refrained from printing a number of stories which might have injured the hostages. Virtually every correspondent based in Tehran knew that some embassy officials had escaped capture in the initial melee and were hiding in the city, but not a single journalist reported their existence. Ultimately, the six Americans escaped Iran by posing as Canadian businessmen.⁴¹

CIA-MEDIA RELATION

The longtime foreign editor of the *Christian Science Monitor* said that he had been "happy to cooperate" with the CIA in the 1950's providing the agency with letters and memorandums from correspondents that contained background information not included in their despatches, and occasionally assigning a story in which the CIA had expressed an interest. But (he) said he had never known that one of his reporters in the Far East was also serving as a CIA political adviser to the Asian head of state about whom he was writing.⁴² The agency had "paid agents in the foreign bureaus of the Associated Press and United Press International to slip agency-prepared dispatches onto the news wire." Other agents managed press clubs in foreign countries which served as message and mail drops, rest and relaxation centres for correspondents. According to one agent, "some (reporters) are lazy." The manager-agent would "slip them things and they 'd phone it in."⁴³ Carl Bernstein estimates that 400 journalists have had some kind of secret relationship with the organization. The figure excludes "even larger numbers. . . who occasionally traded favours with CIA officers."⁴⁴

At the same time, the CIA controlled or influenced the content of a number of English language publications regularly read by American foreign correspondents and by journalists in America. Stories and ideas from these publications often appeared in American newspapers and magazines, transmitted by reporters lacking fluency in the local language. The CIA also owned and financed some news agencies. "One, the Foreign News Service, produced articles written by a group of journalists who had been exiled from Eastern European Nations. In the early 1960's the articles were sold to as many 300 newspapers around the world, including the *New York Times*, the

Christian Science Monitor and the *New York Herald Tribune*.⁴⁵ *New York Times* publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger arranged for some ten CIA employees to be given *Times* cover between 1950 and 1966 under a general policy to help the agency whenever possible. The publisher had a close relationship with CIA Director Allen Dulles. "At that level of contact it was the mighty talking to the mighty," a high ranking CIA official said.⁴⁶ Indeed, Sulzberger promised Dulles that no *Times* staff member would be allowed to accept an invitation to visit the People's Republic of China without the Director's consent. He kept his promise.

CBS executives provided for CIA employees and supplied them with out takes of news films. They "established a formal channel of communication between the Washington bureau chief and the agency; gave the agency access to the CBS news film library; and allowed reports by CBS correspondents . . . to be routinely monitored by the CIA." Once a year during the 1950's and early 1960's, CBS correspondents joined the CIA hierarchy for private dinners and briefings. When the head of CBS news complained to CBS President Frank Stanton about having to call the CIA by pay telephone, he was instructed to install a private line bypassing the network's switchboard. He did so. And when, in 1966, the *New York Times* published a series of articles on the CIA, they were first submitted to former CIA Director John A. McCone, who deleted some elements of series.⁴⁷

While describing the relationship between the formulation of foreign policy and the coverage and evaluation of issues, Cohen (1963) concluded that the press often plays a major role in setting the agenda of public officials. Coverage could establish the comparative importance of issues in minds of policy-makers. Furthermore, anticipation of reporters' questions could prompt officials to spend extra time on certain topics.

DISCUSSION

This part of the paper consists of the analysis of the literature explored in this study as well as the probable reasons for subjective and biased approaches towards foreign affairs reporting. It will also discuss the relationship between US foreign policy and the press performance in the light of the principles described in the Libertarian Theory of the Press.

Most of the studies in this paper indicate that the US press supports US policy on foreign affairs. Why do the US press support the state policy on foreign affairs? Let us briefly discuss the probable factors responsible for this kind of advocacy.

The overwhelming majority of the news stories are based on official sources—on information provided by members of Congress, presidential aides, and other political insiders. A media critic, Leon V. Sigal (1973) discovered as much after analyzing 2,850 news stories that appeared in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* between 1949 and 1969. Nearly four out of five of these stories, he found, involved official sources.⁴⁸

Various studies indicate that the sources upon whom the press relies for foreign news consists mainly of Washington officials concerned with foreign policy who comment on and react to events abroad. The press is dependent on governmental sources to provide focus for and information about world events.⁴⁹

Covering the White House means dancing daily with the President's aides and spokesmen. "We are in small quarters with access to only a small number of official people, getting the same information. So we write similar stories and move on the same issues," says a White House correspondent interviewed in the book *The Washington's Reporters* by Brookings Institute Scholar Stephen Hess. A dozen great venues of power and policy—Defence Department, State Department, Justice Department, Central Intelligence, FBI, and so on—form the daily beats of small cliques of Washington's reporters "whose primary exercise is collecting handouts from those informational soup kitchens."⁵⁰

Sources are nearly everything; journalists are nearly nothing. "Reporters are puppets. They simply respond to the pull of the most powerful strings," Lyndon Johnson once said. So pervasive is the passivity of the press that when a reporter actually looks for news on his or her own it is given a special name, 'investigative journalism', to distinguish it from routine, passive 'source journalism.' It is investigative journalism that wins the professional honours, that makes what little history the American press ever makes, and that provides the misleading exception that proves the rule. The American press seldom investigates anything unless it is urged to by powerful sources.⁵¹

'Exclusive' stories are less a sign of enterprise than of passive service to the powerful. When Reagan's State Department wanted to turn its latest policy line into news, department officials would make it an 'exclusive' for Bernard Gwertzman of the *New York Times* former State Department spokesman John Hughes recently recalled in the pages of *TV Guide*. Hughes could then count on "television's follow-up during the day," since TV news reporters commonly used the *Times* reporter as their source, knowing that he was the trusted vessel of the highest officials. It is a bitter irony of source journalism that the most

esteemed journalists are actually the most servile. For it is in making themselves useful to the powerful that they gain access to the 'best' sources. So passive is the press that even seemingly bold 'adversarial' stories often have the sanction of the highest officials. In December 1982, *Time* questioned President Reagan's peculiar decision-making process in a cover story entitled "How Reagan Decides." This was the first such story given prominence in a major news outlet. Yet the story's source, it turned out, was none other than the President's own White House aides, who thought it would help them club Reagan awake. Without White House approval the story would never have run, as the *Time* editor involved, Steve Smith, told Mark Hertsgaard, author of *On Bended Knee*, a book looking at the press's relationship with Reagan.⁵²

The sources upon whom the press relies for foreign news consists mainly of Washington officials concerned with foreign policy who comment on and react to events abroad. The press is dependent on governmental sources to provide focus for and information about world events.⁵³

With the dwindling population of foreign correspondents because of rising costs, the dependence is more extreme in foreign news reporting.⁵⁴ This dependence can :

- (i) Spawn media-government elite ties resulting in an unwillingness on the former's part to offend their sources.
- (ii) Lead government to manipulate the press to its advantage.

1. American Officials Access to the Media

The foreign news formula gives high American governmental officials privileged access to the media. When they agree on a foreign occurrence, news stories will lopsidedly favour it. When public officials are in disagreement over a foreign policy issue, mass media coverage may present a wider range of information and alternatives for public consumption. Lower-level officials also manipulate foreign coverage. Bureaucrats may try to slip stories into the news in order to promote policies they or their agencies favour; to create a positive atmosphere—prestige—for their department; or to advance their personal careers.⁵⁵

2. Nationalism/National Security or National Interest

In the coverage of foreign affairs, the journalist may be torn between conflicting demands for loyalty, on the one hand, to secrecy for national security reasons and, on the other, to publicity for democratic reasons. Although national interest has frequently been evoked as one of the

determining factors in the selection of the international news, it has seldom been defined and operationalized for the purpose of news flow studies.⁵⁶ The concept of national interest is used in political analysis to describe, explain, or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. It is also used as an instrument of political action to justify denounce or propose policies.

Cooperation with the government in foreign affairs coverage can range the passive role of not divulging information to the (frequent) active role of working as CIA personnel.⁵⁷ Further it can be both intended and unintended, conscious and unconscious. The choice however is not always quite as serious as between national security and publicity. It is argued that foreign events, even in less serious circumstances, are viewed in the 'we-they', framework.⁵⁸ in what Ferguson calls (1963) a "dangerous sports page tendency." Reston (1972) decided on the side of national security when, despite the fact that he knew that the United States was flying high altitude planes (U-2) over the Soviet Union for espionage purposes, the *New York Times* did not publish the story until one of the planes was shot down in 1960.⁵⁹ Although national interest has frequently been evoked as one of the determining factors in the selection of the international news it has seldom been defined and operationalized for the purpose of news flow studies.⁶⁰

3. Subjectivity and Bias

Soon after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba and began indulging in anti-Yankee rhetoric, he was characterized as crazy by segments of the American press. A *New York Daily News* editorial was entitled, "The Guy Seems to be Nuts."⁶¹ The *Miami Herald* called him "as balmy as the trade winds."⁶² In early 1961, Castro started charging the United States with backing an invasion of Cuba. *Time* called the claim 'wild,'⁶³ the *Detroit News* "an utter absurdity."⁶⁴ Whereas CIA-trained, US-financed invaders landed at the Bay of Pigs in April of the same year.

Stuart James Bullion (1983) in his research describes that more authoritarian the society, the more compatible or complementary are press and diplomacy, and the more the press serves as a policy instrument, but I understand that Foreign Policy officials in both authoritarian and liberal societies have a professional tendency to close or control even public diplomatic communication. In liberal societies, "the press fourth estate" ideology encourage disclosure and fosters constant tensions between the press and the foreign policy establishment.⁶⁵

In addition, J.V. Vilanilam's (1983) research interestingly describes that each press system is influenced by the economic, political, and military interests (in other words, foreign policy interests) of the system country.⁶⁶ The researcher pointed out that no South Asian country appeared on the front page of any US newspaper in the sample. On the other hand very few Asian countries provided front page stories for the US press system. Only one story from Hong Kong (a statement by a UK official on Vietnam refugees) was published and no South Asian or Southeast Asian country appeared on the front page of the US papers except Iran and Japan. Countries or units that occupied the top twelve ranks in the US press system were the United States, Poland, France, Iran, USSR, Canada, China, Israel, Great Britain, Nicaragua, Japan and Italy in that order. Those that occupied similar ranks in the Indian press system were India, Great Britain, US, Sri Lanka (Colombo Conference), the Philippines (UNCTAD-V) China, Iran, USSR, Australia, France, Nepal and Japan in that order.

Theoretically, journalistic advocacy of the government belongs in totalitarian states. In the United States, a democracy with a free press tradition, journalistic norms delegate advocacy 'as a newspaper function' to the editorial. Does that exclude advocacy from straight news reports? Policy advocacy, according to Cohen, does take place in the news column of the press too.⁶⁷ Ferguson believes that nationalism is a factor in foreign affairs coverage. However, the likelihood of coming across any direct statement of support for an advocacy government-press relationship in a democratic country such as the United States is almost non-existent.

Hachten (1981) argues that the "Western news media, although relatively independent of their own governments, will tend to report foreign news from the view point of their country's foreign policy concerns."⁶⁸ Paletz and Entman say that while disputes may abound between the press and government, interaction changes.

In case of foreign affairs, elites tend to agree on goals, and to disagree intermittently only on tactics. These are the basic assumptions: America's diplomatic aims are honourable; American corporate profits and investments must be protected when threatened; revolutionary change is undesirable in most countries and must be discouraged. The reasons for this consensus are beyond our concern, but not the consequences for public opinion. On foreign policy, the mass media tend to speak in a monolithic voice, to report a narrow perspective, to limit rather than expand public knowledge of alternative possibilities. The consequences are that the mass media are conduits of elites'

visions of America's overseas interests in all but the most exceptional circumstances.⁶⁹ In fact, a couple of decades ago, in what Rubin (1977) calls "the post-1945 consensus era," an advocacy role was almost automatically assumed when it came to foreign policy coverage.⁷⁰ There was "kind of an ethical imperative about foreign policy in which our country was involved" writes Rivers.⁷¹ Many others sounded the need for caution on the part of correspondents in situations making conflicting demands for loyalty so as not to jeopardize their country's interests.

The official wants the press to serve his interpretation of the government's interest—to publish his version of reality where publication promises a good return, and to refrain from publication whenever the official has any doubts about the wisdom or propriety of disclosure, or even its convenience, since the larger the circle of interest, the greater the number of people who want to share in the policy decision. But the journalist generally believes that the national interest, whatever it may be, is best served by maximum disclosure, by full freedom of information, and he wants to exercise his own judgments, to publish his own interpretation or version of the reality that he thinks is important or newsworthy while it is still fresh and new.⁷²

CONCLUSION

Drawing from the literature reviewed, it is concluded that overall, the US media supports the American governmental policies and gives favourable treatment to the countries where US political, economic and military interests lie.⁷³ Several studies show that US media supports American governmental policies.⁷⁴ Some studies, however, reveal that US media does not necessarily support American governmental policy because, in a free press system, the press is not supposed to be an actor in inter-governmental interactions.⁷⁵

A set of studies by Agbese and Ogbondeh (1988), Armstrong (1973), and Alfonso Herminia (1971) conclude that the American media takes a favourable stance towards the countries where the US political, military and economic interest is involved.⁷⁶

Although the studies of Casey,⁷⁷ Adam,⁷⁸ Mujahid,⁷⁹ and Armstrong⁸⁰ now look outdated, on the basis of the studies of Tadayon,⁸¹ Weaver and Wilhoit (1981), Shoar-Ghaffari (1985), Agbese and Ogbondah (1988)⁸² — it can be generalized that US press gives substantial and favourable coverage to the countries where its political, economic and military interests lie.

In the light of more than 90 per cent of the literature under study, it is concluded that despite the conflicts and ill-will between the Administration and the press, media supported the United States with a patriotic fervor that was highly unusual in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate era. In this case, although, literature gives some flavor on 'adversarial role' too, yet, it can be said that usually the US media follows the 'advocacy model' on foreign affairs reporting. Therefore, on the basis of this study, there is no hesitation in concluding that, in general, the US media does not follow libertarian theory on foreign affairs coverage. Moreover, it is also concluded that the US media generally gives a subjective, biased and inaccurate picture of the Islamic World. It is therefore correct to say that the libertarian model remains only an ideal. As far as the real situation is concerned, the press behaves differently depending on many factors.

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Iqbal and Nationalism : A Comparative Study

KHAWAJA ALQAMA

"If a nationalism is the only discourse credited with emancipatory possibilities in the imperialist theater, then one must ignore the innumerable subaltern examples of resistance throughout the imperialist and pre-imperialist centuries, often suppressed by those very forces of nationalism which would be instrumental in changing the geopolitical conjuncture from territorial imperialism to neocolonialism . . ." (G.C. Spivak)

What was the purpose of founding an independent political entity called Pakistan? Pakistan, as explained by its founding fathers, was created to provide Muslims living on the Indian sub-continent with an Islamic state which would endeavour assiduously to satisfy the economic, cultural and political needs of its population and thus protect the Muslims against a preconceived threat of a permanent Hindu domination in an independent united Indian sub-continent.

According to Sir Frederick Puckle :

"Pakistan movement is the political reaction to Muslim apprehension that union of India, equipped with democratic institutions, whether the government be unitary or federal, can mean nothing but perpetual Hindu domination and virtual Muslim economic serfdom."¹

Puckle relates how Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, no friend to British rule in India, once said :

"Make no mistake about the quarrels between Hindu and Mussalman; they are founded only on the fear of domination."²

According to Saleem Qureshi :

Dr. Khawaja Alqama, Assistant Professor, Department of Islamia University, Bahawalpur.

"This belief of the Muslim elites was not the product of hallucination or a persecution complex; instead it was based upon the persistent refusal of the Congress leadership to accommodate Muslim demands and mitigate Muslim fears of being reduced to a nation of hewers of wood and drawers of water."³

A concrete proposal to resolve this fear came in 1930 from Iqbal, a Muslim poet and philosopher. Iqbal used the platform of a political party to broach the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of North West India;⁴ in 1938 the Sind Provincial Muslim League at its meeting supported the idea of a separate homeland for Muslims for resolving the complicated Hindu-Muslim entanglement; and in 1940 the Muslim League formally adopted this demand as its creed.⁵ According to most scholars of sub-continental history, it was Iqbal who provided the most powerful intellectual Muslim stance on the issue of Muslim nationalism.⁶

In this section we will endeavour to examine in some detail Iqbal's concept of Muslim nationalism and then compare his views on nationalism with some of the leading writers on nationalism in the West. At this point in time it is therefore more than appropriate to emphasise the important role Allama Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938) played in the movement for an independent Pakistan. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Iqbal was — even by the most critical standards — the leading Muslim thinker on the Indian subcontinent. He, who studied law at Cambridge and philosophy (metaphysics) at Heidelberg was the intellectual godfather of independent Pakistan. Iqbal had always been a remorseless enemy of British colonialism : in his youth he volunteered to join forces with the Hindu majority in their fight against the British oppression. But very soon he came to realise that Muslims and Hindus could never be brought together to form a viable political alternative to the existing colonial rule.⁷ Iqbal, with much foresight, was very conscious of the fact that Muslims and Hindus could not co-exist within a single state; they would engage each other in an incessant civil war whose bloodshed and destructiveness was beyond any historical precedent and could hardly be imagined. Islam and Hinduism were too different and too dominating in their own ways to seek a compromise formula which would allow both of them to govern as equal partners in an independent India. For the good of the people, making up the two hostile communities it was necessary to divide them into two sovereign nations : a territorial 'cordon sanitaire' has to be created around their differences. Therefore, with Lutheran candour, Iqbal presented his view of the envisaged division of the Indian subcontinent :

"The Muslim demand for the creation of Muslim India within India, is . . . perfectly justified. . . . I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."⁸

For the young western educated Muslims, Iqbal's importance lies in his ability to fuse (democratic) socialism with Islamic doctrine. Why this fusion of Islam with socialism? Especially, when one knows the atheistic inclinations of socialism. Iqbal had only contempt for early capitalism which forced millions of human beings to live in moral squalor and financial misery. A capitalism which above all was also responsible for colonial oppression and exploitation. Thus, Iqbal turned to socialism to find a sound ideological basis for his reinterpretation of Islam.⁹ Moreover, Iqbal was convinced that the atheistic element in socialism could not persist, was an ephemeral phenomena. He states verbatim :

"The present negative state of Russian mind will not last indefinitely for no system of society can rest on an atheistic basis"¹⁰

However, Iqbal on the other hand was no advocate of religious tyranny which often comes in the guise of an infallible human representative of an omnipotent God. The foibles and megalomania of religious leadership had to be controlled reigned in by an egalitarian and democratic system of socialism :

"In Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains. . . . Islam is a single unanalysable reality which is one or the other as your point of view varies. . . . The state according to Islam is only an effort to realise the spiritual in a human organisation. It is in this sense alone that the state in Islam is a theocracy, not that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility."¹¹

Iqbal with his sense of moderation, thus tried to synthesise the best of socialism with the core values of Islam, and in doing so provided not only a grand ideology but also a platform for the establishment of an independent Muslim nation on Indian soil. Iqbal, in emphasising the social dynamism of Islam, condemned to oblivion the dry, stagnant, ritualised dogma of the *Ulama*. Islam again was a force of change, a home for the Muslims who lived in subjugation to the British colonial rule. It is the (unacclaimed) merit of Iqbal to have transformed Islam into a modern political force which could serve as a

basis for independent Pakistan. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, later, in his political battle with the Congress, skillfully combined Iqbal's view of Muslim nationalism with the Muslim fear of permanent Hindu domination in an independent India to unite the hopelessly divided Muslim elites with their strong regional feelings or, in the words of Ayesha Jalal, strong particularism.¹²

Jinnah's first and foremost task during the period 1937-47 was to create a general ideological consensus among the Muslim elites and undercut the strong regional feelings. This was by no means an easy task. Since 1940 Jinnah constantly played on the theme of Muslim unity and was successful in convincing the Muslim masses that at such a crucial stage of national struggle, when the future of Muslims in India was uncertain, Muslims could not afford to think in terms of parochial or provincial loyalties. It was stressed that Islam recognised no regional and linguistic forces. Thus in a short period of six years "this heterogeneous aggregation, (the Muslims of India), under its elite leadership has been converted into a solid and unwavering nationalist movement."¹³

First let us briefly examine Iqbal's view on the issue of Muslim Nationalism.¹⁴ As a young man, Iqbal, like Jinnah and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan¹⁵ was an ardent nationalist, committed to the unity and freedom of India.

"The great golden past of India, transmitted by distance in time and space into the very perfection of enchantment, stirred his youthful imagination."¹⁶

In the poem entitled *Tarana-i-Hindi* (song about the unity of India) he wrote :
 "We are Indians and India is our motherland."¹⁷

But this romantic view of Indian unity and nationalism was soon to be replaced by Muslim nationalism, both as a high ideal and as a course of action to be followed by the Indian Muslims in the practical politics of India. During his stay in Europe, the birth place of modern nationalism, Iqbal realised that acceptance of nationalism would mean a negation of Islamic ideology. After a careful study of nationalism, Iqbal was convinced that the European concept of nationalism fits the secularist model propounded by most European scholars.

John H. Kautsky, for example, defines nationalism as :

"An ideology and movement striving to unite all people who speak a similar language and who share the various cultural characteristics

transmitted by the language in similar independent states and in loyalty to a similar government conducted in the peoples' language.*¹⁸

But this European model of nationalism divorces religious inspirations from secular motivations. This was totally unacceptable to him. As a high ideal Iqbal sees Islam and modern territorial nationalism as rival principles for organising the ultimate political group.

"Nationalism brings people together, but it also divides them for its criteria of unity among people—race, language and territory—cannot be met by outsiders. One cannot change at will the place of birth or the colour of his skin. Hence it keeps them divided.*¹⁹

According to Iqbal :

"Its divisive facet generates pride in one's own group's imperialistic control and exploitation of another.*²⁰

But his most pungent attack on nationalism is on the question of its identification with secularism²¹ and reduction of religion to a private affair.²² Iqbal sees Islam more as a principle of social action than as a way of securing eternal bliss in the hereafter. In a rejoinder to the reknowned Muslim scholar, Hussain Ahmed Madni, who endorsed the Congress concept of territorial nationalism, Iqbal argued that historically nations had been associated with countries and countries with nations. There was nothing wrong with loving one's land of birth and residence, it was a natural instinct. But he strongly objected to Madni's proposition when it was sold to the Indian Muslims as a political concept, implying that they should put aside their faith, stop thinking of themselves as a separate nation, and sink their identity into a larger Indian nationhood. Iqbal informed Madni that in doing so he was only echoing the Hindu leaders, who gave Muslims the same advice, with a view to securing their own permanent communal dominance in the whole of India.²³ Hence, in espousing Muslim nationalism in India, Iqbal's main objective was to dissuade the Indian Muslims from submerging themselves in a Hindu dominated Indian nationalism. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, almost advocated the same view.

Let us now consider briefly the basis of Muslim nationalism, an ideal type, as explained by Iqbal. According to Iqbal :

"It is not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the universe. . . . That we are members of a society founded by the Prophet of Islam. Islam abhors all

material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea objectified in a potentially expansive group of concrete personalities. It is not dependent for its life principles on the character of a particular people. In its essence, it is non-temporal, nonspatial.*²⁴

Iqbal was not only an idealist, he was also a practitioner and thus very well conversant with the politics of India. He also, therefore, suggested to the Muslims of India the practical course of action, as he deemed it fit, to be followed in order to secure their future in India. In his now famous and often quoted presidential address to the Allahbad meeting of the Muslim League (1930), Iqbal started his speech with a philosophical note. He began by telling his audience that :

"Islam, as an ethical ideal and as a politico-legal value system, had provided generations of Indian Muslims with those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into a well defined people. One might even say that Islam had functioned as a people building force, more effectively in India than in any where else in the world. Laws and institutions associated with Islamic culture had given the Indian Muslim community a remarkable degree of inner unity and homogeneity. Its future as a distinct cultural unit would depend on the maintenance of this Islamic connection. The Indian Muslims according to Iqbal, were far more homogeneous than any other group in the country. Indeed, he stressed, they were the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. Even the Hindus, he said, had not yet achieved the cohesion necessary for being a nation, which Islam has given you [Muslims] as a free gift.*²⁵

He then informed the Indian Muslims that their Indian Muslim national personality could only be secured through the establishment of a Muslim India. Hence the demand for a separate Muslim state as the final solution to the communal problem of India was made.

How different is the concept of Muslim nationalism, as expounded by Iqbal, from the concept of modern territorial nationalism Iqbal so vehemently opposed? In its theoretical form Iqbal's concept of Muslim nationalism was ideological.²⁶ Ethnic, linguistic, and territorial affiliations were not only irrelevant but repugnant to its spirit. But when it came to application all the discarded variables (territory, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, historical traditions) were put back to work. However, this contradiction according to both Dr. Waheed-uz-Zaman and Anwar Syed,²⁷ may be more apparent than

real. They argued that Muslim nationalism for Iqbal is based upon a Muslim community's unwillingness to be ruled by a non Muslim political power.²⁸ Territorial, ethnic and linguistic appeals are to be rejected if they are being addressed by a non Muslim group to a small Muslim group. Muslim nationalism is pre-eminently ideological in actual or potential confrontations with the non Muslims. But when only a Muslim group is involved, territorial, ethnic and linguistic sympathies may be summoned in aid of ideology so as to strengthen the group's inner cohesion necessary for plain survival as well as for undertaking significant collective action. Where Muslims are politically dominant, for Iqbal, Islam has no quarrel with territorial nationalism.

Iqbal therefore, seems to be least worried about the tendency of some Muslim nations, such as Iran and Turkey, to embrace territorial nationalism. Nationalism becomes objectionable where Muslims are in a minority because his fear is that it can lead to their (Muslims) self effacement if the government of the day rejects the idea that religion as such cannot be a living factor in national life.²⁹ But where Muslims are in a majority and hence politically dominant, Islam for Iqbal not only accommodates nationalism, but the two may become identical. Iqbal goes to extent of suggesting that even if a Muslim state declares itself to be secular :

"Its legislature cannot disregard,³⁰ the conscience of the people which has for centuries been trained by the spirituality of Islam."³¹

To sum up Iqbal's view on the concept of Muslim nationalism, it will be safe to suggest that Iqbal was mainly interested in liberating the Muslim majority areas of India from the Hindu rule, which could enable them to safeguard and promote their Muslim personality and, in addition, give them the opportunity to mobilize their life according to the spirit of Islam.³² It was, therefore, necessary Iqbal thought, for the Muslim community to attain independence in political choice making and action.

According to Dr. Zaman, Iqbal, intellectually, prepared the ground for Jinnah, who finally led the Muslims to the goal of Pakistan. Jinnah acknowledged his debt to the Poet Philosopher with the following words :

"His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusions as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India."³³

Before proceeding any further, it would be of interest to compare Iqbal's interpretation of nationalism with the work of the following (mainstream)

theoreticians of nationalism : H. Kohn, E. Gellner, E. Kedourie, K. Deutsch, and M. Hechter.³⁴

Like Iqbal, Hans Kohn, who exemplifies the historical approach to nationalist movements, places nationalism into the phenomenological realm. Kohn to some extent 'de-materialises' nationalism and emphasises its spiritual qualities. For Kohn :

"Nationalism is an idea, an *idee*'-force, which fills man's brain and heart with new thoughts, and drives him to translate his consciousness into deeds of organized action.³⁵

Unlike Iqbal however, Kohn classifies nationalism as a secular force which is deeply rooted in language and territorial. Kohn considers territorial unity and language identity as the necessary prerequisites for the creation of nationalism, a nationalism which replaces religion as the main organizing medium of an integrating and integrated community. Iqbal on the other hand sees nationalism as the embodiment or extension of religion. The base of nationalism according to Iqbal is the Qur'an which is not delimited by language or territory and unites all Muslims across these artificial boundaries. Thus Kohn and Iqbal stand on this point in total opposition to each other. Kohn sees the advent and rapid rise of new secular forces in nationalism while Iqbal explains that nationalism is a part of religion. However, this conflict can be partially resolved and explained by pointing out the difference between Christianity and Islam. Christianity renders its due to the temporal authorities while Islam as a complete system integrates and subjugates the worldly rulers. Islam does not recognise the separation of politics (secular) and religion (spiritual). It perceives only one system, namely one that has been detailed in Al-Qur'an and which is dominated in its entirety by religious inspirations and aspirations. Thus, what we should retain from this comparison between Kohn and Iqbal is that nationalism for both is located in the phenomenological realm, dominated by ideas and not material environment. Despite the apparent differences between Iqbal and Kohn we may conclude that in their approaches to nationalism they have much in common and that they are separated by certain dissimilarities of two religions, namely Islam and Christianity.

In his theory of nationalism Gellner sees pre-industrial man embedded in a rigid, inflexible social structure which defines and determines the (traditional) role such an individual can play. However, the twin forces of industrialisation and modernisation destroy this existing pre-industrial order. The order or structure in question is then replaced by culture, a culture which is defined as follows :

(It is) "essentially the manner in which one communicates in the broadest sense."³⁶ Therefore, "communication, the symbols, language (in the literal or extended sense) that is employed, became crucial."³⁷ Gellner is also convinced that culture is equivalent to nationality. He insists that, "the classification of men by 'culture' is of course the classification by 'nationality'."³⁸

Furthermore, Gellner believes that man is only truly human when he has achieved a certain level of literacy. In an urbanised industrial environment man as a human being has to be able to read and write. Language becomes all-important in creating culture which in turn then becomes nationalism. But why then, it may be asked, language in one area? Why are various nationalities crammed into a tiny corner of the world? Gellner's answer is that modernisation and industrialisation are uneven and affect different language groups in a dissimilar way. That is why the language gap between different groups is re-enforced by an economic development gap. To overcome the vicissitudes of economic development the masses of these language groups have a tendency to look to the indigenous intelligentsia for leadership, an intelligentsia which has suffered a spiritual crisis by the disappearance of the pre-industrial order. However, they, the intelligentsia, are the keepers of language — and with the help of the words that were able to 'manufacture' culture which replaces the old order and serves as the foundation of nationalism. In short, Gellner is convinced that uneven development, an inevitable by-product of industrialisation and modernisation, re-enforces the identity of language groups and nationalities which are led by their respective intelligentsia. Iqbal, of course, would have disagreed with Gellner that culture becomes all important for man living in an industrial environment. For Iqbal the purest and most noble form of language is contained in Al-Qur'an. Individual languages are only media of expression, forms but never substance. Substance is provided by religion; thus, language is shaped and dominated in its content by its religious ideas.

However, Iqbal also claims like Gellner that modern economic development may be uneven, that is always benefiting the Hindus at the expense of the Muslims. The religious gap is emphasised by the existence of an economic gap. For Iqbal, who sees any kind of culture as an integral part of religion, for example, Bengali traditions are inseparable from Islamic dogma, it seems natural that groups facing a crisis situation will form around religious difference and will use their religious distinctiveness as a rallying cry. The Muslims are united by the inspirations and ideals of Al-Qur'an and not by language. Iqbal thus, unlike Gellner, shies away from secular culture and

maintains the hegemonic claim of religion over all matters of life. But like Gellner, Iqbal foresees unevenness in the development process — which forces the concerned groups to cluster around their leaders, the intelligentsia. But in Iqbal's case the intelligentsia should always be closely attached to and inspired by Al-Qur'an.

E. Kedourie also suggests that nationalism is foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness.³⁹ However, this consciousness is embedded in a pernicious doctrine whose evil character is signified by its egoism and idealist, irrational emendations. Nationalism *per se* is subversive of any previously existing order and exacerbates old and creates new conflicts. For Kedourie, the French revolution has created the 'individual', an individual which now falls prey to the dogma of nationalism which in its 'principled' approach lacks the powers of compromise. Man seems to be unwilling to compromise over principles. Language and race in their dogmatic expressions become the guiding criteria for war and peace between political entities, that is nation-states. These criteria override all other differences and create a new international political order which is marked by instability and irresolvable conflict. In nationalist eras communities can no longer pursue pure interests because the nationalist dogma reigns supreme and goes even against important material considerations of those communities. Nationalism is, therefore, a doctrine and the harbinger of instability and war in the international system.

It is interesting to note that neither Kedourie and Iqbal consider language and territoriality as insurmountable differences when it comes to co-operative efforts between disparate and separate groups which do not speak the same language and occupy clearly delineated and differentiated pieces of land. Kedourie, in having no solution to overcome those territorial claims and language differences, only recognises the negative aspects of nationalism — while Iqbal, identifying religion as a unifying force, can classify territorial separateness and language dissimilarities as minor obstacles in the creation of a religious nationalism. Thus, in opposition to Kedourie, Iqbal sees nationalism as a religious movement, which in being not mired in territorial squabbles and language bickering, can be defined as a medium for peace, prosperity and freedom. For Iqbal, the Qur'an provides the only blueprint for a successful nationalist movement. He agrees with Kedourie that language and territorial separateness are not enough to transform a community into a positive force in the international system. Thus, in having many reservations about the efficiency and justice of a secular nationalism, Iqbal in some ways resembles Kedourie—but Iqbal in the end provides a rather strong, positive and encouraging image of his own brand of nationalism.

At first sight K. Deutsch with his interpretation of nationalism has nothing to do with Iqbal's idea of a religious nationalism. For Deutsch nationalism may be defined as follows :

Nationalism "essentially consists of wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders."⁴⁰

Deutsch then divides the above definition into five separate propositions which describe in detail his communicative approach to nationalism. These five propositions may be summarised as follows :

1. A pre-requisite for a sense of group integration is communication among its members.
2. If communication among members is hindered relative to that among non-members, the likelihood that group integration will develop is also hindered.
3. The degree to which communication among groups is hindered depends upon the balance between the rate of social mobilisation and the rate of assimilation. If the former exceeds the later, the rate of group integration will diminish and *vice versa*. The level of social mobilisation can be measured by several indicators, among them : the level of technological innovations, the shift to non-agricultural occupations, monetisation, literacy, urbanisation, transportation network, language, and finally trade. The rate of assimilation can be measured by the proportion of individuals in an area whose previous language and historical traditions were different from those of the majority. Languages and traditions of the majority which are now considered by the minorities in question as their own and assimilate them into the ranks of the majority.⁴¹
4. Depending upon the balance of assimilation factors and mobilisation factors, modernisation either facilitates or retards the level of communication that is essential for the progress by which a people becomes a nationality and a nationality becomes a nation state.⁴²
5. The group with the highest level of social communication is the most nationalistic.

As we said before, at first sight Deutsch's interpretation of nationalism has nothing in common with Iqbal's religious nationalism. However, if we go

beyond the technical aspects of communication, we may find some common ground between Iqbal and Deutsch. Following propositions one to five of Deutsch's exegesis of nationalism we may be able to trace certain similarities between Iqbal and Deutsch. In proposition one we find that group communication aids group integration. As Islam is a religion of deeds, communicative acts are considered to be very important. In fact, the word is seen as the forerunner of the deed. Islam thus emphasises communication as a means to form and to solidify the religious community, the *Ummah*, which is the cornerstone of all its efforts to bring about religious nationalism. In proposition two we are faced with the problem of obstacles to communication. Iqbal would fully subscribe to proposition two, indicating that non-communication among Muslim brothers and sisters would eventually lead to the disintegration of the *Ummah*. In proposition three Iqbal would clearly stress the assimilative power of Islam, the Qur'an provides all the guidelines for the integration of new members. Religious communication and acts relegate all other social, political, economic and technological factors to secondary positions of minor importance. In proposition four Iqbal would surely indicate that in Islam, religious communication, shall tip the balance of power in favour of assimilation over mobilisation.⁴³ Religion, Islam, shall act like a sponge, assimilating and uniting all mobilised individuals. To Iqbal it does not matter what kind of causes and factors make those individuals join the mobilised mass, they all will be absorbed by Islam. In proposition five Iqbal would add as an explanatory note that the Islamic community, the *Ummah*, would be that group with the most frequent and intense level of communication.

If we give Deutsch's exegesis of nationalism a religious colouring and de-emphasise its modernist approach, then we come very close to Iqbal's idea of religious nationalism. Because communication is a product of the mind, 'spiritual' matters play an important role in Deutsch's interpretation of nationalism. The belief in Allah is the communicative link between Muslims and guides all their actions. Therefore, Muslim nationalism can never by-pass religion, it is enshrined in the word of Al-Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet (Peace be upon him). According to Iqbal, any kind of communication is a religious communication. Words outside religious considerations are meaningless for a Muslim; all his private and public life is accompanied by the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet (Peace be upon him). Social communication is therefore, if it has to have any meaning at all, religious communication.

Finally, let us conclude this brief overview of some mainstream theories of nationalism with a look at Hechter's Internal Colonialism, the theoretical *piece de resistance* of this dissertation. Iqbal, in examining Hechter's conclusion, would immediately hierarchise along a religious continuum Hechter's three hypotheses. Most important for Iqbal would be the religious difference among the various groups, relegating all other dissimilarities to a secondary position, Iqbal would not oppose Hechter's ideas : he would just re-arrange the priorities to suit his religious world view. Hechter's linguistic and economic disparities would be embodied into the overall difference of a religious core (Hinduism) and a religious periphery (Islam). Iqbal could use Hechter's idea (in an Islamized version) as an explanation for the creation of Pakistan.

Overall, one can thus say that Iqbal, despite his identification with Althusser,⁴⁴ despite his 'ideo-religious approach', has often the tendency to find himself among mainstream nationalist theoreticians. The dividing line between Iqbal and the other theoreticians of nationalism,⁴⁵ is very often religion—which however in its absolute dominance is likely to obscure the commonalities between his and their approach to nationalism.

After having discussed at some length the political philosophy of Iqbal, it is important to point out that not every group and organisation, especially religious groups, supported the cause of Jinnah and Iqbal. It can be said that Iqbal's appeal was limited to a minority—educated class. It was this class which later became the fire brigade of Jinnah's campaign for Pakistan. It is also interesting to note that many powerful religious groups were opposed to the Muslim League's demand for the creation of a separate Muslim homeland. Foremost among them was the Jami'at-al-'Ulema'-i-Hind, the leading organisation of the Deobandi *Ulema* who have been categorised as Islamic traditionalists.⁴⁶ A great deal of effort was devoted by the Muslim League leadership to win over this group. Eventually they succeeded in doing that. Although only partially, on the eve of partition they obtained the consent of a section of the Deobandi *Ulema* which was led by Maulana Shabir Ahmed Usmani.

Likewise, it has been held that the Islamic Party Jam'at-i-Islami led by Maulana Maududi was also opposed to the ideals of the Pakistan movement. Since the creation of an independent Pakistan they have gone to great length to explain that this was not so. But for one particular social group Iqbal's concept of Muslim nationalism was particularly meaningful. That class was the product of the colonial transformation. It comprised those who have received an

education that would equip them for employment in the expanding colonial state apparatus. This was an ever increasing class consisting of the lower-rank government officials. Among them we also find clerks, technicians and members of independent professions like lawyers, doctors and teachers. Hamza Alavi has termed this class the 'salarial'.

According to Alavi :

*For the want of a better term I have referred to them as the salariat. The term middle class is too wide and petty bourgeoisie has connotations especially in Marxist political discourse that would not refer to this class.*⁴⁷

The point we are trying to make here is to emphasise the role of this social class in the creation of Pakistan and the pivotal role they played in an independent Pakistan. During the Pakistan movement, they put all their weight behind Jinnah. Included in this group were also the university students who according to Dr. Manir-uz-Zaman were the most important 'associational' group behind the Muslim League. Much has been written on the role of the All-India Muslim Student Federation in the creation of Pakistan. Jinnah especially fraternised with the Muslim students of Aligarh, Islamia College Lahore and Dacca University. They were all established during the British Raj period—and these were the places where Jinnah delivered some of his most important speeches. According to Dr. Manir-uz-Zaman it was the Muslim students who carried the slogans of an independent Pakistan to the remotest villages.⁴⁸ Their help in the election campaign of 1946 contributed greatly to the Muslim League's success. However, in a society in which the rural votes predominate and are controlled by the landed magnates the Muslim salariat could make little progress in any elections until it reached an accommodation with the rural elites.

It was not until 1938 that the Muslim League concluded an agreement with the regional power holders who ruled over Bengal, Sind and Punjab. It was a fragile alliance founded on the ephemeral basis of temporary mutual interests. Jinnah's main offer to the regional landed aristocracy was to convince them that the post-independence government would not be in the hands of the Congress Party, a party committed to land reform and a strong (urban) centre. They, the rural elites, should rather vote for the Muslim League which in their dependency on them would thus ensure their survival as a coherent and strong class. In gaining the support of these rural elites, Jinnah had to confront a great number of powerful provincial politicians such as Sikander Hayat from Punjab, G. M. Syed from Sind, A. K. Fazl-ul-Haq

from Bengal and some honoraries from the NWFP — who all were solidly entrenched in these Muslim majority provinces.

Jinnah considered that these politicians were unable to realise that Congress was in a position, once the British left, to supplant the federal structure with a more centralised system. This, he felt, was under-scored with the damage a Nationalist Party can wreak on regional parties. Nehru saw provincial autonomy as the real threat to a united India. This perceived threat had been a persistent theme in his political speeches since his trenchant attacks on the 1935 Constitution.

It is not surprising that the provincial leadership of Muslim majority provinces soon gave in to Jinnah's leadership demands. They were, of course, not prepared to surrender their local autonomy to a centralist power. Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League provided the various regionally based Muslim groups with a convenient voice at the centre of Indian politics in the dialogue with the Indian National Congress and the colonial masters. Jinnah's strategy evolved and he became soon the sole spokesman of the Muslim community of India. In his quest for more political power, Jinnah began to use the language that could unite the Muslims. After 1940 Jinnah was also able to attract the Muslim upper classes who were not without their economic difficulties. The slogan 'Pakistan now' meant that Muslim banks, Muslim industries and Muslim commercial houses would be established in an independent Pakistan without the fear of Hindu domination, which would be removed permanently from their state. However, it cannot be overemphasised that Jinnah's most passionate supporter remained the Muslim salariat class — a class which was absolutely central to the Pakistan movement.⁴⁹ But ironically, the Muslim salariat was not evenly distributed in size and influence in different parts of the Muslim majority provinces of colonial India. And its future fragmentation was written into the pattern of this uneven development.⁵⁰

The Bengali Muslim salariat was the largest in terms of absolute size as compared to Muslims of other provinces. Nevertheless, its share of government jobs was proportionally much smaller than that of Hindus of Bengal, and Bengali Muslims were always an underprivileged majority.⁵¹ They saw in Jinnah's idea of an independent Pakistan their last hope to free themselves from total Hindu domination.

One passage from Jinnah's interview given in 1946 during his visit to Calcutta is produced below to show how he articulated the hope of the Muslims of Bengal :

Question : "Sir, they say that Pakistan will be a country for the rich ones only and not for the poor. Is it true?"

Answer : "I [Jinnah] came to Bengal in 1937 and toured the interior. I saw the extreme poverty in the eyes of the Muslims. They were totally crushed by the Hindu *Zamindars*, who held them in their grip of iron. They produced the golden fibre from the land of God and it was taken away by the *Marwaris* and the agents of English businessmen at low prices, and then it was sent to Calcutta and made colossal profits for them. The Muslims who had actually grown the fibre did not have even a proper shirt to his back, not enough food for his children who had grown thin and emaciated because of perpetual starvation. My heart bled for those brethren of mine. I thought and thought about how their lot could be improved and I came to the conclusion that nothing could be done unless political power in this area was ours. If the British left—and that area did not become Pakistan, then the Hindus will never allow us to make any laws to free the Muslims from the yoke of the cruel *Zamindars*. So must we have Pakistan."⁵²

Jinnah's persuasion and political articulation produced the desired result. During the election of 1946 when others (non-Bengali Muslims in other provinces) were not voting for Pakistan, 99 per cent of the Muslim population of Bengal did vote for the purpose of achieving Pakistan.⁵³

In a nutshell, the central theme of this discussion is that the Pakistan movement was a movement in which diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions, representing different social strata and interests were allied in pursuit of one objective, the creation of a Muslim state. Jinnah's political genius lay precisely in his ability to orchestrate a loose, volatile and unpredictable coalition of forces.⁵⁴ Comprised of diverse groups, both regionally and socially, the unity of the movement that ultimately resulted in the creation of Pakistan.⁵⁵

The great quality of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was that he was able to rally all forces behind the demand for the creation of Pakistan. This was an ideal for which Muslims were prepared to live and die. The solid support was of significance that neither the Hindus nor the British could refuse what the Muslims stood for. It was this firm faith that led to the creation of Pakistan. Quaid-i-Azam was able to achieve Pakistan as if it was done through a miracle.

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1. Frederick Puckle, Sir, "The Pakistan Doctrine : Its Origins and Power", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, 1946, p.535.
 2. *Ibid.*, p.534.
 3. Saleem M. M. Qureshi, "Pakistan Nationalism Reconsidered", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLV, 1972-73, p.557.
 4. However it has to be pointed out that many scholars have contested this generally held view in Pakistan that Iqbal was the first person to have thought of a separate homeland for the Muslims. Gowher Rizvi, *Lindlithgow and India : A Study of British Policy and the Political Importance in India 1936-43*, London : Royal Historical Society, 1978, p. 89.
 5. The feeling of being a distinct nation developed among Indian Muslims only in the 1940's, when it became clear that the British would soon leave India. Prior to that, the Muslim nobility had little in common with the Muslim peasantry and artisan castes: P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 1-2. There seems to be some substance in Hardy's claim. However, many writers have contended that two nations (Hindu and Muslim) were in Indian society since the medieval era. Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, for example argues, "that from the very beginning the Muslims of India of both native and foreign origin, were conscious of their separate identity. Hinduism and Islam remained two distinct, irreconcilable ways of life. The creation of Pakistan was therefore the logical culmination of this irreconcilable clash of values." Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi : University of Karachi, 1969, pp.3-16. R. Traper and Harbans Mukhia, (ed.), *Communalism and the Writing of Indian History*, New Delhi: PPH, 1969; R.C. Majumdar, (ed.), *The Delhi Sultanate*, Bombay : Bharatiya, 1964; A. Ahmed, *Studies in the Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1964, and K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, London: Chatto and Windus, 1967.
 6. It was Iqbal who first dreamed of a separate Muslim state in India, wrote many letters to Jinnah inspiring him to take up the cause of a separate Muslim state. But after his death no other Muslim intellectual took up the cause of the dynamic interpretation of the *Shariat* which Iqbal attempted in his. Talukdar Manzooruzaman, "Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam" *The Politics of Development : The Case of Pakistan 1947-58*, Dacca : Green Book House, 1971, pp. 23-24.
- Dr. Wasim, writing on Pakistan's intellectual heritage sees Iqbal as the master intellectual of Muslim India and then of Pakistan. Mohammad Wasim, *Pakistan under Martial Law 1977-1985*. Lahore : Vanguard Books, 1987, p.180. Anwar Hussain Syed, "In some ways, Iqbal is probably the most influential intellectual in recent Muslim history. In Pakistan, where heroes are in short supply, he continues to be a celebrity. Newspapers publish articles about aspects of his life and work. Literary societies on college campuses praise him. Academics and institutes publish journals and sponsor research to show the greatness of his art and thought." *Pakistan, Islam, Politics and National Solidarity*, New York, Praeger, 1982, p.43.
- Ishtiaq Ahmed sees Iqbal, "as a bridge between orthodox Islam and modernism." He is of the view that, "Iqbal's populism provided a grand ideology, a phantasmagorian which all sections of the Muslim community could find their images, and since he did not get down to concrete prescriptions about how to organize Muslim society, but remained at the level of optimistic speculation, the generality of his thought has effected considerable controversy over his message. Besides referring to the Qur'an and *Sunnah*, it is a common practice among writers to find support for their standpoints by referring to some corresponding opinion of Iqbal. His status in Pakistan is comparable to that of Abduh among the Arabs." Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Concept of an*

Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan, London: Frances Printer, 1987, p.75.

The most convincing analysis on the importance of Iqbal among the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent has come from Sir Hamilton Gibb. He writes, "Perhaps the right way to look at Iqbal, is to see him in one who reflected and put into vivid words the diverse currents of ideas that were agitating the minds of the Indian Muslims. His sensitive poetic temperament mirrored all that impinged upon it—the backward looking romanticism of the liberals, the socialist learning of the young intellectuals, the longing of the militant Muslim Leaguers for a strong leader to restore the political power of Islam." Aziz Ahmed *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 156.

7. As Iqbal said, "We suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps, in the higher interests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands, and conceal our egoism under the cloak of nationalism, outwardly stimulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognise that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions." Shamloo, (ed.), *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, Lahore: Al-Manar Academy, 1948, p. 10. 'Shamloo' was a pseudonym for S.M. Ikram, who was a civil servant at that time.

8. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, (ed.), *Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947*, Vol. II, (1924-1947), Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1970, p. 159.

9. "Iqbal does not regard Islam and socialism as necessarily mutually exclusive or antagonistic. He regards the Islamic concept of equality and Muslim rejection of racialism as similar to that in socialist theory, and the socialist elimination of monarchical institutions as parallel of Muslim iconoclasm. In explaining the institution of Zakat as a voluntary super-tax, Iqbal sees the possibility of eliminating the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few." Aziz Ahmed, op.cit., p. 158.

10. Riffat Hassan, "Development of Political Philosophy", Hafeez Malik (ed.), *Iqbal Poet Philosopher of Pakistan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, p. 154.

11. Mohammad Iqbal, Sir, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1960, pp. 154-155.

12. Here we have to explain what we mean by regional feelings. C.H. Philips in an introduction to his edited book entitled, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1958-1947*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1962, has argued that without Jinnah's leadership it seems likely that regionalism, such as the proposal for a united and independent Bengal, which was discussed by both Hindu and Muslim leaders in 1947, would have competed seriously with Muslim nationalism as the political aim in the Muslim majority provinces. However, it has to be noted that although the question of a united and independent Bengal came under discussion after Lord Mountbatten took over as the Viceroy of India in 1947, it came at a stage when the communal politics of India were at a climax. Bengali ethnic nationalism (perse) was never there, because of polarisation of politics on communal lines. Suhrawardy supported the idea of a united Bengal, with full support of Jinnah, who according to Ayesha Jalal, was always opposed to the partition of Bengal. Sarat Bose and Kiran Shankar Roy (leader of the opposition in the Bengal Assembly) responded favourably to the offer. However nothing came out of the talk, firstly because Congress and its leadership was opposed to it. Nehru warned the Bengali Hindus not to be misled by Suhrawardy. He said an independent Bengal would mean the dominance of the Muslim League and particularly, the whole of Bengal going into the Pakistani area. Moreover, the League's sub-committee was divided on the issue. Four out of six members of the committee

were opposed to an independent Bengal outside the pale of North-Western Pakistan. Suhrawardy's own position was also tenuous. Many saw him as responsible for fanning the communal tension of 1946, known as the Calcutta riot of 1946. According to Stanley Wolpert, "Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Tucker, In-Charge of India's Eastern Command, received intelligence reports that Suhrawardy told an immense Muslim crowd gathered round Ochterlony's Monument that afternoon that the Cabinet Mission was a bluff, and that he would see how the British could make Mr. Nehru rule Bengal. Direct Action Day would prove to be the first step towards the Muslim struggle for emancipation. He advised them to return home early and said. . . that he had made all arrangements with the police and military not to interfere with them. Our intelligence patrols noticed that the crowd included a large number of Muslim goondar (hoodlums), and that. . . their ranks. . . swelled as soon as the meeting ended. They made for the shopping centres of the town where they at once set to work to loot and burn Hindu shops and houses. . . . At 4.15 p.m. Fortress Headquarters sent out the codeword 'Red' to indicate that there were incidents all over Calcutta." Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 285.

He was Jinnah's most mercurial ally. On the issue of United Bengal and the role of Suhrawardy. Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman : Jinnah the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1985. Stanley Wolpert, op.cit., R.J. Moore, *Escape from Empire : The Alee Government and the Indian Problem*, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1983. According to R.J. Moore, the origins and course of the movement for a separate Bengal await analysis. It is difficult to disagree with Moore's view.

13. Saleem M. Qureshi, op. cit., p. 558.

14. It will not be an over statement to say that the contemporary understanding of nationalism is far from complete. Some view nationalism as a reflection of the 'state of mind' of the individual members of a political community while others have argued that it is a manifestation of certain ideological current. For an academician it is an object of inquiry, for a politician it can be used as a tool for political purpose, and as the purpose varies, so does the interpretation. For an excellent review of the literature, Boyd C. Shafer, *Faces of Nationalism*, New York : Harcourt, Jovanovich, 1972, especially Chapter I. Muslim nationalism especially is elusive because it preceded the designation and demarcation of the territory of Pakistan.

15. Muhammad Ali Jinnah devoted himself to Hindu-Muslim Unity, and to co-operation between the Muslim League and the Congress for almost three decades. The break occurred as a consequence of the 1936-37 provincial elections. Nehru's insistence that the Congress was the only Nationalist Party led Jinnah to 'resist Hindu Raj'. Thereafter, the clear inference is the mistrust of Congress leaders. "From Martial Law to Martial Law, Politics in the Punjab, 1919-1958," Syed Nur Ahmed, edited by Craig Baxter, from a translation from Urdu, by Mahmud Ali, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. LVIII, No. 4, 1985-86, pp. 720-723.

16. Iqbal Singh, *The Ardent Pilgrim : An Introduction to the Life and Works of Muhammad Iqbal*, Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1951, p. 23.

17. Muhammad Iqbal, Sir, *Bang-i-Daru*, (A Collection of Urdu Poems), Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1949, p. 82.

18. John H. Kasitsky, "Nationalism", H. G. Keeschull (ed.), *Politics in Transitional Societies*, New York : Appleton Century-Crofts, 1971, p. 112.

19. Anwar Syed, *Pakistan, Islam, Politics and National Solidarity*, New York : Praeger, 1982, p. 50.

20. *Ibid.*

21. Secularism to this day remains a very contentious issue in the sub-continent. Ashis Nandy, "Secularism is a gift of post-medieval, European Christianity to this (Indian sub-continent) part of the world. The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance," *Alternatives*, Vol. XIII, 1988, p. 180; T.N. Madan, "Secularism in its Place", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, November 1987; Ralph Bultjens, "India: Religion, Political Legitimacy, and the Secular State", *Annals, AAPSS*, 483, January, 1986.

22. "If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by nationalist system of ethics and policy. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual, and has nothing to do with what is called man's temporal life. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state are organic to each other." Presidential Address at Annual Session of Muslim League at Allahabad, 1930. C.H. Philip et al., (ed.), *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962, p. 239.

23. Statement on Islam and Nationalism in reply to a statement of Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madni, *Ehsan*, March 9, 1938, Shamloo, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, op.cit., p. 233-229.

24. S. A. Wahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Lahore: SH. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964, p. 376.

25. Anwar Syed, op. cit., p.45. Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League on December 29, 1930.

B. Anderson defines the nation as "an imagined community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." He argues that the 'ism' of nationalism has created a false analogy with the 'ism' of ideology. Nationalism, or nationality is better classed with kinship or religion because it is perceived as destiny rather than choice and thereby helps to provide transcendental explanations of human suffering, sacrifice, and especially death: Book Review on "Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism", *Anthony Reid, Pacific Affairs*, Vol. LVIII, No. 3, Fall 1985, p. 497.

26. Ideology is a "Representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence." Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays*, London: NLB, 1971. Translated from the French by Ben Brewster, p. 152. It should be noted that Iqbal in his quest to stress the socialist-materialist dimensions of Islamic nationalism is very difficult to classify among the mainstreams of nationalism. He lacks the communicative rigour of a Deutsch, he ignores the pathological sides of new nationalism, the fief of a Kedourie; he is far from the modernisation theories of a Lerner, and he vehemently disagrees with Gellner on the language issue.

27. Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1964, Chapter 4; Anwar Syed, op.cit., Chapter 3.

28. According to Francis Robinson, there would appear to be a tendency amongst Muslims to organise politics on the basis of their faith. Where Muslims form a minority, there is a tendency to organise political activities as a separate political community, and then demand a separate state. One good example outside South Asia is the Moro liberation movement of the Muslim Filipinos. Within South Asia, of course, there is no shortage of examples. There was a demand from the Moplah community of Kerala in 1947 for the foundation of a Moplistan within the Indian Union. In Andhra Pradesh *Majlis-e-Ittehadul-Muslimeen*, formally requested in the late 1960's that a separate state for all Indian Muslims should be established on the east coast between Ushkhatnam and Madras. Francis Robinson stressed that formation of a political party is not

restricted to Muslim society, but the formation of the separatist movement on the basis of religion and the assertion of the political identity on the basis of religion does seem to be a special characteristic of Muslims. Francis Robinson, "Islam and Muslim Separatism", David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp, (ed.), *Political Identity in South Asia*, London : Curzon Press, 1979, p. 78.

29. According to Iqbal, "The religious order of Islam is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a policy on Indian national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principles of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. Aziz Ahmed, op. cit., p. 160.

30. Iqbal's declaration here should be interpreted as his unwillingness to grant politics (statehood) a separate status independent of Islam. The label secular in a Muslim state has in its final consequence no substance : it is absorbed by all pervasive religious sentiment and has no *raison d'être* of its own.

31. Reply to question raised by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru popularly known as *A Rejoinder to Nehru*, Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964, pp. 116-19. Present example is that of Bangladesh, where the Bangladeshi leadership had to insert a clause clearly stating faith in the Almighty Allah as a fundamental principle of the Constitution of 1977. Insertion of this clause was brought about mainly because of public pressure. Zilur R. Khan, "Islam and Bengali Nationalism", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXV, No 8, August 1985. It is important to point out that recently the Bangladesh Parliament has declared that Islam will be the state religion of the country.

32. *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, Lahore : Sh : Muhammad Ashraf, 1956, Chapter II, p.6.

33. *Ibid.*

34. We have included Hetcher among this group because this theory serves as the theoretical framework for the dissertation.

35. H. Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism*, New York : Harper, 1962, p. 19.

36. E. Gellner, *Thought and Changes*, London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p. 155.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

39. E. Kedourie, *Nationalism*, New York : Praeger, 1961.

40. K. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Cambridge : The Technology Press, 1960, p.71.

41. K. Deutsch, op. cit., p. 507.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-105.

43. It should be noted again here that, for Iqbal, mobilisation of a Muslim always ends with his even stronger assimilation into the *Ummah*, the Islamic community. It should also be noted that traditional societies can 'modernise' through an increase in communication. Yet, their members have not undergone social mobilisation in the Deutschian sense which implies that those members should break away from their original (kinship) group and join a new *gesellschaft*. Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, London : Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1969.

44. Althusser like Iqbal sees a human being as an integral part of a community. Communal values and traditions are the essence of an individual : an individual is always

subjected to a collective conscience. Thus, collective consciousness over-rides individual will. Whatever tolerance is granted to individual expression is within the accepted spectrum of collective consciousness.

45. Among whom : H. Kohn, E. Gellner, K. Deutsch and M. Hechter.

46. Z. Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, London : Asia Publishing House, 1963.

47. Hamza Alvi, *Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology*, 1987, p. 4. Unpublished, Manuscript is available from the Author.

48. Maniruzzaman, *The Politics of Development : The Case of Pakistan 1947-58*, Dacca : Green Book House, 1971, p. 21.

49. Referring back to Hechter's theory of internal colonialism, we again have to stress that the salariat class is an excellent example of an educated minority elite who cannot obtain a just recompense from the centre. Therefore, it is no surprise that the salariat class is at the fore of a secessionist-cum-independence movement. It should also be added that the salariat class could envisage to gain a lot in terms of new employment from the creation of a new independent state entity called Pakistan. In short, the Muslim salariat had — out of self-interest — to fight for the Pakistan movement.

50. Uneven development causes secessionist movements, but uneven development within secessionist movements may also be the source of the downfall of these afore-mentioned associations.

51. Hechter would classify this phenomenon as a clear case of relative economic deprivation—which could only be remedied by the minority taking recourse to drastic (secessionist) political action.

52. Serajuddin Hussain, *Days Decisive*, Dacca : L. Rahman, 1970, p.1.

53. Referring back to Hechter, we can deduce from this voting behaviour that the Muslim Bengalis felt more oppressed in economic and cultural terms than other Muslim minorities.

54. The theory of internal colonialism does not account very well for charismatic leadership. Therefore, this theory—or model—is unable to capture and evaluate the greatness of Jinnah's contribution to the establishment of an independent Pakistan.

55. Ayesha Jalal, 'Inheriting the Raj : Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue,' *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1985 p. 50.

The Humanist-Environmentalist Requirements for Sustainable Bangladesh

MUHAMMAD HASAN IMAM

INTRODUCTION

Environmentalism first developed as response to the industrialism in the nineteenth century. But in 1960s, the environmentalist spirit of green movement turned our attention from looking at the environment *per se* towards its interrelationship with human activities, with an emphasis on the relationship between human and natural environments, and between poverty and environmental degradation.¹ Besides, the green movement in the West was diverse in subjects and strategies. Environment, poverty, militarization, consumerism, marginalization, powerlessness, moral degradation, psychic illness can be mentioned as some of the issues the Greens placed on their agenda. The green wave of thought and action thus looked for alternatives to the dominant paradigms of development. However, the green alternative is still considered as much less-articulated, discussed, and politically organized compared to the 'Blue' (market, liberal, capitalist) and 'Red' (state, socialist, planning) options.² Some have located the green movements in the transition from social democratic society to neo-conservative society.³ It is also argued that environmental issues can be divorced from old-fashioned Left-Right conflicts.⁴ It is conceived of as neither Left nor Right, but forward since both communism and capitalism aggravated environmental degradation in their own fashion. Industrialism or industrial capitalism is found to be the common object of critique by the Greens.

However, we do not have scope for elaborating the ideas and the ideological content of the green politics or green economy here. What is relevant to our present discussion is the very rationale of fair deal between

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man and nature. This actually recognizes the unavoidable logic that fair living on the earth ultimately hinges on the fair sharing of the burden and benefits by all human beings. Despite the difference of assumptions, purposes, and concepts in the green line of thought, there is thus, an observable unity of ideas which is best expressed in the statement that : "The specificity of the green view of the global problematique derives from the effort to see and examine the world in a radical humanistic perspective."⁵ Therefore, whatever the extent of complexity one finds in understanding greening the earth and operationalizing the still incoherent conceptualizations, the humanistic elements of the stream is beyond any theoretical hypocrisy. Moreover, green politics emphasizes eco-development and globalism in the sense of caring for the earth. The green perspective eventually raises the questions whether the existing global institutions and initiatives can really comply with the calling of environmentalism. Changes in the international organizations, trade, aid, and development assistance are sought to ensure the appropriate atmosphere for pursuing sustainable development strategy. It is found that ecological consideration is one of the main sources of inspiration that activated the green views. Development is conceived of as intermeshing of environment, economy, and social values justified along intergenerational and international well-being. In this sense, greening, environmentalism, and sustainable development do not differ much in meaning and appeal. These points have special relevance in considering the situations of the poverty-stricken, least developed countries like Bangladesh.

Since the green movement flourished by opposing the Western mode of development, the appeal of the green views in our situation needs some elaboration. During last twenty years the establishment started recognizing the concern expressed over the environmentally harmful development. Principles, strategies and action plans are developed to cope with deteriorating world environment. The UN system and the internationally active NGOs play important role in suggesting environmentally integrated development activities throughout the globe.

In this paper it is attempted to judge the Bangladesh situation in relation to policies and prejudices of the establishments, and finally to focus on some requirements for sustainable development in the region.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REVIEWED

Starting with the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment in 1972, the UN system considerably advanced environmental actions by initiating

dialogues, holding conferences, publishing reports and arranging agreements among nations. In its continued efforts, UN system achieved a number of triumphs. The World Conservation Strategy of 1980, the Brundtland Report of 1987, and the Agenda 21 of 1992 are the milestones in its search for global agreement on principles and actions relating to environmentally safe development options. Undoubtedly, associated NGOs extended important collaboration in carrying out the UN efforts.

UN documents, reports, and especially the Agenda 21 have clear discussion on national responsibilities and international cooperation needed for addressing environmental issues. Much has been stated on building national capacities to accelerate environmental care and also to identify their requirements and services at national levels. Developing countries, however, advised to take lead in improving their capacities and implementing action plans so that an 'integrated international assistance approach' could work well by continuous assessment of the situation. From environmental point of view, however, deep concern is expressed over the fragmented nature of the world. These documents highlighted the common international issues. The problems of managing the shared ecosystem are pinpointed with reference to the traditional form of national sovereignty.⁶ The Brundtland Report emphasized that the systematic features operate within and between the nations and that the ecosystems do not respect national boundaries.⁷ The conservation strategy of 1990 warns that, "... a key issue for the future is whether (national) frontiers will hold, be held by force or crumble before a tide of environmental refugees. The only chance of stabilizing the situation lies in international cooperation on an unprecedented scale to establish sustainability for all societies. Sovereign state must stop regarding themselves as a self-reliant units ... and accept a future as components of a global system."⁸

It is hard to oppose the above views and the sense of urgency underlying the statements. Globalism is inseparable from any environmental thought, especially, when ecosystemic understanding becomes the basis. Therefore, fruitful actions towards global care must have to comply with regional and national actions. Otherwise, the integrated nature of world environmental system could hardly be benefitted by the partisan approaches. But the fact which is less-emphasized is that the environmental awareness and values cannot proceed much further unless other hard realities of international relations are taken alongside. Keeping the present structure of wealth and power constant, partnership in ecodevelopment is a myth. 'International cooperation on an unprecedented scale' can well begin with the realization of environmental holocaust; to be fruitfully 'unprecedented', economic, social

and political barriers should not be perpetuated. Poor countries with the only wealth of 'sovereignty' or 'self-respect' can hardly be active partner in an unequal structure of relationships. With respect to the vulnerabilities of the less-developed countries, UN efforts seems less enterprising.

Therefore, the meaning of globalism and sustainability in UN fashion sounds different from that of the environmentalist movement of the 1960s. Sustainable development, thus, have special implications for the poor countries like Bangladesh. The members of the establishments seem to have conceived of sustainability as nationally divisible objective to be achieved individually by the states without referring to their typical resource constraints and the indivisible internationality of its creation. Similarly, globalism is narrowly conceived of and consequently found to be confined in dealing with the 'global commons' or in interstate technical cooperation without taking into consideration the existing inequality among nations in terms of wealth, power, and prestige. Intentionally or unintentionally, they ignore the historical origin of internationally shared causes of deprivation and misery. The calling for sustainable development came only after the man-made disruption had affected to the extent that some areas are even in a state of irreversible loss.

The Brundtland Report and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) have got reservations in taking a more dynamic conceptualizations of the term 'environment'. A more humanitarian understanding of environmental issues could have provided the strength to challenge the fundamentals of our understanding and conception of the national issues. United Nations and some NGOs, are caught in by the reservation and limitations inherent in their wrong assumptions about the fairness of existing world order—economic, political, and informational. An open trading among nations cannot benefit all trading partners in the present system. Daly argued that comparative advantage is irrelevant in a world characterized by the international mobility of capital in pursuit of absolute advantage. Thus, the sustainability becomes the vision of the market economy which does not find international trade inequality and poverty as problematic.⁹

Since the publication of the Brundtland Report, the prospects of environmental care within present institutional set up has been carefully reviewed. Accordingly, a number of new issues both of conceptual and practical values came forward. A section of scholars specifically focussed on the fact that any attempt to harmonize development and environment in future must have to start with the commitment of compensation for the past plunder. Without such sense of obligation to the poor and powerlessness of today's

world and the immediate benevolent initiative to gain mutual confidence, the ideas of sustainability would not sustain. Unfortunately, in some documents, the chapters on international cooperation and institutional requirement are concerned more with the national barriers and national responsibilities than the international obligations.

Denying the historical facts and factors of poverty-creation and environmental degradation, the UNCED emphasized the national level initiatives to identify barriers to sustainability of the developing countries to assess their national capacities and weakness for attracting donors' help. But what is essential for the United Nation is to mobilize North's priorities on launching confidence-building real programme for internationally beneficial environmental actions. Speth pointed out that : (i) paying carbon tax; (ii) augmenting flow of financial and technological assistance; (iii) relieving external debt; and (iv) helping tackle environmental challenges are the four initiatives required of the industrially countries as priorities.¹⁰ Today, the main reason for attacking the UN efforts and inter-governmental arrangements is their approval of the present role and prescription of World Bank and IMF. They are believed to have been spreading ecological burden across the globe. They are accused of accepting the dominance of the North in exploiting and manipulating the resources of the South in the name of environmental issues. Therefore, it has been argued that the economic, social and political factors should not be reduced into 'innocent actors'.¹¹ For this reasons the nature, structure and function of the United Nations are found to be confusing. Criticism and review of UN-sponsored environmental discourses continued through the Rio conference. In the same city of Brazil, 1992 Global Forum and International NGO Forum organized activities, series of hearings, and conference which provided a different tone as the matters like the role of World Bank, militarism, corruption, and international power structure are drawn into the main agenda of discussion in relation to environment and optimism at a world of real cooperations between peoples.¹² However, UN efforts made environment the central issue of national, regional and global importance in politics, development, and ethic.

One thing is obvious from the above discussion that 'environmental concern' itself possesses the inherent strength to change our value-orientation towards the scale of development, range of institutions, level of actions, and number of beneficiaries. Certainly, environment or humankind or the earth being the identity for all of us and being the minimum frame for viewing things, provides a forward looking urge. New International Order for fruitful structural adjustment is felt essential for holding such environmental vision.

New international economic order is now believed to be a precondition for arresting the deteriorating relationship between humanity and the biosphere.¹³ Eventually new environmental ethic is a felt need of the time.

SUSTAINABILITY AND BANGLADESH

The concrete situations of Bangladesh suggest that some of the environmental issues threaten the basic cycle of the pattern developed around life and livelihood. All the vital components of the life-process—land, people, vegetation, water—are affected by regional and global environmental changes. Besides, the regional political changes, state formation, and development activities historically moulded the social organization of resource use in such a way that environmental degradation is more profound than regeneration of capacity. Bangladesh emerged as a nation-state having a tiny figure to undergo the pains inflicted by environmental degradation and ecological imbalances. Human number increases in an ecologically unmanageable way. Land is owned, used and controlled by complex institutional arrangements of social origin which are as much harmful as agrochemicals. Water is a constant threat as alternating flood and drought affect the ecosystems. Therefore, ecologically speaking, the present number and rate of population growth, land degradation, drought and flood threaten the ecosystems, not only a nationstate. Since 'environment' today intrinsically upholds the global concerns and urge for much more coordinated treatment of the issues, the internalities and externalities of Bangladesh situation must be integrated into any practical attempt to environmental care.

As a narrowly politically confined territory, Bangladesh society finds it too difficult to benefit from inter-system exchanges. Ecological embargo perhaps further aggravated the situation. Conventional foreign aid and loan disbursement could hardly help bring about expected results. Internal arrangements are equally hopeless as the poverty continues through the interactive effects of poor resource base and poor management efficiency. The delay in planning of population control, land use, and water management has reduced the prospects for success to the extent that a number of externalities are now essential to be taken into consideration to accurately ascertain the prospects in future. Present government efforts towards sustainable development policy and strategy formulation are mainly to comply with the observations made on the most visible issues rather than long term ecological perspective. As a least developed country with peculiar socio-political formation, Bangladesh environment faces issues of different characters and implications. The nature of environmental concerns expressed by the

government and the international development agencies are something to be solved nationally, at best, regionally through conventional cooperation. Similarly, the rhetoric of sustainable development is unpracticable unless the people are provided the minimum needs. The scope for discouraging borrowing from the future for present consumption, and conscientizing people with inter-generational ethic is limited unless certain level of quality of life is ensured. As a less industrialized, less commercialized, and minimum technology user, Bangladesh seems to have the advantage to follow a sustainable development strategy which would incorporate the idea of the intrinsic value of environment and the values of sharing environment with the coming generations. But any attempt to operationalizing sustainable development leads to the question of ascertaining the present resource stock, rate of extraction, possibilities of regeneration and number of beneficiaries in case of non-renewable and renewable resources. Sustainability by its meaning involves all humankind; their sharing of the environmental benefits and partnership in protecting the environment. Jacobs observes, "Sustainability is meaningful if it is global in scope. It refers to the maintenance of environmental capacities throughout the world, not just in particular regions. A national economy can only do not reduce environment capacities within its own boundaries, but not cause their reduction elsewhere. Thus intergenerational and intergenerational equity should be ensured. Poverty in one part of the world today must be addressed to that end."¹⁴

Such conceptualization of sustainability contradicts with any attempt to define sustainable development for Bangladesh which excludes the externalities involved in environmentally sound development strategy. The poverty and inequality of Bangladesh, within herself and in relation to others, should be judged in context of the sustainable world environment and humankind. What is found unjust and unethical is that the present disparity of world resources, institutional arrangements, and burdens are taken for granted in prescribing sustainable path to development for the least developed countries.

In view of the facts and the nature and extent of environmental issues, Bangladesh situation raises certain vital questions of higher order to be considered for framing perspective policy.

1. Whether the global structural changes are again a felt need for planning and implementing national environmental issue.
2. Whether the present state of environment within its political boundary has the carrying capacity to feed, support and socialize the growing population.

3. Whether the country can take sustainable steps towards successful environmental protection by her own efforts, without cooperation from surrounding states.
4. Whether the extra-budgetary allocation and resources would be available for taking care of the environment.
5. Whether the available information and conceptual supports are enough to shape the economy, society, polity, culture, and ecology of the country towards sustainability, equality, and continuity.

Such considerations involve a lot many questions, inquiries, and projections in addition to the debate on the ideological strategic line. Consensus may not simply be possible for a number of reasons : (i) dearth of data regarding resource-assessment; (ii) inefficient implementation of approved programme; (iii) unavailability of tested models; and (iv) prevailing ethic of inter-state cooperation.

However, available views on the relationship between the internal and external factors of Bangladesh environmental degradation and under-development have focussed on the matter to some extents. It seems clear that greening Bangladesh can be possible only through a broader environmentalist endeavours, considering her poverty and unequal position as a threat to the world environment. It is essential to organize world opinion in favour of such a notion. Sobhan rightly observed that the success of sustainable development in developing countries lies with the structural adjustments among the developing countries lies with the structural adjustments among the developed countries. He asserts, "Can we devise a historic cost for eroding the resource base for the development of future generations? Can some mechanism be designed for developing countries to be compensated by developed countries for the inequitable consumptions of resources and to pay repatriations for damage to the environment? In the absence of such a process of historical accountability and for any notion of compensation, for the North to make demands on the Third World for exercising ecological austerity will be less than credible for both governments and peoples."¹⁵

REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUSTAINABLE BANGLADESH SOCIETY

It is therefore rightly emphasized that persistence of poverty in any part of the world is a threat to the scheme of healthy world environment. Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries of the present world. Her poverty

must be perceived as global concern if the spirit of environmentalism is rightly conceived of. Even, following Gallopin's statement on the general process of worldwide impoverishment, it can be argued that "the situation is more complex and cannot be reduced to the moral obligation of the rich to help the poor."¹⁶ With this understanding the international community and the international institutions can help Bangladesh to stand on her own limbs in a short periods of time. In other words, development of Bangladesh environment is inseparable from the ideas of a sustainable world environment.

However, Bangladesh government in their Country Report¹⁷ to the UNCED proposed several steps : (i) concessional finance on affordable non-commercial terms; (ii) compensation from polluters; (iii) waiver of any green conditionality unless additional fund is attached to aid; (iv) special environmental fund. The third one actually implies the dialectics between Bangladesh and the rest of the world. Additional fund is not sufficient to ensure environmentally safe development in the country.

To be green or sustainable, Bangladesh needs to assess her resources stock, rate of depletion, prospect of regeneration. Irreversibility must be identified with great courage and vigour. The socio-cultural elements are to be assessed in close connection with the bio-physical changes. Only a proper understanding of the potentialities and sustainability of the socio-cultural systems and its relevance to the bio-physical system can suggest appropriate measures of improvement and impoverishment. The extent of impoverishment include absolute reduction overtime in content, capacity, and availability of the socio-cultural and bio-physical items. Embankment failure is not greater an event than that in politics and production. All these failures may be found equally important issues if taken on the broader plain of a system framework.

However, Gallopin recently provided a conceptual framework in this line which refuted the usual sectoral and analytical approaches to global socio-ecological impoverishment processes on the ground that change and non-equilibrium, connectedness and complexity accelerated the relationship between social and ecological aspects at global, national and local levels.¹⁸ He rather advocated a socio-ecological systems approach to socio-ecological impoverishment. For the very nature of such approach impoverishment is also explained by the local-global casual interactions in social as well as ecological systems. Here again the basic questions arises : whether and to what extent a national sustainable development is possible within a growing interdependent world system.

CONCLUSION

At this stage, we may suggest that the pursuit of sustainable development in Bangladesh can only be possible through national, regional and international cooperation, based on the principles of humanism and environmentalism. Specifically, Bangladesh requires a human response to ensure at all levels the: (i) sustenance of the ecosystems; (ii) productivity, equity and the improvement of life situations; (iii) capacity to adjust to the external changing international scenarios; (iv) international adjustment to support self-reliant initiatives to socio-economic upliftments.

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Quaid-i-Azam's Economic Planning Committee's Report of 1945 : An Analytical Review

ZEENAT MAJID

INTRODUCTION

Preliminary Research

The importance of planning as a tool of economic development was known to economists of the subcontinent before Pakistan and India attained independence in 1947. There are many types of planning. However, a centralized concept of planning was first put into practice in former USSR in late 1920s. Although during this and subsequent two decades, the movement for independence from British rule had gained momentum, leaving little time for any economic thinking; both Congress and Muslim League directed their economic experts to start thinking about how to cope with the problems of underdevelopment once the subcontinent attained independence. Quaid-i-Azam is reported to have stressed the need for preparing a development programme for the Muslims of the subcontinent as early as April 14, 1941.¹ He appointed a formal Committee for this purpose in 1944 which submitted a Twenty-Year Development Programme in 1945. The details of this programme have been recently brought to light by Mr. Khalid Shams-ul-Hassan in his book *Quaid-i-Azam's Unrealized Dream*.² The present study aims at recapitulating the salient features of this programme and analyzing it in the light of economic developments in Pakistan during 1950s.

The paper is divided into three parts. Part I explains the background of the formation of the Committee and the way it worked and prepared its report. Part II gives salient features of the Report and the recommendations contained in it. Part III casts a critical look at the nature of the Committee's recommendations and their comparison with major economic developments in Pakistan during 1950s.

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I

FORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE**Background**

Unfortunately, there is a general impression that, the Muslim League leaderships, during the Pakistan Movement, did not give much attention to the economic problems. This is far from truth. In fact, ever since the adoption of Lahore Resolution in 1940, Quaid-i-Azam never missed any opportunity in urging Muslim League to adopt measures for alleviating Muslim economic backwardness. At the Madras Session of the Muslim League a year later (1941), he deplored that Muslims were at the bottom in the economic and social conditions compared to other communities, and emphasized the need for devising a Five-Year Plan for socio-economic development of the Muslims. His urgency about its preparation is indicated by the fact that he wanted a part of the plan to show as to "how quickly and how best the department of the national life of Muslim India may be built up."³

Subsequently, for this purpose, a Committee under the Chairmanship of Raja Sahib Mahmudabad, was formed and was asked to submit its report within six months. However, due to paucity of funds the Committee failed to complete its job.

At its Karachi Session in December 1943, All-India Muslim League passed a Resolution authorizing its President, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, to appoint a Committee with power to co-opt additional member and "to prepare a comprehensive scheme for five-year programme for the economic and social uplift, including state industrialization in Pakistan zones, introduction of free primary basic education, reform of land system, stabilization of rent, security of tenure and improvement in the conditions of labour, agriculture and control of money lending."⁴ The second part of the resolution appears to be a sort of policy directive for the Muslim League Ministries working in the Pakistan areas. The Committee was asked to submit its report as early as possible, and an interim report within six months, i.e., by June 1944.

Quaid-i-Azam in his circular letter of April 12, 1944 to the forty persons tentatively selected for the Committee, stated that the main purpose of the Committee would be "preparing us to participate in the natural developments in the direction of commercial and agricultural expansion and industrialization and be ready for a gigantic and coordinated drive of economic reconstruction."⁵

Selection and Composition

The formation of the Committee was an uphill task, as the Muslim experts were fewer in number, and a large number of them were in Government service. Expertise from private sectors were hard to obtain as few Muslim owned and managed sound and big industrial, trading, banking and other economic enterprises.

After months of hard endeavours, he was able to announce on August 23, 1944 a twenty-three members Planning Committee, headed by Ali Nawaz Jung, an Engineer with A.B.A. Haleem an Educationist, as its Secretary, M.L. Qureshi an Economist, as Joint Secretary. Mr. Qureshi was destined to be the Chief Economist of Pakistan's Planning Commission which formulated the Country's First Five-Year Plan. The Committee was a combination of best and finest talent available from various fields as is apparent from the following profession-wise membership.⁶

Engineering	- Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung, Khan Bahadur Abdul Aziz, Syed Arif-ud-Din, Ahsan Yar Jung and Mohsin Ali
Economists and Scintists	- Elias Burney, Anwar Iqbal Qureshi, M. L. Qureshi, L. K. Haider and Dr. Wali Muhammad
Education	- Mian Afzal Hussain and A. B. A. Haleem
Commerce and Trade	- Hasham Premji, Malang Ahmad Badshah, Hatim Alvi and S.M. Bashir
Industrialists and Bankers	- Mir Laik Ali, M. B. Zaidi, Ahmad Isphahani and Rafi Butt
General Interest	- Kh. Shahab-ud-Din, Abdur Rab Nishtar, and Ghulam Ali Talpur

Working of the Committee

Once formed, the Committee lost no time in getting on to its task. The Committee held its inaugural meeting on September, 1944 at Delhi. Only 12 members, besides the office bearers, participated, but the expertise and their calibre made the number irrelevant.

The Chairman as embodied in Muslim League's resolution, i.e., "to survey and examine the conditions of India and more particularly of the Pakistan areas with a view to preparing the Muslims to participate in the natural developments in the direction of commercial and agricultural expansion

and industrialization and be ready for a gigantic and coordinated drive in the field of economic reconstruction, specially in the 'post war reconstruction.'⁷

He stressed the need for the speedy completion of the work as political and economic scenario was changing fast and uncertainty was making time a crucial determinant. Time consuming research, a pre-requisite for a comprehensive plan, was not practicable. Scope had to be confined to the preparation of a general outline, and ground work for the plan.

Of the numerous problems, which needed attention, achieving food sufficiency in view of 15 per cent deficiency on food supply and tackling unemployment—particularly that of educated required immediate attention.

The work of reconstruction was not unpracticable, and could be achieved through effective planning. He advocated fixing a long period (12 to 15 years) for planning.

The Committee also laid down the organizational structure for systematic planning. Fifteen Sub-Committees were appointed for the various sectors of the economy to deal with the different aspects of the problems.⁸

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Agriculture : | 1. Agriculture Production, Soil Conservation and Afforestation. |
| | 2. Annual Husbandry and Dairying. |
| | 3. Fisheries. |
| | 4. Water Uses and River Regulation. |
| | 5. Rural and Cottage Industries. |
| Industry : | 6. Mining and Metallurgy. |
| | 7. Chemical Industries. |
| | 8. Manufacturing and Engineering Industries. |
| Transport and
Communication : | 9. Communication and Transport. |
| | 10. Transport Industries. |
| Finance and Commerce : | 11. Finance. |
| | 12. Trade and Commerce. |
| Economic and Social
Overheads : | 13. Fuel and Power. |
| | 14. Public Health. |
| | 15. Housing. |

These Sub-Committees also suffered from the same limitations, which handicapped the main body, i.e., scarcity of experts and finances. To overcome the former limitation membership of the Sub-Committee was

extended to prominent scholars, who were not members of the Planning Committee. More than one Committees had to be managed by one Chairman, e.g., in one extreme case six Sub-Committees were managed by one Chairman. Each Sub-Committee was assigned the task of drawing a report along with a memorandum in giving the existing state of affairs and laying down the objective within fifteen years divided over five years period indicating the lines and method by which these were to be achieved along with expected cost. The reports were to be submitted to Planning Committee within four months. In spite of the shortage of trained staff and funds, these had to undertake the difficult task of collecting basic information over a wide area. Obstacles appeared to be innumerable and unsurmountable, but spirit to succeed was created by Quaid's personal interest.

Quaid's Address : Enunciation of Guiding Principles

Quaid-i-Azam was invited to address the Second Meeting of the Planning Committee on November 5, 1944. He recounted the background to the appointment of the Committee. The Muslims, he said, were at the lowest end of the economic ladder—and had zero economic organization. They could go up the economic ladder, only through strong organizations at the economic level. It was with this end in view that he had suggested setting up of the Muslim Chambers of Commerce in important provinces, which were now in a position to form a federation. This could prove a powerful forum for discussing various industrial and commercial issues. The present Committee was formed on the behest of Muslim League "to draw up a plan of economic development on a wide and comprehensive basis."⁹

Its report shall create awareness among the Muslims to focus attention on matters affecting their economic life. The Quaid asked the Committee to make a realistic assessment of economic potentialities of Pakistan areas, as extreme views of pessimism and optimism had been expressed on this count. He desired that report of the Committee be authentic and serve as a guide for economic planning.

The one objective, which he exhorted the Committee to keep in mind, while drawing the plan, should be "to level up the general standard of living amongst the masses and not to make rich richer and accelerate the process of accumulation of wealth in the hands of few individuals; "our ideal should note to be capitalistic but Islamic; and the interests and welfare of the people should be constantly kept in mind."¹⁰

He was full of admiration for the members of the Committee and paid rich tributes to their calibre and considered them equal to experts any where in the world and declared himself lucky to have their services in this nation-building venture. He was sure the Committee would propose sound lines of development and explore the potentialities especially for better economic life in Pakistan and Hindustan in general. He assured them his fullest cooperation in implementing their recommendations in the provinces where the Muslim League was in power, and to recommend it to the British Government as well. The address not only provided the guidelines, but also an incentive to the Committee to suggest a multidimensional approach to improve the economic conditions of Muslims through systematic planning.

II

THE REPORT

The Economic Planning Committee considered and approved with modifications the draft of a Memorandum/Report prepared by its Chairman in its Fourth Meeting held from 30 June to 2 July at Bombay. This was termed as the First Report however, Second and a more comprehensive Report dealing with the problems of Pakistan areas, was to be prepared after various sub-committees engaged in collecting data and drawing up proposals submitted their reports. But this report could not be prepared due to fast moving political events. The Committee decided to submit this Memorandum/Report to the Quaid-i-Azam to avoid further delay. The first part of the report concentrated on identification of problems and laying down basic principles to be pursued from the Muslim point of view for the formulation of Plan in British India. Second part of the report a documented statistical portion indicated the sectoral allocation and resource distribution as well as the growth targets for next twenty-years (1945—1965) divided in four Five-Year Plans.

The Report explained the philosophy of planning as making full use of the human, physical and technological resources. The report discusses the basic issues like population explosion, which added to the complexity of problems of poverty, unequal distribution, structural imbalance, along with the post-war crises. Low production was the root cause of the crises in India which was in part the failure of existing system to utilize big strides in scientific knowledge for full utilization of resources.

Existing institutions needed restructuring not only to boost production but also to improve the distribution system for the benefit of the consumers instead of indulging in the competition to have maximum command over the

resources by the producers to exploit the masses. Mitigation and eradication of such problems can only be initiated through a planned development programme in the form of Five-Year Plans by establishing a continuous linkage for the next two decades for the utilization of physical and human resources. The priority objective was provision for 'basic needs' as a first step. The possibility of which was visualized only under 'genuine democracy of Islam'.¹²

THE FEATURES OF THE REPORT

Time Frame Work

The Committee recommended the period of twenty years (1945-1965), spilt into four Five-Year Plans to initiate a programme. It was essential for re-building of the economy to obtain far reaching results.

The Committee was of the view, "Period of Capital Investment can only be shortened by a high rate of investment, which must be at the cost of social services."¹³ Main objective of the planned programme was coordination between creation of earning power and improvement in social condition. Moreover any preference to producer over consumer would prove an obstacle in the development process.

Proposed time duration was based on sound economic reasons. It was combination of mid term and long term planning, making it a continuous process. Moreover, similar time frame work was then in vogue for planned development in a number of advanced and developing countries. It was vital for comprehensive planning to make inroads for meaningful implementation.

Statistical Base

The statistical information, a basic requisite for the formulation of comprehensive plan, was scarce and incomplete. Due to lack of trained staff, a volatile political situation and vast areas that had to be covered. Sub-Committees were entrusted with the collection of data and to minimize these difficulties.

In view of these limitations not only the report had to be prepared in two parts, but a 'skeleton programme'¹⁴ of basic issues had to be drawn. Thus the figures had to be evaluated on not what they were but what they represented. The direction of the planning and general approach towards the problems identified. In this frame work it was indeed a pioneer contribution of the Committee.

longer period. The creation of demand for work was no substitute for maintenance of work. Strict regimentation by the state was adopted in others. Standard of living was even lower there after planned programme. It could only be justified in emergencies like war. Regimentation would damage the sense of responsibility vital for progress. The state had to formulate constructive policies and devise a system to generate gainful employment, to guarantee the right to work to any one who was willing to work and able to work. The objective should be improvement in the standard of living of the masses not making the 'rich richer'. Equal distribution of job opportunities requires education, technical and scientific — which had made long strides after war. Its absence has kept masses in backward conditions and techniques primitive. Education and training of skill will further reduce the inequalities of income, which are considered unjustifiable. Country had the manpower which can be organized to exploit the available resources. Co-operation must be made the rule of life not competition the motive force.¹⁷ Majority of the people were engaged in agriculture. Therefore, it should be considered 'key industry.'¹⁸ It could give greater opportunity for a sound and profitable investment in human welfare and progress. This was in no way to undermine the role of industry, the two sectors were closely related.

Institutional Restructuring

Institutional restructuring was suggested for mitigating the class rigidities and reducing the exploitation in each sector, e.g., by the *Zamindar*, in the agricultural sector, the capitalist in the manufacturing (irrespective of the nationality whether British or Indian). Exploitation of man by man on the basis of the ownership of means of production was considered unjustified (Marxian Analysis) substitution of scientific methods of production for manpower though essential for the transition should be at a minimum displacement of labour. The experience of developed countries was summed up in these words. "Man should be master of machines, and not its slave."¹⁹ Related issue of money as a source of power and instrument for exploitation should also be addressed.

A Vision : Just Economic System

A just economic system (Islamic, already mentioned) consisting of features of capitalism and state planning was recommended to avoid monopolies and private profit motive of the extreme type various degrees of the state involvement subject to their condition along with private freedom for the ownership of the property had to be maintained. The form of organization considered suitable was "Public Corporation,"²⁰ having power of the

Government and flexibility, initiative of the private enterprise."²¹ It would be an appropriate form for social welfare and distributive justice important aspect of their function would be, not only to undertake research, but also to co-ordinate the research of the Government and private agencies and make the results available to all for the greater national interest. The role of the state was marked not only as a agency assisting the formulation of the plan but also in its implementation—for the allocation and mobilization of resources in the desired channels along with the co-ordination of the short term and long term objectives.

THE GENERAL APPROACH

Planned development was recommended to achieve the twin targets of elimination of poverty and increased social welfare. Post war problem had made it a burning question. Planned programme had to be initiated within the framework of Five-Year Plans. Planning was considered a comprehensive exercise. Detailed information was required to assess diversified resources of the regions. The role of the state was formulation of constructive policies and devising a system oriented towards cooperation rather than competition. Existing capitalistic system had encouraged private profit motive giving rise to concentration of wealth in fewer hands and increasing disparities in income. Quid-i-Azam warned against this tendency and advised to suggest a new approach.

The Committee was aware of its limitation as only the government could undertake elaborate research for the planning. They decided to chalk out a broad outline of the programme and lay down the foundation of the planned economy.

In order to transform broad proposals into definite shape institution like Planning Commission in each Government shall have to be set up. The planning implementation shall have to be entrusted to a Development Board. In the initial stages the reliance shall have to be on foreign personnels to fill the gap of trained at home. The basic assumption for development was the cooperation of the public. Popular government and people incentives to work could speed up the pace of development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To achieve the target of 6 per cent per annum growth rate in national income, four Five-Year Plans were recommended for the period 1945—1965. According to basic principles laid down priority was given to productive

activities followed by social sectors. Income generating activities were placed on the top of the list, co-ordination between two major sectors, was of vital importance sectoral allocations were determined with these objectives. The scenario of total and percentage allocation of development expenditure and mobilization of resources for the purpose was presented in the Tables 1 and 2 and sectoral recommendations were given.²²

TABLE 1
Total and Percentage Sectoral Allocation
in Twenty Years Development Programme

(Crores of Rupees)

Head	1st FYP		2nd FYP		3rd FYP		4th FYP		Total	
	Crore	%	Crore	%	Crore	%	Crore	%	Crore	%
Planning Organization and Administration	125	6.8	125	4.0	125	2.7	125	2.0	500	3.2
Agriculture and Animal Husbandary	700	36.8	1050	33.3	1400	30.7	1250	20.3	4400	27.9
Industry	525	27.7	950	30.2	1475	32.4	2450	39.8	5400	34.3
Communication and Transport	125	6.6	300	9.5	450	9.9	725	11.8	1600	10.2
Education	125	6.6	225	7.1	350	7.7	550	8.9	1250	7.9
Health	75	3.9	125	4.0	250	5.5	450	7.3	900	5.8
Housing	25	1.3	75	2.4	100	2.2	100	1.6	300	1.9
Defence	200	10.5	300	9.5	400	8.8	500	8.1	1400	8.9

TABLE 2
Total and Percentage Resource Mobilization
for Development Expenditure

(Crores of Rupees)

Source of Finance	1st FYP		2nd FYP		3rd FYP		4th FYP		Total	
	Crore	%	Crore	%	Crore	%	Crore	%	Crore	%
Surplus Revenue from Taxation	525	27.6	1620	51.4	3170	69.6	5350	87.0	10665	67.7
Capital Balance	350	18.4	400	12.7	450	9.8	-	-	1200	7.6
Internal Loans	675	35.5	725	23.0	775	17.0	825	13.4	3000	19.0
External Loans	400	21.1	400	12.7	200	4.3	-	-	1000	6.3
Return from Investment	50	0.1	105	3.3	280	6.1	550	9.0	885	5.6
Total	1900		3250		4875		6725		16750	
Deduct Repayment Foreign Loans	-		100		325		575		1000	
Available	1900		3150		4550		6150		15750	

Agriculture and Allied Sectors

Agriculture was considered to be the key sector of the economy. It contributed a large share in GNP and employment. All development plans heavily depended on agriculture sector for their success. But the key person in agriculture, i.e., cultivators were in poor economic condition. To improve the lot of producers and for fuller utilization of resources a total of Rs. 4,400 crore was allocated for the period 1945—1965. Out of this amount, Rs. 1,200 crore were earmarked as working capital. In sub-sectoral allocation highest amount was kept for irrigation (Rs. 500 crore) followed by establishment of warehousing and marketing centres (Rs. 475 crore).²³

Table 3 shows plan-wise percentage allocation for agriculture sector.

TABLE 3
Plan-wise Percentage Allocation for Agriculture Sector

Head	1st Plan	2nd Plan	3rd Plan	4th Plan
Percentage of Total Allocation	15.0	23.9	31.8	28.4
Increase over the Previous Plan	-	50.0	33.3	-10.7
Percentage Allocation of Five-Year Plan	36.8	33.3	30.8	20.3

Note : This Table and subsequent Tables have been calculated from Table 1.

Percentage of total allocation in each Five-Year Plan indicates an increase upto Third Five-Year Plan followed by a decline in Fourth Plan. It is right to assume that even percentages do not represent the exact position. However, it does indicate that the sector was given due importance in accordance with basic principles.

For implementation of the programme, the following measures were suggested :

1. Institutional changes, e.g., removal of number of intermediaries.
2. Peasant proprietors farming be encouraged through cooperative organizations.
3. Land survey development organization should be set up.
4. It is suggested to set up hundred experimental farms, fifty research stations and 460,000 model holdings.

Irrigation was also given high priority. Agriculture development was linked with irrigation facilities. It needed proper utilization of water and elimination of waste. In some projects, like sinking tubewells, cooperation of private sector can be encouraged. The management of irrigation work had to be in accordance with the requirements.

Agriculture was not much organized and farmer suffered many losses, either by natural calamities or by fluctuating prices. It was suggested to set up warehousing and marketing facilities alongwith multi-purpose cooperative societies.

Allied sectors like animal husbandry, dairy farming, etc., can provide alternative source of income to the farmers by better utilization of less fertile lands. Dairy farming and fisheries can improve the dietary standard as well. Research in all these sub-sectors should be encouraged.

Industry

In the initial stages emphasis was on agricultural development. But soon, in view of its contribution to material prosperity, the rate of industrial development was expected to be higher than that of agriculture. Moreover, it had a vast scope as 80 per cent of imported consumer goods could easily be produced at home. So balanced inter-sectoral development was recommended. Allocation in the twenty-year development programme and even Five-Year Plans indicate the same direction.

These three categories indicate an increasing allocation in the industrial sector. The data show that the emphasis was on keeping with the global trend as no country could rely on single sector or industry for her development.

TABLE 4
Dimension of Allocation for Industry

Head	1st FYP	2nd FYP	3rd FYP	4th FYP
Percentage of Total Industrial Allocation	9.7	17.6	27.3	43.4
Plan-wise Increase	-	81.0	55.3	66.1
Share in each Plan	27.7	30.2	32.4	39.8

In sub-sectoral allocation highest priority was given to consumer goods industry, Rs. 1,400 crore or 25.9 per cent. For industrial development main deficiency—power generation had to be removed. It was second on the priority list, Rs. 1,000 crore.

Manufacturing can complement agricultural development in a number of ways, bridging the gap between production and consumption, to reduce seasonal unemployment. Direct use can be possible in certain directions like water lifting and drainage. Proper research and other measures should be adopted to encourage this sub-sector, being an integral part of the economy.

Industry must be dispersed in the different areas to distribute the benefit among those who produce goods on small scale.

Communication and Transport

It was considered that with industrialization and improvement in agricultural sector more infrastructure will be required.

All means of transport be re-organized and developed. Resource allocation was made accordingly. First priority was given to railways, followed by roads and shipping and aviation, 32.8 per cent were kept for the former and 18.7 per cent for later.

TABLE 5
Allocation for Transportation and Communication

Head	1st FYP	2nd FYP	3rd FYP	4th FYP
Percentage of Total Transport Allocation	7.8	18.7	28.1	45.3
Plan-wise Increase	-	140.0	50.0	61.1
Share in each Plan	6.6	9.5	9.8	11.8

A continuously increasing trend can be seen, it is to keep pace with other sectoral development. As rapid growth in industrial sector is envisaged in Third and Fourth Five-Year Plans, so percentage depicts a remarkable increase.

Social Services

Importance of social services for redistributing benefits among the public, particularly in rural areas, was recognized. Emphasis was on education, health and housing respectively.

Education

Education was considered the most important sub-sector. It enables the masses to respond more intelligently to new techniques of production. Wide scope existed for technical training and professionals. Total of Rs. 1,250 crore or 7.9 per cent were estimated for it.

TABLE 6
Dimension of Allocation for Education

Head	1st FYP	2nd FYP	3rd FYP	4th FYP
Percentage of Total Education Allocation	10.0	18.0	28.0	44.0
Share in Five-Year Plan	6.6	7.1	7.7	8.9
Increase over Previous Plan	-	80.0	55.6	57.1

Pattern of expenditure was not different from the productive sectors. Third and Fourth Five-Year Plans indicate a marked increase over the Second Plan. Percentages increased consistently in each five-year programme.

In sub-sectoral allocation pre-primary and primary education was followed by higher secondary level and technical education, 40 per cent 32 per cent and 12 per cent respectively. Women education including rural area was part of the programme. Adult education and training centres were recommended for the purpose.

Health

In view of importance of health for the welfare of masses a rational health policy was recommended. Main focus was on research on all aspects of health problems.

TABLE 7
Dimension of Allocation for Health

Head	1st FYP	2nd FYP	3rd FYP	4th FYP
Percentage of Total Health Allocation	8.3	13.9	27.8	50.0
Share in each Five-Year Plan	3.9	2.9	5.5	7.3
Increase over Previous Plan	-	66.7	110.0	80.0

Each plan received more for health sector as compared with previous one. Sanitation and preventive measures given priority in sub-sectoral allocation, i.e., 22.2 per cent followed by hospitals and rural dispensaries, 16.7 per cent and 11.1 per cent respectively.

Housing

Physical infrastructure was in extremely poor state. Slums in urban areas and poor housing in rural areas reflected the degree of poverty. It was considered the duty of the state to provide home to every family. However,

state could not do it alone. The responsibility must be shared by private sector. Housing and cooperative societies must be encouraged in this field along with *Panchayats*. An amount of Rs. 300 crore or 1.9 per cent was provided. It might be meagre, but consistent increase was allocated like any other sector.

TABLE 8
Dimension of Allocation for Housing

Head	1st FYP	2nd FYP	3rd FYP	4th FYP
Percentage of Total Housing Allocation	8.3	25.0	33.3	33.3
Share in each Five-Year Plan	1.3	2.4	2.2	1.6
Increase over Previous Plan	-	200.0	33.3	-

Defence

Defence was of vital importance for the security of the country, particularly in view of World War II. Maintenance of peace was not an economic need, but a vital need to avoid wastage of scarce natural and material resources.

TABLE 9
Dimension of Allocation for Defence

Head	1st FYP	2nd FYP	3rd FYP	4th FYP
Percentage of Total Defence Allocation	14.3	21.4	28.6	35.7
Share in each Five-Year Plan	10.5	9.5	8.8	8.1
Increase over Previous Plan	-	50.0	33.3	25.0

Total amount of Rs 1,400 crore was estimated for it. Difference from the other sectors was declining trend in each Five-Year Plan and after initial increasing in Second Plan direction was same. Exception was of total allocation percentage.

Trade and Commerce

New trade policy was needed to curtail expenditure on imports and encourage exports. Such policy was justifiable on rational grounds. There was, at the initial stage, a need for import of capital goods for industrial sector growth but import of durable consumer items must be discouraged to save scarce foreign exchange resources. Speaking in technical terms, in the first

phase appropriate policy was that of import substitution and once this goal was reached we could think of export led growth.

There were two particular problems which agricultural economies face :

1. Their exports consist of primary products with fluctuating prices.
2. Their imports consist of finished goods with stable or rising prices.

This has resulted in constantly decreasing terms of trade.

Sources of Revenue

Additional funds had to be generated from different sources of public revenue, leaving the existing contribution of taxation, Rs. 400 crores per annum intact. Total amount of Rs. 15,750 crores was needed in twenty years (1945—1965).

Taxation

Taxation will be the major source of revenue. Total amount of Rs. 10,665 crores (Table 2), 67.7 per cent will be contributed by this. This was the limit of taxation to maintain agricultural prices at reasonable level.

TABLE 10
Contribution of Taxation

Head	1st FYP	2nd FYP	3rd FYP	4th FYP
Share in Twenty-Year Programme	4.9	15.1	29.7	50.1
Share in each Five-Year Plan	27.6	51.4	69.6	87.0
Increase over Previous Plan	-	47.9	95.7	68.8

Source : Calculated from Table 2.

Increased reliance was on taxation in the twenty-year development programme. Maximum contribution in the Fourth Plan in first two categories, whereas the last category reached its peak in the Third Five-Year Plan. It was only the First Five-Year Plan that taxation was second on the list of priority. Highest contribution was made by internal loans.

Other Sources of Revenue

Total internal loans indicated a continuous increase over the entire period percentage declined. Capital balance contribution declined and made no contribution after Third Five-Year Plan. Total amount of return of investment appeared to be nominal, but its share increased over twenty years as well as in

each five-year programme. External loans was important source of revenue in the first two quinquenniums and declined in third and nil contribution in the fourth one.

Forecast for its Achievement

Economic Planning Committee was optimistic about its achievement once twenty year development programme was implemented. The twine objectives of elimination of poverty and reducing the income disparities was anticipated to be attained by changes in the basic indicators.

TABLE II
Anticipated Changes in Basic Indicators

Head	1945	1965
National Income (British India including Pakistan)	Rs. 3200 crore	Rs. 10263 crore
Population	314 million	390 million
Average National Income during Five-Year Plan	Rs. 3608 crore	Rs. 8646 crore
Average Revenue	Rs. 505 crore	Rs. 1470 crore

Source : Khalid, *op.cit.*, pp. 62-91.

These were anticipated on the basis of increased allocation on productive activities, agriculture and industry. Former getting the priority in earlier stages and later taking over in the Third and Fourth Plans. Stage was ready for greater emphasis on social services. Future programme was planned on the following assumptions :

1. Four per cent per annum increase in National Income instead of 6 per cent.
2. Increased in National Income will be followed by increased revenue so tax rate will be reduced from 17 per cent to 16 per cent.

The salient features of resources and allocation for the fifth quinquennium were :

1. Complete reliance on internal resources, taxation being the largest contributor.
2. In expenditure, industry was followed by education sector for the period.
3. Employment generation and reduction in occupational imbalance was likely to be achieved.

III

AN EVALUATION OF THE REPORT

Opportunity to Transform Economic Dream into Reality

The implementation of the Report of the Muslim League Planning Committee had to be postponed from 1945 onward as political issues took priority over every other problem. Quaid-i-Azam had clear vision about the state of affairs of the Sub-Continent and reached the conclusion that "socio-economic power flows from the possession of political power. An independent India would not necessarily bring the dawn of freedom to the Muslim." He had devised a "Pakistan first strategy"²⁴ to achieve goals for the Muslim. Once political power was achieved Quaid-i-Azam lost no time in declaring that economic life in Pakistan will be organized on the sure foundation of social justice. Now was the opportunity to transform his dream into reality by implementing the All-India Muslim League Economic Planning Committee's Report.

The focus in this part is on the comparative study of two development programmes formulated by All-India Muslim League Economic Planning Committee and attempts of the planning organization in Pakistan till its culmination in the form of First Five-Year Plan (FFYP to be referred from now on) in the fifties. The reason for the selection of these two programmes is similarity of common features—being the first systematic attempt in the discipline of planning. Scope is confined to the period and First Five-Year Plan otherwise volumes had to be written for meaningful analysis supported by statistical information (extremely scarce in both cases). However an overview of other plans will also be taken into account wherever necessary for the sake of completion. The detailed intellectual exercise is left to the future generation of research scholars. This is first step toward exploration of similarities and differences in the two programmes prepared in the British India and Pakistan for the Muslim by the Muslim. Moreover various dimension of the programmes will be taken into account to establish the fact whether "First Five-Year Plan have drawn its vision, insight and guideline from its pioneering development programme."²⁵

The history of planning Pakistan can be divided in two phases—pre-planned and systematically planned; both full of unsurmountable constraints. The constraints ranged from disruption of means of transport, communication, collapse of banking and commerce, withholding of cash balances by the Indian Government complete economic blockade, migration of trained and

professional staff. The one single problem that alone contained the germs of destroying young economy of Pakistan was enormous flow of refugees²⁶ (7.9 million).²⁷ The economy could easily be termed as "refugee economy."²⁸ Attention had to be diverted from development to rehabilitation and reconstruction in the very first fiscal year. Pakistan survived this economic ordeal. The state of affair was reflected in the first budget speech by Quaid-i-Azam; when he concluded: "the prophets of evil have been thoroughly discredited" there is steady and all round improvement in the economic field.²⁹

Re-structuring of Planning Institutions

Planning, however informal started in Pakistan from 1947 onward when attempts were made to co-ordinate economic development with planning. A Development Board, a Planning Advisory Board and an Economic Committee were set up in 1948. Economic Affairs Ministry was set up to co-ordinate the planning activities. Establishment of the Planning Board was in keeping with the recommendations of the Muslim League Economic Planning Committee. Planning machinery was reorganized again in 1953 and 1958 when Development Board was replaced by Planning Board—an autonomous body and its status was raised to Planning Commission and later to a division in the President's Secretariat.

Each institution made its contribution in spite of basic limitations like scarcity of data, trained personnel vital for planning. Development Board managed to compile a Six-Year (1951-1957) development programme by incorporating Colombo Plan of 1950. This plan was not a scientific plan, but was considered merely an aggregation of individual projects prepared in the absence of essential information and many basic statistics. However, it made its mark by adopting the direction given by the Muslim League Economic Planning Committee. This was represented in greater role of public sector, higher allocation to the agricultural sector (one third of the total resources).³⁰

Recommendations of another sector committee—Muslim League Agrarian Committee 1949 suggested institutional change similar to the guideline given by Muslim League Economic Planning Committee. Major problem to be addressed was to fix the ownership, ceiling (150 acres of irrigated land, 300 acres of semi irrigated land and 450 acres of unirrigated land).³¹ The implementation of the plan could not run its course due to Korean War and had to end two years earlier; and priority development programme had to be prepared. It was kept flexible project to project plan was undertaken. Though it is not considered a representative plan yet its contribution in laying down the foundation of industrial development and infrastructure was quite substantial.

A beginning was made, and Planning Board as mentioned earlier, was appointed to prepare a Five-Year Plan.

Era of Systematic Planning

Systematic planning was launched with the decision of formulation of Five-Year Plan, a new phase of planning was on the evil. The terms of the reference of the Planning Board were, (a) to review the development that has taken place since independence, (b) to assess the resources, material and human, which can be made available for development during next five years beginning April, 1954 (later changed to April 1955), (c) to prepare a national development plan based on the fullest utilization of these resources for a period of Five Years.³² Draft of the plan was formulated and circulated in May 1956 among various Government and non-Government agencies for illiciting general opinion, was revised in the light of suggestions received. It was not approved by the National Economic Council till February, 1957 (finally approved in April 15, 1957). Two years delay was an important factor in the partial achievement of the plan. Status of the Board was raised to the Planning Commission in 1958 by the new regime. However in spite of unsurmountable difficulties and delays a Five-Year Plan (1955—1960) was formulated and ready to be implemented. An era of Scientific Planning had been ushered.

Salient Features of First Five-Year Plan

The First Five-Year Plan was the beginning of the scientific planning in Pakistan. Basic philosophy of plan was the improvement in general welfare of the masses. Five major objectives were selected to achieve this aim. These were : 1. to raise national income and per capita income 15 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively 2. To increase employment opportunities 3. To provide social services like education health and housing 4. To improve balance of payment 5. To increase development in less developed areas.³³ These were the highlights in the Muslim League Committee Report and were common in all Pakistan's Plans.

Sectoral allocations were projected with these objective in view. To keep the uniformity with the main theme of the paper. The total and percentage, sectoral allocation are taken into account (Table 12) the First Five-Year Plan has the additional benefit of actual amount and percentages used. This will make comparative analysis more meaningful.

TABLE 12
Allocation of Resources and Actual Expenditure

(In Million Rupees)

Field of Development	First Plan Target		First Plan Actual	
	Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage
Agriculture (Including V-AID)	1,220	11	570	7
Irrigation	1,260	12	780	10
Industry, Fuels and Minerals	3,050	28	2,430	31
Power	900	8	570	7
Education	460	4	440	6
Health	230	2	160	2
Social Welfare and Manpower Training	100	1	30	1
Transport and Communications	1,790	17	1,340	17
Miscellaneous	300	3	-	-
Housing	1,490	14	1,530	20
Total	10,800	100	7,850	100

Source : Mahbulul Haq, *The Strategy of Economic Planning*, Oxford University Press, Karachi.

Emphasis is again a direction and approach overall strategy though not 'explicit' yet 'implicit'.³⁴ It was in favour of growth orientation. Industry was the leading sector in both total amount and percentages (target and actual) to be followed by physical infrastructure, e.g., housing and transport 20 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. The priority to the industrial sector was given to bring sectoral balance and utilize the infrastructure created in the pre-planned era. Allocation to housing was the need of the time to rehabilitate displaced persons and transport to accommodate growing requirements of both sectors and rapidly increasing traffic. As a result social overhead were recipient of too smaller share of resources.

Financial resources were estimated to be mobilized mainly from domestic resources, 62 per cent and 38 per cent from external resources. In internal resources major target 91 per cent was realized in private saving. Public saving turned out negative, gap was filled by deficit financing to the extent of Rs. 150 crores³⁵ for which no projection was made earlier. It was assumed to be non-inflationary. However, it had inflationary impact due to expansion in the government expenditure, mainly non-development (91.2 per cent³⁶ of revenue resources). Two major items of expenditure were defence and general

administration. These absorbed 70 per cent³⁷ of the domestic revenue. Development expenditure had to be financed from external resources. Delay in its administration proved a limitation. Shortfall in foreign aid and loan had more than proportional impact on domestic savings 30 per cent reduction in former led to 70 per cent reduction in the later.³⁸

Comparative Study of two Plans

The two Five Year Plans, one formulated by the Planning Committee (Muslim League Committee to be referred from now on) appointed by Quaid-i-Azam himself and the other First Five-Year Plan by the Planning Board whose members were also the members of earlier Committee can be compared in their various dimensions. The comparison is not between the size and statistics which can be subject to criticism due to its various limitation and availability, method of collection and interpretation. Their significance lies in the general approach in identification of the problems, and the direction of planning. Focus is on these themes and trace the imprints of thinking of former one on the later, and single out the similarities and the differences.

Common Features in the two Plans

These were pioneering attempts in the sense, Muslim League Committee Report made a beginning of systematic planning in the British India, while First Five-Year Plan laid down the foundation of Scientific Planning in Pakistan (with period of a decade apart 1945-1955). The two agencies were adopting current global trend and emphasized the role of planning as stated. "It has shown that properly planned and directed to a definite objective the capacity of the country is enormous."³⁹ They were not unaware of limitation of the programme thus considered it a beginning not an end of the development process. Implementation of the plan was considered vital for the economic development as reported, "It should be preposterous to expect that the State should make the plan and not carry it faithfully into action"⁴⁰ or "A plan has meaning only if it is put into action."⁴¹ The target aimed at was general welfare as evident from the statement. Production was meant for the community and not for the private motive of the few.

Broad Objectives

There was consensus on major issue in the two programmes. These were: (a) Eradication of poverty and (b) Reduction in income disparities. Emphasis was very clear in guide lines enunciated by Quaid-i-Azam himself. "It is not our purpose to make the rich richer and accelerate the process of accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few individuals. We should aim at

levelling up the general standard of living of masses.⁴² Similarity of ideas can be traced in the draft of First Five-Year Plan. The Economic and Social objectives of the government policy were well known. They are to develop the resources of the country as rapidly as possible so as to promote the welfare of the people, provide adequate living standard and social services, secure social justice and equality of opportunity and aim the widest and most equitable distribution of income and property.⁴³

Strategy

Strategies of the two plans differed in priority determination of the two major objectives. Strategy of Muslim League Committee was social justice. Emphasis was on improvement of general standard of living to eradicate twin problem of poverty and unequal distribution of income in view of the present and future size of the population. The strategy of First Five-Year Plan was growth oriented aimed at building up the productive capacity. Distributional justice was given secondary importance.

However, both plans agreed on common determinant of development, e.g., 'the success of development depends on inducing a flow of investment sufficient to maintain full employment.'⁴⁴ There was need of deliberate planning for greater employment.⁴⁵ Reduction in already meagre level of consumption was not envisaged by the two planning organizations. Greater role was assigned to the public sectors in Muslim League Committee as well in First Five-Year Plan.

Objectives

The objectives of planned development programmes in keeping with general practice were to raise per capita income, ensuring better standard of living, greater employment opportunities and reduction of inequalities in its various dimensions. Muslim League Committee's report was of the view that doubling of standard of living will not be sufficient for 'freedom from want'. It will have to be raised by three times. For this national income had to be increased to 6 per cent per annum (compound) over the period of two decades. Percentage per capita income was expected to increase from 57 to 74 per cent or from Rs. 55 to Rs. 196, e.g., three and a half times.⁴⁶ In First Five-Year Plan target was 15 per cent increase in national income. It could be achieved by generation of 'useful employment of uphold the dignity of man and high worth of his personality which were cherished by Muslims as religious doctrine.'⁴⁷

Sectoral Strategies

Financial allocations to various sectors are reflection of priorities. However, the figures (as mentioned earlier) are not to be taken in their face value, but as a pointer towards the direction of planning as acknowledged by the Committee that figures for the future must be largely a matter of conjecture and by no means a matter of simple calculation. Percentage allocation of four quinquennium is taken into account to make it more meaningful. For the purpose of comparison with the allocation of First Five-Year Plan.

TABLE 13
A Glance at Comparative Percentage Sectoral Priorities

Sector	MLC Report Percentage	FFYP Percentage
Agriculture	28	7
Industry	34	31
Transport and Communication	10	17
Education	7	6
Health	5	2
Housing	1	20

Sources : * Calculated from the Table 12.

** Qureshi, M.L., *op.cit.*

The criteria for allocation was productive activities, top priority was given to such sectors at earlier stage and social services in later stage. Identification of such activity was different in two programmes. Agriculture was the key sector in terms of overall percentage allocation in twenty years programme (28 per cent) and first two Five-Year Plans sector allocation (Table 12) e.g., about 37 per cent and 33 per cent respectively where as First Five-Year Plan allocated only 7 per cent of actual resources.

However, both organizations unanimously recommended comprehensive institutional reforms which were used not only for agriculture development alone, but for rural development in general. The report laid stress on the need of reform of land system stabilization of rent, security of tenure and improvement in the condition of labour in agriculture and control of money lending. Punjab Muslim League Agrarian Reform Committee of 1949 and Land Reform Commission of 1958 suggested similar reforms with some variation in the size of ceiling. The reform of late fifties was considered more revolutionary. The objectives of all these were same namely to break the

monopoly in power of *Zamindar* and *Taukdar* in the report and *Jagirdar* in the later agrarian reforms. First Five-Year Plan considered the "inequalities which originate in large scale land-ownership, are socially purposeless, undesirable and harmful."⁴⁸ The Planners attached highest priority to the rights in land.

Institution recommended for the purpose was Cooperative Societies with a view to strengthen the position of small man for "survival in competition against men of large means."⁴⁹ Cooperative Societies had to be assisted by the Government by "firm measures of policy and action"⁵⁰ in all aspect of agriculture production and distribution to achieve the target of income stability and guidance which hampered their effective role in the past.

Industrial Strategy

The importance of industrial sector could not be less emphasized in view of heavy dependence, 80 per cent on imported consumer good along with the need of sectoral balance in the area. In over all twenty-year development programme the percentage allocation was higher (34 per cent) though less in first two Five-Year Plans. Though gap was reduced in the Second Plan to be given highest priority in the Third Five-Year Plan. Strategy was in keeping with the main philosophy, e.g., to improve the general welfare, emphasis was on consumer good industry to be followed by capital good industry. Power generation was considered vital for the development. First Five-Year Plan gave high priority to industrial sector in terms of actual percentage financial allocation, e.g., 31 per cent of total resources. It included fuels and minerals. This was higher than target of 28 per cent provided in the Plan. Almost two third of resources were provided in order to have sound foundation for raising the industrial structure of the economy. It was acknowledged that industrial development of recent years has been guided not by carefully worked out long range strategy, but by a series of *ad hoc* decisions based on what seemed most necessary and expedient at that time.⁵¹

Social sector such as education, health and housing were relatively on lower ladder of priorities in over all planning. Education was on top of the list in the report whereas housing was the main sector in First Five-Year Plan.

Comparative Analysis of Financial Resources

Strategy of collect financial resources was biased towards domestic resources in the two programme, e.g., 67 per cent in twenty-year development programme and 62 per cent in First Five-Year Plan. Difference appears to be nominal, in reality if other sources, internal loans and capital balance are taken

into account it is much more substantial, e.g., 80 per cent in the first quinquennium. Gap is marked in the external resources, that is 6 per cent in the former and 38 per cent reliance in the later. This gap is reduced if 20 per cent allocation to external resources in the first quinquennium is considered (Table 13). The heavy reliance on external resources in First Five-Year Plan was in keeping with the practices of past planning programme that is of Colombo Plan and Six-Year Plan. This dependence proved one of the important impediment not only in the First Five-Year Plan but in subsequent plans as well. Even in the latest planning shift towards domestic resources is not by choice but by compulsion.

Taxation was supposed to make major contribution in the twenty-year's development programmes in general with the exception of the first plan. This was result of systematic planning, as additional amount had to be collected by a continuous but gradual increase of 1 per cent in tax rate in the four plans. No shortage in the resources was foreseen on the contrary the reduction in the rate was recommended at the completion of twenty-year programme. The role of foreign resources in initial stage was not ignored its size was reduced with the estimated growth rate in each phase.

Overview

The study highlights the fact that First Five-Year Plan had drawn its insight and guidance from its predecessor programme. It established the realistic approach of the later. Though it had no chance of implementation, yet its validity had been proved wherever its recommendations were incorporated in the First Five-Year Plan and subsequent plans it led to better achievements, its absence caused shortfalls particularly in selection of time period, basic strategy and sectoral priorities.

Mid term plan period was selected in both cases. Each phase consisted of five years. Its significance was apparent in less than target achievement of First Five-Year Plan due to two years delay. Long term plan (perspective plan) was not formulated in Pakistan till Third Five-Year Plan (1965—1985). A Committee of Economists (1992) had suggested a prospective plan stretching to 12 years⁵² for the Eighth Plan. This was suggested by the Chairman of the Muslim League Planning Committee in his inaugural address on 3rd September, 1944 at Delhi to adjust planning work in accordance with the experience gained.⁵³

Basic philosophy of the two programmes was the promotion of welfare of the masses. Eradication of poverty and reduction inequalities of the

income were Chief Objective. Strategies of the two different Muslim League Committee was consistent in its recommendation of distributive justice. Strategy in Pakistan Planning is summed up in S.M. Saeed's words, recently, "In the evolution of conscious or unconscious, stated or unstated philosophies of management in Pakistan, the pendulum has swung many times from one extreme of production-oriented stances to people-oriented stances, both in national and enterprise management. At the end of 'golden sixties' the realization began to dawn that pure growthmanship may have landed us in a quagmire with high growth ratios collapsing under the weight of distributive inequalities. Process of redressing began in the seventies."⁵⁴

This was reflected in sectoral allocation. Agriculture was assigned the position of key industry in the former Rs. 1200 crores were allocated to this sector for the purpose besides proportional allocation between agriculture and industry, 28 per cent and 34 per cent respectively in the total and highest in the first and second quinquennium. Number of institutional, financial and sub-sectoral reforms were suggested. Number of these can be found in the latest twelve points package of agrarian reforms.

First Five-Year Plan indicated a big contrast between the major sectors. Industry was at the top by 31 per cent allocation of resources, and agriculture was no way comparable with its 7 per cent resources. It proved one of the important reason in shortfall. It was stated in the plan that the progress in industry however spectacular was unable to make up for the deficiencies and bottlenecks resulting from inadequate agricultural production whereas success of Second Five-Year Plan was attributed to more proportional allocation (15 per cent and 22 per cent)⁵⁵ for this sector and its performance. Achievement of the industrial sector in First Five-Year Plan had to be evaluated with reservation as favourable economic environment was created by the earlier development programme. Moreover, public policy and investment was highly in its favour.

In spite of the support the five major selected industries only two (cotton and sugar) registered a substantial increase. In the Muslim League Committee Report industrial allocation presented a consistent trend. It was not only given a proportional share in it for the sectoral balance, there was a continuous increase in the four quinquenniums as well. It was assumed to be leading sector in the Third and Fourth Plans.

Transport and communication was considered essential economic overhead for the rapid economic development of major sectors. This was given due share in both programmes (10 per cent to 17 per cent) more emphasis in First

Five-Year Plan was justified due to unique position of Pakistan, two parts, divided by one thousand miles, and contrast between the transport problems of East and West Pakistan. Other such areas were defence and planning and administration, Muslim League Committee assigned decreasing percentage in each phase and nominal percentage in total allocation. Non development expenditure consumed a major portion (91 per cent) from internal resources in First Five-Year Plan of share of defence was 45 per cent.⁵⁶

Resource mobilization strategy was consistent in Muslim League Committee Report. Taxes were considered as main source. A steady increase was co-related with development expenditure non-development expenditure were kept to a minimum. In First Five-Year Plan development expenditure were dependent on external resources. Even short-term forecasts were difficult to make element of uncertainty was greater due to slow arrival of foreign aid and loans. Shortfall in First Five-Year Plan was attributed to such delays as well. It was repeatedly witnessed in the Third Five-Year Plan and Seventh Five-Year Plan when targets had to be revised due to stoppage of foreign resources.

Similar impact was felt by the participation of foreign experts in First Five-Year Plan strategies and priorities suggested by them, were more in keeping with global strategies rather than economic situation of Pakistan. Contrary to that experts in Muslim League Committee were conversant with local condition and their approach proved more realistic in different dimensions, like provision for basic needs which was incorporated in the Third Five-Year Plan. Formulation of perspective plan which was adopted in 1965 and again being recommended by the Economic Committee 1992 for Eighth Five-Year Plan. They retreated it in the words. "eliviation of extreme poverty, promotion of more equitable distribution of the incomes, the raising level of human development by doubling per capita income in 12 years."⁵⁷ It is tribute to the insight, pragmatism and guidance towards right direction of the Committee.

CONCLUSION

Khalid, S. H. re-discovery of Quaid-i-Azam papers had established the facts : he complied with the words of great leader by its publication in this period as Quaid-i-Azam advised S. S. Hassan in 1947 about these papers, "Do not" make use of them for some time, say twenty years. Then publish them. The Mussalmans must know the difficulties we faced then and details of how the battle for Pakistan was fought and "won."⁵⁸

It has opened a new vista for boundless research for the research scholars. The paper has established the fact that this is valuable addition in the economic history of Pakistan particularly in planning. Muslim League Planning Committee Report is full of economic vision, insight and guidelines. Pakistan's First Five-Year Plans has drawn not only inspiration, but adopted certain principles from this pioneering attempt. This led to better achievement. Deviation from this not only in this plan but in subsequent plans were responsible for shortfalls. Recent recommendations to use this as guideline for current and future planning is tribute to acumen of the members of the Committee, who provided a direction of the planning to newly-emerging country. Quaid-i-Azam's eulogy of the members was not unfounded when he said: "The Committee that has been formed is composed of men who would do credit to any people or any country in the world."⁵⁹ It has stood the test of time. Its implementation when undertaken has transformed dream into reality during previous decades of planning. It is upto the planner and policy makers to transform Quaid-i-Azam unrealized dream into reality, in its true spirit and letter.

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Geopolitical Analysis of the Kashmir Crisis

M. R. HAFEZNEIA

When the Sikh rule ended, the British handed over the State of Kashmir to Golab Singh for a small sum in 1848. The Dogra family of Golab Singh subjected the population to all of cruelties.

The policies of the British Government and wrong behaviour of political leaders of Kashmir caused the continuance of Indian domination over the region. On the other hand, geographical situation and characteristics of Kashmir as compared with both countries, India and Pakistan caused the difference between them, and led to political and military clashes during the years 1948, 1965 and 1971.

The United Nations in two resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 laid down the formula to hold plebiscite to decide the fate of the Kashmiri people. These resolutions, despite their acceptance by India and Pakistan, have not been implemented. The Indian government has not agreed on any of the arrangements to hold plebiscite in Kashmir. There is a long history of the Indian refusal to come to any agreement whereby the Kashmiris could be given opportunity to decide their fate of either joining India or Pakistan. The picture of Kashmir needs to be presented clearly :

1. Interaction between two cultures, Islamic and Hindu failed to bring about a synthesis or bring the Muslim ethos under the Hindu control in Kashmir. For this reason, the Indians have been unsuccessful in curbing the peoples' desire to decide their fate they like. To keep the lid on the whole situation, the Indians have resorted to the use of Armed force. So far it has not been able to achieve any success.

2. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region of Kashmir was surrounded by three nuclear powers — Soviet Union, China and India. Pakistan has been claimed by the West and the Indian government to have also achieved substantial success in acquiring nuclear technology, but it is yet far away from the stage whereby it could be called a nuclear power. Kashmir is a poder-keg and the forces around are such that it could lead to a bigger explosion than what is being witnessed at present. It has been a fact that Kashmir was an international issue and it still continues to be such.

GEOSTRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF KASHMIR REGION

The region of Kashmir that forms a part of Pamir has geostrategic and geopolitical characteristics that increase its strategic importance. Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and India are its direct neighbours.

Elevation of Kashmir

As a part of Pamir plateau, Kashmir overlooks the lowland around it namely the Decan Plateau, India Eastern Iranian Plateau, and Afghanistan. Punjab plain in Pakistan, Tajikstan in Central Asia, Tibet Plateau and Sinkiang in West China are lower than Kashmir region and Pamir. These regions therefore sense danger from Kashmir region from military point of view, and consider the presence of such an hostile neighbour in the region as a source of temporary or permanent threat.

Communicational Position

The region of Kashmir specially its northern part has very important position as it serves as a link between South Asia with Central Asia and Tibet, West China and Sinkiang East Asia.

The region of Kashmir and northern part of India and West of Tibet form the water-shed basin of five rivers, Sind, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej, and also form a topographic unit. The valleys, passes and the course of its waters are such that their direction is towards the Punjab Plain. It has therefore a special strategic importance for Pakistan because of its dependence upon these rivers the Punjab and Sind and fertile Plains are irrigated by them. Its control by a power hostile to Pakistan can prove as a serious threat to its existence.

Just as we see the aforementioned geographical advantages have given the Kashmir region a geostrategic importance, and the control of whole of its or a

part of it by any neighbouring power can be taken as a source of serious danger by the others to their national security and vital interests.

The divergence of neighbour powers combined with convergence of opposite powers in the geopolitical model is sketched below :

MAP No. 1

Geopolitical Interaction Model before the Collapse of U.S.S.R.



divergence (Oppositness) $\longrightarrow \longleftarrow$
 Convergence (agreement) $\longleftarrow \longrightarrow$

After the collapse of U.S.S.R. one of the four powers went out of competition. Two local political powers appeared instead which are considered to be having any interest in the Kashmir region. In the new geopolitical model after the collapse of U.S.S.R. therefore, there have remained only three powers. Convergence of India with U.S.A. as competitors for China and Pakistan (even to the extent of common military manoeuvres) and also her attitude to those countries that have good relations with China and Pakistan can likely be analysed in the framework of changing geopolitical model.

MAP No. 2

Geopolitical Interaction Model after the Collapse of U.S.S.R.



COMPARISON OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN INTERESTS TO KASHMIR

Just as was previously mentioned, India and Pakistan have geopolitical views and consequently special interests in Kashmir and each of them pursues its aims in the region and knows that Kashmir issue affects her national destiny. Here arises this question : both countries are in the pursuit of their aims, but which of them is being most influenced from the changes in Kashmir.

It is necessary to take into cognizance the views of these countries about Kashmir. Both Pakistan and India, as two rival powers know that elevated region of Kashmir is such that the control of Kashmir by any rival power is likely to cause a serious threat to its national security. Although both of them have the same situation in this respect, but in the conditions, as compared with India, Pakistan is by far more vulnerable, because firstly, capital of Pakistan as compared with India, is nearer to Kashmir and more vulnerable. Secondly, the great cities and the important region of Punjab and economical and population gravity of Pakistan is nearer to Kashmir.

Pakistan's relation to Kashmir in respect of its need of water sources, is absolutely clear, whereas India does not have such a need. These water sources are life support for Pakistan, and the economic life of about 80 per cent of Pakistanis and her great cities depend upon these sources. Appearance of every type of event that causes obstacle to obtaining the water sources can create political, economic and social problems for Pakistan. Protection and security and safety of above mentioned water sources, is therefore very vital for Pakistan, and its control by any other power, can threaten her national security, social and economic safety and political independence of Pakistan.

Kashmir region has topographic unity with Sind and Punjab plains. The structure of water network explains this reality, and for this reason access to Kashmir from Pakistan and Punjab is by far easier than from the northern India. The number of routes between Pakistan and Kashmir are more than the number of routes between India and Kashmir. There are seven routes from Pakistan to Kashmir whereas there is one route from India to Kashmir. Because of the existence of valleys and river beds of Punjab and their branches and also direction of mountains, they all make the connection between Punjab plain and Kashmir easy, whereas from the side of India, routes are perpendicular to the range of mountains and pass from most difficult terrains.

In other words the real topographic link is between Pakistan and Kashmir. From the other hand, it is a fact that the any powers that rules over Kashmir would threaten the national security of Pakistan, because the direction of connectional passes and valleys, mountains and river-beds are towards Pakistan, and makes it easier for any hostile power to have an access to the sensitive places of Pakistan in the Punjab region.

Also Pakistan has historical relations with Kashmir region, and enjoys cultural, social and religious ties with it, whereas India does not have such close relations. 80 per cent of Muslim population in Kashmir is firmly tied with special social relations with Pakistan and Punjab region is a reality that can not be ignored. The national desire of Pakistan obliges the government to support the legitimate rights of the people of Kashmir.

The protest of Pakistani Muslims in different cities through a number of ways, such as processions and strikes, reflect the strong feelings of Pakistanis for Kashmiris.

In the final analysis of the comparison of interests of Pakistan and India, we come to this conclusion that India has no vital interest in Kashmir but Pakistan, for her national security needs Kashmir. Pakistan on account of

importance of defending its political independence for keeping the steady flow of water of its rivers and the affinity of the people of Pakistan with the people of Kashmir is forced to assign the highest priority to Kashmir.

In short, continuation of the Kashmir crisis has negative impact on the relations between India and Pakistan and even China. In 1965, Kashmir was the chief cause of war between India and Pakistan.

The study brings out the hard reality that Kashmir is of vital significance for the economic life and security of Pakistan. India, however, is not under such compulsions. If the peace and security is to be established in the region and if this human problem of Kashmir is to be resolved, the plebiscite should be held in Kashmir.

This is the just solution and the world should lend support to the people to exercise that right to decide their fate according to the resolutions of the United Nations to which both India and Pakistan had freely committed themselves.

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Book Review

Dr. Muhammad Arif, *Tehrik-i-Pakistan*,
Progressive Publishers, Ichhra,
Lahore, 1994, Price Rs. 195, Pages 384.

The major objective of the study is to present to the younger generation an accurate narrative of the struggle of the Muslims of India to carve a homeland—Pakistan—in 1947. A great deal has been written on this subject, but Dr. Muhammad Arif, an Economist of international fame, has based his work on original sources, whether contributed by the protagonists or the opponents of Pakistan, to lend real authenticity to the movement which triumphed ultimately.

Beginning with Potwar, as the cradle of ancient civilization, nearly 50,000 years old, it has been argued that the area which became Pakistan continued as a separate entity over a long period. It has been noted that India was a multi-national state. Differences between the Hindus and the Muslims in social, cultural, religion and other fields made them distinct and different. Division between the Hindus and the Muslims was perennial. This hard truth has been set forth in right earnest manner.

The gradual erosion of the Mughal power and the rise of a host of new forces are recounted. But the British finally succeeded and the Mughal reign virtually ended in 1857. The Muslims carried their struggle against the British rule, but without any major success.

A new era began with Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. His ideas and efforts has been assessed. As the founder of the Two-Nation Theory, his contribution for advancing the Muslims cause has been given a rightful place in the movement for the separate abode of the Muslims of India.

The setting-up of the Muslim League in 1906 and the subsequent political developments has been described. To remove the allegation that the Muslims were dictated to by the British, evidence has been produced to prove it otherwise.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's role, first as the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, and subsequently as the fervent leader of the Muslims, has been discussed at length. In the crowded events before 1940, the Quaid-i-Azam emerged as a statesman open to reason. When all roads were blocked, the demand for the creation of Pakistan became as the only option for the Muslims of India and Quaid-i-Azam turned this demand into a reality.

The Lahore Resolution and arguments advanced to justify the Muslim demand and the political struggle that ensued established the fact that the Muslims should have a home-land of their own. From Cripps Mission to the June 3 Plan, the vital role of Quaid-i-Azam as the key-figure has been dispassionately presented.

The Pakistan Movement is a subject which requires a number of volumes for a comprehensive description. In this exercise much has not been written about a number of areas such as the contribution of different people and places in the crucial phases of the movement. But in a thematic study, discussions like these could well be avoided without reducing the academic value of the work.

Dream of Allama Iqbal came true through Quaid-i-Azam. Dr. Arif has portrayed ably the history of the Pakistan Movement. This is a rare book in Urdu, and it could well be described as a concise history of the Pakistan Movement and its author a political historian.

Dr. M. ASLAM QURESHI

Statements

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Male', Maldives : July 4-5, 1993

The Twelfth Meeting of the Technical Committee on Rural Development was held in Male' on July 4-5, 1993. All member countries participated in the Meeting. The SAARC Secretariat was represented by Mr. Ahmed Saleem, Director'. The Meeting was inaugurated by Dr. Mohammad Latheef, Deputy Minister Atolls Administration of the Government of Maldives.

The Committee considered the networking arrangements among institutions dealing with appropriate rural technology in Member States. It reiterated that the list of institutions be compiled at the earliest so that the details of modalities and mechanism for the proposed networking arrangements could be worked out by India.

While reviewing the decision regarding compilation of the SAARC Directors of Experts in Rural Development, the Committee urged Member States to forward their lists to the Secretariat for onward transmission to the Government of Bhutan for its early compilation.

The Committee considered the Report of the Meeting of the Expert Committee to study the Modalities and Mechanisms and Financial Implications for establishing "SHELTERNET" which was held at New Delhi on June 21-22, 1993. It decided that Member States would communicate their comments to the SAARC Secretariat by the end of September 1993 so that the proposal could be considered at the next session of the Standing Committee.

These statements have been prepared by Syed Karim Haider, Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Quaid-i-Azam Campus, Lahore.

The Committee took note of the fact that 1994 is the SAARC Year of the Youth and suggested activities to highlight the event. The committee also formulated the Calendar of Activities for the year 1994.

SAARC SEMINAR ON ROAD USER CHARGES AND ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF PROJECTS

New Delhi, India : July 13-15, 1993

A SAARC Seminar on Road User Charges and Economic Evaluation of Projects was held in new Delhi on July 13-15, 1993. The Seminar was attended by delegates from Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

Mr. M.K. Saxena, Director, NITHE, New Delhi delivered the welcome address at the Seminar in which he highlighted the development scenario for Roads in the SAARC Region and compared it with the development indicators forming an average of eighty-five developing countries.

He felt that in view of the inadequacy of roads in the countries of this region massive investments in creating new facilities are required.

The Seminar was divided into Ten Technical Sessions and the delegates from the participating countries deliberated on the Planning Strategy and the Methods for Evaluating Road Projects adopted by them.

SAARC AUDIO VISUAL EXCHANGE (SAVE) COMMITTEE MEETING

Kathmandu, Nepal : August 3-4, 1993

The Eleventh Meeting of the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange (SAVE) Committee was held in Kathmandu from August 3-4, 1993. The meeting chaired by Mr. Tapa Nath Shukla, General Manager of Nepal Television, was attended by delegates from all the Member Countries. This Secretariat was represented by Ms. Nima Ome, Director.

The Committee reviewed the progress in the implementation of the decisions taken at the Tenth Meeting. It was observed that much progress had been made in the preparation for the SAARC TV Quiz 1993 which is scheduled to be telecast during November 1st and 2nd week. The contributions from the Member Countries for the co-production on the theme "SAARC Year of the Disabled—1993" were previewed/auditioned. The co-production is to be

telecast/broadcast on December 8, 1993 to commemorate the signing of the SAARC Charter.

The schedule of TV/Radio programmes approved by the SAVE Committee are given in the following Table :

Schedule of (SAVE) Programmes

Television

Sr.No.	Country	Title	Date
1.	Bhutan	: The Dragon Kingdom	1st Oct. 1993
2.	Bangladesh	Pottery and Handicrafts	1st Nov. 1993
3.	India	Desert Festival	1st Dec. 1993
4.	Maldives	Gift of the Sea	1st Jan. 1994
5.	Pakistan	Women in Development	1st Feb. 1994
6.	Nepal	Tharus of Western Nepal	1st Mar. 1994

Note : SAARC Quiz will be telecast in the first and second week of November, 1993.

Radio

Sr.No.	Country	Title	Date
1.	Maldives	Facing a Challenge	15 Sep. 1993
2.	Bangladesh	Modernization in Agriculture and its impact on the Environment	15 Oct. 1993
3.	Bhutan	Environment Conservation in Bhutan	15 Nov. 1993
4.	India	Percussion Instruments in Indian Music	15 Dec. 1993
5.	Nepal	Agriculture and Environment	15 Jan. 1994
6.	Pakistan	A Tale of Two Rivers	15 Feb. 1994
7.	Sri Lanka	Melodies and Rhythms of Sri Lanka	15 Mar. 1994
8.	Bangladesh	Monsoon in Bangla Song	15 Apr. 1994
9.	India	Environment and Development	15 May, 1994
10.	Nepal	From Self Help of Self Reliance	15 Jun. 1994

Alternate Programmes

Sr.No.	Country	Title	Date
1.	Pakistan	Story of a String	
2.	Nepal	Melodies of Yesteryear	

**PRIME MINISTER OF NEPAL INAUGURATES
ANNEXE BUILDING****Kathmandu, Nepal : August 16, 1993**

The new annexe building of the SAARC Secretariat was inaugurated by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nepal, Mr. G.P Koriála, on the 16th August, 1993.

In his inaugural address, the Prime Minister stated that Nepal is fully committed to SAARC and assured the Secretariat of His Majesty's Government's fullest cooperation. He pointed out that "Strengthening of SAARC can give full play to the vitality and dynamism that is inherent in the societies of this region and thus restore the rightful place of South Asia in the World Community." He said that the need for more physical facilities for the Secretariat is quite reasonable in view of the active role being played by the Secretariat in the implementation of SAARC Summit decisions.

During the inaugural ceremony, Prime Minister Koriála presented to the Secretariat a 'Peacock Window', a magnificent example of Nepalese wood carving skills.

The Secretary-General of SAARC, Mr. I. H. Zaki, while lauding the Government's initiative to construct the annexe building said that the opening of the building would meet the need for additional office space which had been acutely felt for some time now. "By generously placing at our disposal in 1987 the main building of the Secretariat at this prime location in the centre of Kathmandu, complete with all facilities, His Majesty's Government of Nepal greatly contributed to the effective functioning of the Secretariat reducing to a minimum any initial teething problems," the Secretary-General said. He further said that the unflinching support and assistance extended by the Nepalese authorities to the Secretariat has always been warmly appreciated by the Member States and the Secretariat Staff.

The Secretary-General praised His Majesty's Government of Nepal for its generous gesture once again in meeting the entire cost of the construction of the annexe building and other related works which has been estimated at approximately Nepalese Rupees 4 million. With the additional floor area of 4100 sq. ft. now available, the Secretariat can re-allocate office space more rationally and relocate the Library in a much bigger room in the annexe building.

The inauguration ceremony was attended by the diplomatic community and also representatives of the International Organizations, UN Agencies,

Non-Governmental Organizations and Foundations which have been regularly supplying the Secretariat with books and publications.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

Islamabad, Pakistan : August 30-31, 1993

The Twelfth Meeting of the Technical Committee on Agriculture was held in Islamabad on August 30-31, 1993. Participants from all SAARC countries attended the meeting.

The meeting was inaugurated by Mr. Ali Khan Junejo, Minister of Food, Agriculture and Cooperative of Government of Pakistan. Dr. Zafar Altaf, Chairman of Pakistan Agricultural Research Council chaired the meeting. The SAARC Secretariat was represented by Mr. Prabal SJB Rana, Director.

Some of the recommendations made by the Committee were :

1. Establishment of Networking Arrangements among the Coordinators and Counterpart Scientists in the twelve agreed areas of crop/discipline, the funding for which be considered under the SAARC Regional Fund.
2. Joint Exploration and Collection of Germplasm of Agri-Horticultural Crops and their wild relatives including medicinal and aromatic plants and forest Trees in the wake of genetic erosion be conducted in Nepal and Bhutan and be funded under the SAARC - Japan Special Fund in 1994.
3. SAARC Fund for Regional Projects to consider funding for following projects :
 - (a) Production of Bio-Fertilizers with special reference to Rhizobia of Nitrogen Fixation (RNF) in India, Nepal and Pakistan.
 - (b) Income generating projects such as Bee Keeping, Sericulture and Mushroom Production for low income group in urban and rural areas in SAARC Member States.

While reviewing the progress of the project proposals identified in its earlier meeting the Committee also identified following two programmes to be undertaken in the 1990s :

- (i) Data Base on Technology and Training Facilities in Agriculture Science within the SAARC Countries.

(ii) Meetings of the Expert Group on Crop Diseases.

The Committee strongly felt that SAARC should establish greater linkages with the international and regional centres such as Cereals and Legumes Asian Network, ICRISAT and FAO networks specially on environment, watershed management, fisheries, Bio-technology. The Committee also considered the SAIC Budget for 1993-94.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON TOURISM

Kathmandu, Nepal : September 14-15, 1993

The Third Meeting of the Technical Committee on Tourism was held on September 14-15, 1993 in Kathmandu. The Meeting was chaired by Mr. L.P. Upadkhaya, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation of His Majesty's Government of Nepal.

The Committee reviewed the progress in implementation of the Action Plan on Tourism agreed upon at its First Meeting in Colombo in October 1991. It deliberated on issues such as joint promotion of the region as a tourist destination and regional cooperation in training, transportation, exchange of information and joint venture investment.

At the end of its deliberations, the Committee agreed upon specific measures to be implemented by member States. It also recommended that a Group of Experts consisting of representatives from the government and private sector may take place in the first quarter of 1994 to evolve common tourism products and other strategies for joint promotion of tourism and prepare project proposal for joint participation in some of the international tourism fairs.

The committee discussed the proposal of SAARC Scheme for Promotion of Organised Tourism within the region. It also discussed some of the issues relating to the Scheme for intra-regional tourism and as a result it was felt that the Scheme could be launched towards the end of this year.

RATIFICATION OF CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES

Male', Maldives September 23 : 1993

The SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances signed in Male', on November 23, 1990 has entered into force on September

15, 1993, following completion of ratification procedures by all the SAARC Member States.

The Convention signed during the Fifth SAARC Summit in Male', seeks to reinforce and supplement at the regional level, the relevant international conventions and promote regional cooperation among Member States in both law enforcement and demand reduction.

Incorporating the universally accepted principle of 'extradition or prosecution' consistent with the respective national legislative regimes, the Convention envisages the widest measures for mutual legal assistance among Member States in investigation, prosecution and judicial proceedings in respect of offences.

Member States have also committed themselves under the provisions of the Convention to adopt necessary measures to establish as criminal offences under their respective domestic law, drug related offences specified in the Convention.

In the field of demand reduction, Member States have agreed to adopt appropriate measures aimed at reducing the illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances with a view to reducing human suffering and eliminating financial incentives for illicit traffic.

While considerable progress has already been achieved in implementing the cooperative measures envisaged in the Convention, the formal entry into force of the Convention is a significant step forward and a further impetus for the continuing collective efforts against drug trafficking and drug abuse.

MEMORANDUM ON THE GUIDELINES FOR SAARC-JAPAN SPECIAL FUND

Kathmandu, Nepal : September 27, 1993

SAARC Secretary-General, Ibrahim Hussain Zaki and Ambassador of Japan in Kathmandu, Chuichi Ito, exchanged letters finalizing the "Memorandum on the guide-lines for SAARC-Japan Special Fund" on September 27, 1993.

Established with contributions from the Government of Japan, the Fund consists of two Components intended to finance respectively, selected SAARC activities and intellectual exchanges between SAARC Member Countries and Japan.

The Government of Japan has made a contribution of US\$300,000 for the year 1993-94 of which US\$100,000 has been allocated to Component I and US\$200,000 to Component II.

Training Workshop in Pakistan on Molecular Biology, Genetic Engineering and Bio-Technology, Training Programme in India on Pollution Control, SAARC Youth Volunteers Programme in Nepal and the Maldives are SAARC activities to be financed by component I of the Fund during the current year. An in depth study of transport infrastructures and transit facilities of SAARC countries in order to formulate viable proposals for their improvement will also be financed by Component I of the Fund.

To discuss the possible exchange programmes under Component II, the Government of Japan invited the Heads of the SAARC Divisions in the Ministries of Foreign/External Affairs of the SAARC Member States to Tokyo from 3 to 8 April, 1993, where a number of ideas were discussed for utilization of the Fund.

NEPAL RATIFIES SAPTA

Kathmandu, Nepal : September 27, 1993

The instrument of ratification of SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) signed by Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala, the Prime Minister of His Majesty's Government of Nepal was received on September 28, 1993 by the SAARC Secretary-General Mr. L. H. Zaki. The House of Representatives of Nepalese Parliament unanimously approved SAPTA in the first week of September 1993, which has been subsequently signed by the Prime Minister. Thus Nepal becomes the first country to ratify the Agreement on SAPTA.

This Agreement was signed at the ministerial level by all SAARC Member States in the presence of Heads of State or Government during the Seventh SAARC Summit in Dhaka in April this year. The Council of Ministers during the Seventh SAARC Summit urged Member States to complete all formalities for operationalizing SAPTA, including the finalization of Schedules of Concessions and the process of ratification before December 1995. Member States were requested to start immediately the process of negotiating exchange of trade concessions with a view to completing it by December 1993. The Agreement will come into force after the seven Contracting States complete the formalities of ratification/acceptance.

The initiative towards establishing SAPTA was taken at the Sixth SAARC Summit in Colombo in December 1991. This framework Agreement outlines rules and modalities for step-by-step liberalisation of intra-regional trade and envisages periodic rounds of trade negotiations for exchanging trade concessions on tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff lines. The Contracting States have, however, agreed to negotiate initially only tariff preferences on a product-by-product basis.

SAPTA accords Special and Favourable treatment to the Least Developed Countries in SAARC. Additional measures in favour of Least Developed Contracting States are also incorporated in the Agreement. Provisions for safeguard action and the balance of payments measures to protect the interests of Member States in critical circumstances are also outlined in the Agreement.

The first round of trade negotiations has been initiated and Member States are at present in the process of exchanging request/offer lists for seeking trade concessions. The Inter-Governmental Group (IGG) on Trade Liberalisation is expected to meet soon to negotiate exchange of trade concessions.

The signing of SAPTA was indeed a landmark achievement of the Seventh SAARC Summit in Dhaka, which has paved the way for gradual dismantling of trade barriers and expansion of intra-regional trade among SAARC countries. It will play a catalytic role in promoting long term contacts among traders and entrepreneurs in the region.

NEW DIRECTOR JOINS THE SECRETARIAT

Mali', Maldives : October, 1993

Mr. Ahmed Latheef has joined the SAARC Secretariat on 1st October 1993 as the new Director from the Maldives. He had replaced Mr. Ahmed Saleem, who had served the Secretariat for more than three years. Mr. Latheef is a career diplomat and has served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Maldives for the last twelve years. He has been associated with SAARC activities since 1984.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

Dhaka, Bangladesh : October 6-7, 1993

The Eighth Meeting of the SAARC Technical Committee on Women in Development was held in Dhaka from October 6-7, 1993. The meeting was chaired by Mr. Muhammad Enamul Haq, Secretary, Ministry of Women's

Affairs, Government of Bangladesh. The meeting was inaugurated by Mrs. Sarwari Rahman, Minister of State, Ministry of Women's Affairs of Bangladesh. All Member Countries participated in the Meeting. The SAARC Secretariat was represented by Director, Mr. Ahmed Latheef.

The Committee reviewed the progress made by Member Countries regarding publication of the Guide Books for Women in Development. It also reviewed the articles for the third issue of the *Solidarity Journal* based on the theme of Girl Child. Four countries presented the status reports on the Girl Child of their respective countries. The other countries agreed to submit their status reports on Girl Child by the end of the year 1993.

The Committee adopted the Draft Plan of Action for Women prepared by Bangladesh. It was of the opinion that the Plan should be considered only as a guideline for preparation of National Plans of Action by Member Countries, since it does not apply to all Member Countries with equal force as the situation of women differs from country to country. It noted that the time frame recommended in the Plan was too long and decided that some of the action could be implemented immediately. It was further commended that the implementing agencies should include NGOs.

The Committee discussed the issue of the forthcoming World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), and the Ministerial Conference in Jakarta (1994). It agreed that a Workshop for formulating a common stance by SAARC Member Countries for preparation and effective participation in Jakarta and Beijing Conferences will be held in India.

The Committee discussed and finalised the Calendar of Activities for 1994 which include three workshops to be held in India, Pakistan and respectively in addition to several on-going activities.

SAARC WORKSHOP ON NEW APPROACHES TO PREVENTION TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION

Colombo, Sri Lanka : October 6-9, 1993

A Workshop on 'New Approaches to Prevention Treatment and Rehabilitation' was held in Colombo from October 6-9, 1993.

The National Dangerous Drugs Control Board in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted this Workshop at Marriott Hotel, Colombo. The Workshop was attended by delegates from five Member countries.

The Workshop was inaugurated by General Hamilton Wanasingha, Secretary, Defence, and the Guest of Honour was Mr. A.K. David, Director-General, South Asia and SAARC. Professor Nandadasa Kodagoda, Chairman, National Dangerous Drugs Control Board (NDDCB) chaired the Workshop.

Country reports were presented by participating delegates in both prevention and treatment and rehabilitation, concentrating on innovative approaches adopted in their respective countries. Several Sri Lankan NGOs active in the drug field gave inputs on their experiences.

The participants went on three field visits. They were shown an innovative preventive campaign in the vicinity of the Colombo Fort Railway station. They were also exposed to Camp Method of treatment of drug dependent persons, which is a procedure that was evolved by the NDDCB.

Another highlight was a visit to the Navadigantha Treatment/ Rehabilitation Centre which crystallises the benefits of State and NGO cooperation.

The Workshop split into two groups, one dealing with Prevention and the other with Treatment and Rehabilitation. Each group was requested to crystallise the following :

1. Innovative projects they propose to do in their respective countries on return.
2. Formulate two sets of recommendations :
 - (a) One set to their respective countries.
 - (b) One set to the SAARC Secretariat.

The Groups after their meetings, came up with project proposals and recommendations. The Workshop concluded with the expectation of all present that this meeting will further strengthen the existing ties and cooperation between SAARC countries in their efforts to eradicate drugs from the region.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND CULTURE

Colombo, Sri Lanka : October 14-16, 1993

The First Meeting of the Technical Committee on Education and Culture was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka from October 14-16, 1993. All Member countries participated in this meeting.

The Meeting was inaugurated by Mr. W.J.M. Lokubandara, Minister of Education, Higher Education and Cultural Affairs and Minister of Indigenous Medicine by lighting the traditional oil lamp.

Mr. N. Navaratnarajah, Director, SAARC Secretariat made a statement on behalf of the SAARC Secretariat.

The Committee reviewed the progress in the implementation of activities since the Fourth Meeting of the Technical Committee on Education.

The implementation of decisions on the recommendation of the Expert Group on the seven priority themes under Education was also reviewed by the Committee. It recommended that more information in respect of Nodal Agencies/Clearing Houses could be furnished to the Secretariat of circulation. It further felt that identification of specific contact points within the Nodal Agencies/Clearing Houses, together with postal address, telephone, telex, fax numbers, cable address, etc., could facilitate more effective interaction among Nodal Points/Clearing Houses and the Secretariat.

The Committee discussed the implementation of SAARC Chairs, Fellowships and Scholarships and Reports by Member States on Comprehensive Review of its operations. In this regard the Committee underlined the need to expeditiously dispose of applications in order to enhance the utilization of the Scheme and urged Member States to furnish detailed information in the schedule circulated by the Secretariat to ensure coordination and follow-up action. It agreed that the wider dissemination of information on the Scheme through Academic Institutions would be necessary for fuller utilization of the Scheme.

The Committee reviewed the progress in the implementation of activities since the 10th Meeting of the Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture and noted that four activities were successfully held during 1993.

The Committee discussed the consideration of proposals to hold future South Asian Festivals in the light of the hope expressed by the Seventh Summit in Dhaka in April 1993 that South Asian Festivals could become a regular feature.

India announced that arrangements were being made to publish the Anthology of Poetry of SAARC Member States by March 1994.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF DRUG TRAFFICKING AND DRUG ABUSE

Dhaka, Bangladesh : October 30, November 1, 1993

The Eighth Meeting of the SAARC Technical Committee on Prevention of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh from October 30 — November 1, 1993, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Azimuddin Ahmed, Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs of Bangladesh.

The Meeting was inaugurated by Mr. Abdul Matin Chowdhury, Hon'ble Minister of Home Affairs. Mr. N. Navaratnarajah, Director, SAARC Secretariat made a statement on behalf of the Secretary-General.

The Committee reviewed the progress in the implementation of the activities since the Seventh Meeting, which include, *inter-alia*, the following :

- (a) *Exchange of useful Information on Programmes of Drug Abuse Control and Prevention* : The delegations briefed the Committee on new approaches to drug abuse prevention and treatment, the changes in institutional and policy framework, modification in schemes for assisting NGOs, epidemiological studies and other research, development of drug abuse monitoring systems and procedure for rapid survey and the preparation of multi-year master plans. The Committee recognized the usefulness of exchanging information on all these aspects and requested Member States to send all available materials to the Secretariat for circulation on a continuous basis.
- (b) *Directory of NGOs to enhance its usefulness* : The Committee recognized the need to update the information contained in the Directory of NGOs and requested all Member States to supply this information to the Secretariat for incorporation in the Directory. Regarding additional information on the NGOs, the Committee was of the view that particulars relating to fax, telephone, telex may be readily available wherever appropriate.
- (c) *Implementation of the SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Mechanisms and Strategies for Implementation, Consultation and Harmonization of National Drug Legislation* : The Committee held detailed discussion on all aspects of mechanisms and strategies for the implementation of the Convention and enactment of enabling legislation. The Committee noted with satisfaction that the Convention had entered into force on

September 15, 1993 following the completion of ratification procedures by all Member States.

The Committee was of the view that after Member States have made sufficient progress in the enactment of enabling legislation, the comparative study of drug legislation prepared in 1989 could be updated. This updated study could be the basis for the meeting of the representatives of the Member States to monitor progress proposed by the New Delhi Seminar to be held in 1995.

The Committee felt that it is important and necessary to examine in detail the administrative and legal arrangements obtaining in Member States to identify the weaknesses in the system which enable the abuse of medicinal drugs, and to suggest improvements. The Committee recommended that each Member State should prepare a detailed report on the subject and send to the SAARC Secretariat within six months. The SAARC Secretariat may then convene a meeting of an Expert Committee with one expert from each country to examine and submit a comprehensive report to the Standing Committee.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT

New Delhi, India : November 1-2, 1993

The Twelfth Meeting of the Technical Committee on Transport was held in new Delhi (India) on November 1-2, 1993. Participants from all SAARC countries attended the meeting.

The meeting was inaugurated by Mr. S. P. Bagla, Secretary, Ministry of Surface Transport, Government of India. Mr. M. K. Bhalla, Chief Engineer, Ministry of Surface Transport, Government of India, chaired the meeting. The SAARC Secretariat was represented by Mr. Prabal SJB Rana, Director.

The Committee reviewed the progress in implementation of various decisions taken by it at its last meeting.

The possibility of involving organisations like ESCAP, UNCTAD and UNDP was recognised by the Committee and Member States were requested to communicate their views/suggestions in this regard.

The role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and voluntary organisations for facilitating and accelerating the implementation of inter-regional programmes in transport sector was recognised by the Committee and Member States were requested to identify NGOs and voluntary organizations together with their respective areas of specialization in the field of transport.

The Committee also identified four new areas of regional cooperation in the transport sector, namely, transport safety, rural transport, environmental aspects and energy conservation. Member States were requested to furnish Status Papers bringing out details of work already done or being done as also the aspects on which further work needed to be done in each country. The Committee also felt that environment was another subject which required inter-sectoral coordination between the Technical Committee on Transport and the Technical Committee on Environment.

EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON HIGHER EDUCATION

Kathmandu, Nepal : November 9-10, 1993

A Meeting of Expert Group on Higher Education was held in Kathmandu from November 9-10, 1993. Six Member countries participated in this meeting.

Country Reports relating to Higher Education were presented by delegates and discussions were also held on Policies and Programmes — Relevance and Innovations, Management and Financing of Higher Education.

WORKSHOP ON FISHERIES SOCIO-ECONOMICS AND MARKETING

Dhaka, Bangladesh : November 16-17, 1993

A two-day SAARC Workshop on Fisheries Socio-Economics and Marketing was organised by the Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council (BARC) in Dhaka on November 16-17, 1993, with a view to discuss various socio-economic and marketing aspects involved in fisheries development in SAARC Member Countries. The Workshop was inaugurated by Mr. Abdullah Al-Noman, Minister for Fisheries and Livestock of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. A total of fifty scientists from Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka attended the Workshop. Participants from NGOs such as BRAC, CARITAS and Proshika alongwith some donor agencies and international organisations also attended the Workshop. Nine papers on socio-economic aspects of fisheries were presented by the participants and each paper was discussed in the Workshop.

Among the recommendations made by the Workshop were :

1. The need for inclusion of strong environmental impact study in the prefeasibility and feasibility stages formulation of any fishery project.
2. Fisheries products be covered under subsidized air tariff by the Airlines of SAARC countries.
3. India to host a Workshop of Counterpart Scientists on the theme 'Alleviation of Poverty through Agriculture' in 1994.
4. SAIC to undertake exchange of information and data bank of fisheries in SAARC countries; establishment of a common SAARC fish genetic resource centre and promotion of cooperatives.

COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Dhaka, Bangladesh : November 21-22, 1993

The Fourth Meeting of the Committee on Economic Cooperation (CEC) was held in Dhaka on November 21-22, 1993. The Meeting was attended by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. The leaders of the delegations were at the level of Commerce Secretary.

CEC considered and approved the Report of the Meeting of IGG on Trade Liberalization held in Colombo on November 11-12, 1993. It appreciated the useful work carried out by IGG and urged member States to complete the process of exchange of information in order to complete trade negotiations by the end of December 1993. It also appreciated the fact that Nepal was the first country to ratify SAPTA Agreement and urged other member States to complete the process of ratification with due urgency.

CEC also considered and approved the Report of the Second Meeting of the Expert Group on Joint Ventures in the field of Handicrafts and Cottage industries, held in New Delhi on August 18-19, 1992. The Report of the Expert Group contained concrete suggestions to promote cooperation among Member States in the area of handicrafts and cottage industries.

The Committee also agreed in principle to a draft proposal on technical cooperation on a regional approach for standardization, measurement and quality control activities in the SAARC region. It was decided that Indian Bureau of Standards would implement the project while the National Standard Bodies in individual Member States would act as the Nodal Agencies. The Committee also approved in principle a project proposal by International Trade Centre, Geneva for promotion of intra-SAARC trade, Bangalore on December 28, 1993. All Members of the Council participated in the meeting and the

second tranche of the contributions to the Fund were also confirmed as being up-to-date. The Council took the following decisions on the projects placed before it :

- (i) *Mini/Micro Hydel Power Projects* : The consultants shortlisted from India, Nepal and Pakistan would be provided with detail terms of reference in order that they could decide on the time frame and fees involved.
- (ii) *Integrated Sericulture Projects* : The Chairman would consult with the Agricultural Finance Corporation Ltd. (AFC) Bombay to try and reduce the fees for the feasibility study.
- (iii) *Split Location Cement Plant* : The ERCOM Consulting Engineers Pvt. Ltd. from India were selected as Consultants.
- (iv) *Manufacture of Drilling Equipment for water drilling, oil and gas development and surface mining* : National Management Consultants (NMC) of Pakistan were selected as Consultant.
- (v) *Integrated Dairy Project* : Bankers Institute of Rural Development (BIRD) from India were selected as Consultant.
- (vi) *Integrated Medicinal and Herbal Cultivation and Processing Plant* : Professional Consultancy Services Pvt. Ltd. (PCSL) and Rural and Development Associates (RDA) from Nepal were selected as Consultant.
- (vii) *Cut-flower Project* : Biotech Consortium India Ltd. (BCIL) from India were selected as Consultant.
- (viii) *Bulk Drugs Projects* : Dalal Consultants & Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (DCEL) from India were appointed as Consultant.
- (ix) *Dolomite Based Projects* : The list of consultants is being prepared.
- (x) *Manufacture of Zinc Oxide* : Terms of reference for the feasibility study are being prepared.
- (xi) *Manufacture of Gum Rosin and Vegetable/Gum Turpentine* : The list of consultants is being prepared.

The Chairman of IDBI would cease to be the Chairman of the Council for SAARC Fund for Regional Projects (CSFRP) on completion of two years, i.e., February 11, 1994. The next member country to take over the Chairmanship of the Council would be decided through correspondence.

SAARC MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON WOMEN AND FAMILY HEALTH

Kathmandu, Nepal : November 21-23, 1993

The SAARC Ministerial Conference on Women and Family Health was held in Kathmandu on November 21-23, 1993 with the participation of all Member States.

The Conference was inaugurated by Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala, Prime Minister of Nepal. His Inaugural Address was preceded by the statement by SAARC Secretary-General and Executive Director of UNFPA. Following country statements by leaders of delegations, the plenary session constituted Working Groups for the four Conference themes listed below :

- (i) Socio-cultural, environmental and developmental factors affecting role and status of women, fertility and women's reproductive health : Policy and programme implications and recommendations.
- (ii) Factors affecting reproductive health and the delivery of services : Issues and Strategies.
- (iii) Contraceptive technologies and women's concerns : An Assessment.
- (iv) Planning, management and financing of reproductive health with particular reference to family planning programmes.

The Conference adopted the Reports of the four Working Groups and the final document entitled "Kathmandu Resolution on Women and Family Health." The Resolution resolved, *inter alia*, that each nation in the region may take appropriate action to raise the age of marriage, register births and deaths, provide access to quality family planning services to all eligible couples, strive to increase the number of institutional deliveries and deliveries attended by trained health workers.

In the Resolution, the Ministers of the SAARC Member States also agreed that regional cooperation and collaboration should be promoted and findings of essential and operational research shared in the fields of child survival, safe motherhood, adoption of the small family norm, and raising the status of women. They called upon Member Countries to bring strong political commitment to empower women and improve their status in society, promote female literacy and education and skill development for income generation to strengthen their earning capacity. The Ministers called upon the donor countries to provide increased financial assistance to developing countries to promote their development programmes which would accelerate sustained

economic growth, alleviate poverty, and lead to sustainable development. The Ministers resolved that the text of the Kathmandu Resolution may be forwarded to the International Conference on Population and Development Secretariat at New York as the input of SAARC Member Countries to facilitate preparatory work of the Conference.

The Prime Minister of Bangladesh and SAARC Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia attended the Concluding Session of the Conference and delivered a statement. In her statement, the Chairperson congratulated UNFPA for co-sponsoring this Conference. She emphasised that the issue of family health cannot be treated in isolation. It is part and parcel of a larger programmer for the emancipation of women and for integrating them into the development process, she said. She added that these actions must be supplemented by appropriate legislation to ensure equal treatment of women at home, at the work place and in the society at large. She stressed that at the same time, various government policies must support legal enactments in order to produce the full impact.

VISITORS TO SAARC SECRETARIAT

Kathmandu, Nepal : November 23, 1993

Begum Khaleda Zia, Prime Minister of Bangladesh and current Chairperson of SAARC visited the Secretariat on November 23, 1993. Begum Zia was accompanied by Mr. A.S.M. Mostafizur Rehman, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh and Mr. Ram Hari Joshi, Minister of Tourism of Nepal.

During her visit the Prime Minister met the Secretary-General Mr. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, the Directors and staff members of GSS-I of the Secretariat.

A ten member delegation from the European Parliament led by Ms. Anita Pollack of U.K. paid a visit to the Secretariat on October 10, 1993. The delegation was on an official visit to Nepal.

Mr. Hiroyasu Sonoki, Executive Director of Asia Pacific Telecommunity (APT) visited the SAARC Secretariat on December 27, 1993. Mr. Sonoki met Mr. I.H. Zaki and Mr. Y.K. Silwal and discussed on developing cooperation between SAARC-APT in the field of Telecommunications.

**THIRTEENTH SESSION OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS****Dhaka, Bangladesh : December 4-5, 1993**

The Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh has announced that the Thirteenth Session of the SAARC Council of Ministers will take place on December 4-5, 1993 at Dhaka. The two-day Council Meeting will be preceded by the Thirteenth Session of the Programming Committee (30th November) and Eighteenth Session of the Standing Committee (December 1-3, 1993), respectively.

THIRTEENTH SESSION OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS**Dhaka, Bangladesh : December 4-5, 1993**

The Thirteenth Session of the Council of Ministers was held in Dhaka on December 4-5, 1993 under the Chairmanship of Mr. A. S. M. Mostafizur Rahman, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh. The session was preceded by the Thirteenth Session of the Programming Committee and Eighteenth Session of the Standing Committee on November 30 and December 1-3, 1993, respectively.

The Council, while reviewing the status of implementation of its earlier decisions made the following observations :

Cooperation with International Organisations :

- (i) *European Community (EC)* : The areas that have been identified could be explored further in order to formulate concrete programmes for mutual benefit. The Council authorised its Chairman to initiate follow-up action by exchanging formal letters of acceptance with the Vice-President of the European Commission. It also requested the Secretary-General to initiate action towards formulating specific proposals for cooperation with European Community.
- (ii) *Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)* : Authorised its Chairman to further explore the possibility of cooperation with ASEAN taking such measures as he deems appropriate.
- (iii) *Asian Development Bank (ADB)* : Cooperation with ADB would be pursued on the basis of the recommendations of the Inter

Governmental Group (IGG) on South Asian Development Fund (SADF).

While reviewing the progress in the implementation of the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme, the Council noted that since March 1, 1992 when the scheme became operational, seven hundred seventy-three persons had availed of this scheme. As regards inclusion of new categories in the scheme, the Council reiterated its earlier decision that more time was required to review the operation of the Scheme before considering inclusion of new categories.

The Council also reviewed the status of implementation of Summit decisions and made the following remarks :

Noted with satisfaction that Member States were taking appropriate follow-up action on the Seventh SAARC Summit Consensus on Eradication of Poverty.

A Meeting of Finance Ministers of SAARC Member States may be held to address the issues of harmonization of national proper plans with open economy and structural adjustment strategies, including the broadening of international macro economic policies to respond to developing countries concerns which were highlighted by the Seventh SAARC Summit. It welcomed the offer of Bangladesh to host the meeting of the SAARC Finance/Planning Ministers before the next Session of the Council of Ministers.

Welcomed the Kathmandu Resolution on Women and Family Health adopted by the 'SAARC Ministerial Conference on Women and Family Health' held in Kathmandu on November 21-23, 1993. It recommended for approval by the SAARC Heads of State or Government, the Resolution adopted by the Ministerial Meeting and requested the Secretary-General to obtain approval through circulation.

Approved the proposed Plan of Action for the observance of 1994 as the 'SAARC Year of the Youth', as recommended by the Standing Committee. It took note of the document regarding preparation for the Ministerial Conference on Youth in South Asia to be held in Male' on May 14-16, 1994. In this context, the Council welcomed the forthcoming World Youth Summit and recommended that the SAARC Ministerial Conference on Youth in Male' evolve a collective position on issues on common interest to the SAARC Member States.

Regarding the collective positions by SAARC Member States at the Conferences on World Population 1994, the World Conference on Women

1995, and the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction 1994, the Council :

- (i) Welcomed and endorsed the decision of the "SAARC Ministerial Conference on Women and Family Health" held in Kathmandu, that the text of the Resolution be forwarded to the International Conference on Population Development (ICPD) Secretariat in New York as the input of the Member States to facilitate preparatory work for ICPD to be held in Cairo in September 1994.
- (ii) Recalled that the Heads of State or Government at the Seventh SAARC Summit held in Dhaka in April 1993 had expressed support for the proposal to convene the World Summit for Social Development scheduled to take place in Copenhagen in 1995. In this regard, it welcomed the offer of Government of India to host a Workshop in 1994 to evolve a collective position on issues of common concern to the SAARC countries.
- (iii) Welcomed the offer of India to host a Workshop in February 1994 in order to formulate a collective position by SAARC countries on issues to be discussed at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction to be held in Japan in May 1994.

While approving the report of the Eighteenth Session of the Standing Committee, the Council decided on the following :

- (a) The permanent residence for the Secretary-General may be purchased or built and fully furnished from the SAARC Secretariat's budget to ensure long term economy. The Council requested the Secretary-General to prepare a detailed financial proposal in this regard for consideration by the Standing Committee at its next session.
- (b) An early meeting of the Expert Group on Statistics to prepare standard format and concepts for the data bank on economic and social indicators of the Member Countries.
- (c) Each Member State nominate a Member to the Governing Board of the SAARC Documentation Centre (SDC) which is to be located at the Indian Scientific Documentation Centre (INSDC) in New Delhi. The Council directed the Governing Board of SDC to hold its First Meeting at INSDC in February/March 1994. The SDC would come

under the purview of the Technical Committee on Science and Technology.

- (d) Member States exchange the lists of items and necessary information for trade concessions as early as possible to enable the Meeting of Inter Governmental Group (IGG) on Trade Liberalisation to be held in Islamabad in the first half of 1994 to complete the negotiations of trade concessions under SAPTA. The Council also welcomed the offer of the Maldives to host another meeting of IGG in Male' in January/February 1994, if deemed necessary.
- (e) In view of the unprecedented changes sweeping across the globe in the area of trade and economic relations including creation of trade blocs among major economic entities, the Council urged Member States to complete all formalities to operationalise SAPTA latest by 1995.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT

Islamabad, Pakistan : December 13-15, 1993

The First Meeting of the Technical Committee on Environment was held in Islamabad from December 13-15, 1993. The Meeting was attended by participants from all SAARC Member States. The Secretariat was represented by Mr. Humayun A. Kamal, Director. The Meeting was inaugurated by Mr. Imtiaz Ahmad Sahibzada, Secretary, Environment and Urban Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan.

The Committee reviewed the activities held since the Special Session of the Committee on Environment held in Islamabad on November 1-3, 1992. It was noted with concern that only a few Member States have furnished some information/materials to the SAARC Secretariat and decided that the Member States be requested to supply information/data required under the relevant paragraphs of the Report of the Special Session, such as focal points, nodal institutions, identification of specialized institutions, to the SAARC Secretariat by March 31, 1994, to enable the Secretariat to serve as a clearing house for circulating these data/material to all Member States. The Committee examined in-depth all the recommendations contained in the 'Regional Study on Greenhouse Effect and its Impact on the Region' which was finalized by the Coordinators at the Male' Meeting in December 1992. The Committee while examining each recommendation, considered its importance as well as various programmes and measures carried out by the Member States in the region. It

took into consideration various factors such as urgency, financial implications and existing capabilities of Member States. It also discussed at length the identification of the measures for immediate action as recommended by the Study and decided on a number of modalities for their implementation by Member States.

While discussing the proposal for SAARC/SACEP collaboration, the Committee supported the proposal. It agreed that Member States which could not communicate the views on the MOU during the Meeting, may do so by June 30, 1994 for circulation amongst member States through the SAARC Secretariat.

The First Meeting also discussed Agenda 21 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and identified possible regional initiatives. It noted that Member States were already undertaking a detailed consideration of Agenda 21 and drawing up their respective national programmes accordingly. It also felt that in identifying any regional initiatives for the SAARC region, the spirit of the Agenda 21 should be treated as an overall guiding principle. The Committee also prepared the Calendar of Activities for 1994.

SAARC MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON DISABLED PERSONS

Islamabad, Pakistan : December 16-18, 1993

The SAARC Ministerial Conference on Disabled Persons was held in Islamabad from December 16-18, 1993. The Conference was inaugurated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Mr. Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali and attended by all Member States. SAARC Secretary-General, Mr. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki and Director Mr. Humayun A. Kamal participated at this Conference.

The objectives of the Ministerial Conference, as contained in the Regional Plan of Action for Disabled Persons, adopted by the Dhaka Summit, were as follows :

1. To create awareness among the masses about the needs and problems of the disabled person.
2. To promote sharing and exchange of information among SAARC countries on special education, treatment and rehabilitation of the disabled persons.

3. To develop effective system for early intervention and diagnosis at grass-roots level through community based rehabilitation strategies.
4. To update and revitalize existing services for the disabled and to plan/initiate new services for the welfare, care, training and rehabilitation of the disabled persons.
5. To make endeavours for integration of disabled persons into the mainstream to make them contributive members of the society.

The recommendations of the Conference which were adopted as the "Islamabad Resolution on Disabled Persons" on December 18, 1993, is given below :

1. Existing laws relating to the welfare of the persons with disabilities be reviewed and amended to improve the quality of their life. Appropriate legislative measures be initiated to ensure equalization of opportunities and their full participation in all walks of life.
2. National and regional policies be evolved for the provision of essential services for the persons with disabilities in areas of prevention, early detection, diagnosis, treatment, education and rehabilitation.
3. Appropriate legal and administrative measures be taken to ensure access to public places and buildings by provision of ramps, lifts and mobility aids for the persons with disabilities.
4. Efforts be made to institute modalities for exchange of information and expertise on programmes for persons with disabilities at national and regional levels.
5. Special emphasis be laid on the production of audio-visual and printed material on prevention, early detection, diagnosis, treatment, education and rehabilitation for sensitization of relevant institutions, parents and the public.
6. The role of media and NGOs should be highlighted and supported to achieve maximum community participation in programmes for the welfare of the persons with disabilities.
7. Special libraries with braille books and audio-visual aids be established with arrangement for display and sale at affordable rates.
8. Health care facilities, in particular for the families of the persons with disabilities be extended to include genetic and marriage counselling.

9. Appropriate administrative strategies be adopted for vocational training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities including self-employment and income generating programmes.
10. The Member States should observe 1993—2002 as the 'Regional Decade of Disabled Persons' as declared by Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP) countries.
11. Considering that the majority of the people living in rural areas in the region, steps should be taken for extending services for the persons with disabilities to rural areas making the maximum use of existing infrastructure with local bodies, health centres and schools.
12. Concrete measures for composite treatment of persons with multiple disabilities may be considered by the Member States.
13. Steps may be taken for networking of agencies working for the welfare of persons with disabilities both within and between 11 Countries.

MEETING OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL GROUP ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION

Colombo, Sri-Lanka : November 11-12, 1993

The Meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group (IGG) on Trade Liberalization was held in Colombo on November 11-12, 1993. The main task of IGG was to negotiate and finalize tariff concessions under the framework of SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA).

Most of the Member States had earlier exchanged lists of products of export interest for seeking trade concessions. During the Meeting the Delegates held general discussion on individual trade regimes as well as on the state of exchange of trade information to preparation of request-let for tariff concessions. Later on, the delegations engaged themselves in bilateral meetings in order to understand market access conditions concerning the products of their interest. These bilateral meetings provided greater clarity and transparency in understanding national trade policies and issues of market access conditions such as the size of the market, tariff regimes and major exporters. Given the complexity of the trade negotiations, it was decided to continue the process of exchange of information and trade negotiations. It was, therefore, decided that IGG would meet again for carrying forward the process.

SAARC - UNICEF SIGN AND AGREEMENT**December 10, 1993**

The SAARC Secretary-General and the Executive Director of UNICEF signed a Cooperation Agreement between SAARC and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) on December 10, 1993. Under the Agreement SAARC and UNICEF will cooperate in implementing the directives on children by the SAARC Summits since Bangalore 1986 including the resolutions of the SAARC Conferences on Children in South Asia, held in new Delhi in 1986 and Colombo in 1992.

The Agreement specifically calls for SAARC and UNICEF to define an annual agenda of cooperation and to develop, implement and publish joint studies on mutually identified priority concerns in fields such as basic education, essential nutrition, primary health and the rights of the children and women. Analytical reports, technical publications and other documentation relevant to children would be exchanged among the SAARC countries on a systematic basis. Progress would be monitored towards achievement of common goals for children and development in the 1990s.

Under the Agreement both the organizations would promote research, analysis, policy development and dissemination on such themes as would enhance investment in human development and mobilise innovative action for disadvantaged children specially girls.

The Agreement will be operated by the SAARC Secretariat and the UNICEF Regional Office for South Asia, based in Kathmandu, reinforcing Government-UNICEF cooperation at the country level.

**COOPERATION BETWEEN SAARC-ASIA PACIFIC
TELECOMMUNITY****Kathmandu, Nepal : December 27, 1993**

The Executive Director of Asia Pacific Telecommunity (APT), Mr. Hiroyasu Sonoki, during his visit to Kathmandu on December 27, 1993, had wide ranging discussions this morning with SAARC Secretary General, Mr. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki and Secretary-General-designate, Mr. Y.K. Silwal on developing cooperation between the two organizations in the field of Telecommunications.

The discussions focussed on possible programmes and projects for implementation within the terms of reference of the SAARC-APT Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to be signed shortly.

The MOU envisages regular exchange of publications and documents as well as information on the respective activities of the two organizations in this field and cooperation for accelerating the growth of telecommunications in South Asia.

The formal establishment of cooperation arrangements between SAARC and APT is the culmination of consultations initiated in August 1993 during the visit of SAARC Secretary-General to Bangkok to deliver the Keynote address at the APT sponsored meeting of Planning, Development and Implementation of Telecommunication Networks.

APT is the focal telecommunication organization of the Asia Pacific Region in which six SAARC countries are also members. Established in 1979 to ensure balanced development of telecommunications in the Asia Pacific Region, APT serves as a permanent machinery to correlate planning, programming, operation and management of telecommunication services in addition to being a consultative organization for settlement of telecommunication matters and a professional resource in this field.

The development of SAARC-APT cooperation is expected to result in mutually beneficial partnership contributing to regional cooperation in this vital sector.

MEETING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS TO REVIEW THE PERFORMANCE OF SAARC DRUG OFFENCES MONITORING DESK

Colombo, Sri-Lanka : December 29-30, 1993.

A Meeting of Law Enforcement Officers to review the performance of SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk (SDOMD) was held in Colombo from December 29-30, 1993.

At the Inaugural Session, the Keynote address was delivered by Prof. Nandadasa Kodagoda, Chairman, National Dangerous Drugs Control Board, Colombo (NDDCB).

The Agenda for the Meeting included the following :

1. Concept and overview of the SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk.
2. Achievement of the SDOMD by Mr. C.L. Ratnayake.
3. Views of individual countries followed by discussion.
4. Problems and reasons for failure to comply with the decision of the Technical Committee in respect of servicing the SDOMD.
5. Visit to the Police Narcotics Bureau. Discussion on the working of SDOMD.

**SPEECH BY H.E. Mr. CHUICHI ITO
AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN ON THE OCCASION OF THE
EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON SAARC-JAPAN SPECIAL FUND**

It is my great pleasure to deliver a few words on the occasion of the exchange of notes regarding the 'SAARC - Japan Special Fund'.

With the belief that the promotion of the activities of SAARC will definitely contribute to the peace, stability and development of South Asia, Government of Japan has extended the contribution amounting 300,000 US dollars to this Fund in this fiscal year, to support and encourage cooperation activities among the Member Countries of SAARC and to promote intellectual exchanges between Japan and the Member Countries of SAARC.

Though the Fund started with modest contribution, I think this beginning shows one of very important steps taken by SAARC to widen its activities with the cooperation of a country outside South Asia. I am very much honoured that Japan could become first country which makes joint efforts with Member Countries of SAARC for the development of South Asia.

Recalling the process of the discussions and consultation between SAARC and Japan to start this Fund, I would like to note that without special effort done by Mr. Ibrahim Zaki, and his able Directors and Staffs, SAARC-Japan Special Fund would not have been materialised. On this very occasion of the beginning of our new cooperation, particularly I wish to extend my sincere thanks to the distinguished Secretary-General Zaki.

I hope this Fund will be cherished by the Member Countries of SAARC and the activities financed by this Fund will be expanded year by year to strengthen the cooperation of SAARC Countries.

Mr. YADHAV KANT SILWAL
NEW SECRETARY-GENERAL OF SAARC

Mr. Yadhav Kant Silwal, Foreign Secretary of Nepal will take over the charge as the Secretary-General of SAARC from January 1, 1994. He will succeed Mr. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki from the Maldives. Mr. Silwal has been Foreign Secretary of His Majesty's Government of Nepal since November 1992. As a career diplomat of His Majesty's Government, he had held important positions abroad.

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Chronology of Important Events

SOUTH ASIAN REGION

July to December 1993

BANGLADESH

- July 8* Bangladesh asked Muslim States to take tough stand on Bosnia issue.
- August 13* It was reported that Bangladesh's Defence Intelligence Agency had recently detained ten people in connection with alleged spy rings operating for India's Research and Analysis Wing.
- September 2* Bangladesh Prime Minister Khaleda Zia claimed that the Foreign Policy of her thirty-month-old Government was a success, although problems remained with big neighbour India.
- October 15* Golam Azam and his party Jamaat-e-Islami had admitted for the first time that they opposed Bangladesh's independence.
- 18* It was reported that Sheikh Hasina Wajed's main opposition Awami League was leading in a crucial municipal poll in a southern district.
- November 1* Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Reaz Rahman told that the SAARC Council of Ministers would meet to review the on going action programme among Seven Member States for collective benefits.
- 23* Bangladesh Prime Minister Khaleda Zia indicated that Nepal could use the Bangladeshi Port of Chalna as a transit point.
- December 20* Bangladesh Bay Scouts Association had announced the highest award of 'Silver Tiger' for Syed Ghous Ali Shah, Chief Scout Commissioner of Pakistan.

INDIA

- July 16* Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao disclosed efforts to salvage a crucial rocket deal with Russia had reached a 'delicate stage'.

- July 24 Indian expelled one of the officials of the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi on charges of alleged espionage activities.
- 25 An official of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad was declared *persona non grata* by the Government of Pakistan on the basis of his activities being inconsistent with the norms of diplomatic behaviour.
- 26 Acting President Wasim Sajjad asked India to hold a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan for resolving all outstanding issues and maintaining peace in South Asia.
- 27 Indian Junior Foreign Minister, Salman Khurshid, expressed his desire to hold talks with Pakistan to ease tension but expressed doubts about early talks because of uncertain political situation in Pakistan.
- 28 A Foreign Office spokesman in Islamabad said that India had rejected Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear test ban treaty.
- August 5 Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said that Pakistan was keeping a close watch on its relations with India and the development in Kashmir.
- 17 Pakistan asked India to stop harassing its High Commission staff in New Delhi and to abide by the code of conduct agreed to by the two countries for the treatment of each other's diplomats.
- 26 Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar told the Senate that India was producing hundreds of kilograms of plutonium every year, which could be diverted for use in nuclear weapons.
- September 5 India expressed concern over Chinese missile sales to Pakistan, but said that New Delhi would not 'whine' over the issue. Indian diplomat J.N. Dixit told reporters.
- 18 Indian Minister for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, welcomed a suggestion for Oslo type secret talks between Pakistan and India to help settle the Kashmir dispute.
- 25 It was learnt that Pakistan had not received any fresh proposal from India for talks between the two countries but would welcome any serious offer to have a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. This was stated by a Foreign Office spokesman.
- 25 Caretaker Prime Minister of Pakistan Moeen Qureshi said in Islamabad that under no circumstances would Pakistan forego its capability unilaterally or roll back its nuclear programme.
- October 1 Indian Foreign Minister, Dinesh Singh, proposed a dialogue with Pakistan to promote a climate of stability in the region. He said in the UN General Assembly that "wisdom lies in overcoming conflicts with a positive vision animated by peace and amity and in creating the necessary confidence and will for peace among countries and people."

- October 4* Pakistan's officials in Islamabad handed over to the Indian High Commissioner relief goods for the earthquake victims of the Western Indian state of Maharashtra.
- 12 Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Salman Khurshid said in New Delhi that India hoped the United States would not back Pakistan's effort to introduce a resolution over Kashmir in the UN General Assembly or the pretext of human rights violations.
- 15 Pakistan asked India to let the people of Kashmir determine their destiny.
- 17 The Government of Pakistan strongly condemned the arson carried out by Indian forces against the Hazrat Bal Shrine and called on the Indian Government to immediately lift the siege of the Shrine and repair the damage inflicted on the main prayer hall and other parts of the premises.
- 18 India expelled two Pakistani diplomats and two members of its mission on charges of indulging in espionage.
- 19 A Foreign Office spokesman in Islamabad refuted the Indian charge that four members of the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi and Consulate General in Bombay were involved in espionage and linked to the Hazrat Bal incident.
- 19 Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao felicitate Ms. Benazir Bhutto on assuming the Premiership of Pakistan and suggested to her that bilateral discussions be commenced in the spirit of the Simla Agreement for normalizing relations between the two countries.
- 20 Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in a message to the Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, expressed her government's willingness to engage in serious and purposeful discussions on the Jammu and Kashmir issue with India.
- 28 Foreign Minister Sardar Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari said that lifting of the siege of Hazrat Bal Shrine, reduction in security forces in Indian-held Kashmir and end to repressive measures were the prerequisites for holding talks with India on the Kashmir issue.
- 30 India accused the United States of abandoning its previous even-handed policy on South Asia to favour Pakistan in the dispute over Kashmir.
- November 7* The Pakistan Army denied an Indian report that three of its soldiers were killed by the Indian Paramilitary Troops on the Line of Control dividing Kashmir.
- 12 Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said that India should agree to discuss the future status of Kashmir as a separate agenda item so that Pakistan could respond positively to its offer of talks.

- November 24* Pakistan denied reports of the existence of any secret agreement between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India during the Simla Conference in July 1972 and termed them as "baseless and malicious allegations."
- 24 A Foreign Office spokesman said that Pakistan and India will resume bilateral talks at the Foreign Secretary level from January 1, 1994 in Islamabad for resolving their differences, including the Kashmir issue.
- 24 US State Department sources welcomed the announcement in New Delhi that Pakistan and India had agreed to resume talks on Kashmir after a lapse of nearly a year.
- 27 India expressed its displeasure to the United States on the move to repeal the Pressler Amendment and showed concern that the new law would pave the way for resumption of American Military Aid to Pakistan.
- December 4* Foreign Minister Sardar Asaf Ahmed Ali said that he had useful discussions with his Indian counterpart, Dinesh Singh, on all bilateral issues including Kashmir.
- 16 A Foreign Office spokesman welcomed India's reported willingness to open its nuclear facilities for inspection and termed it a 'major breakthrough.'
- 16 A Foreign Office spokesman said that violations of the Line of Control by the Indian forces had increased since past several weeks.
- 28 Replying to an adjournment motion in the Senate, the Minister for Interior, Naseerullah Khan Babar, said that the reduction of Indian Security Forces by at least one division in occupied Kashmir was a precondition for holding Prime Ministers level talks with India.

NEPAL

- July 2* King Birendra of Nepal said Nepal would maintain a non-aligned foreign policy and hoped to solve the Bhutanese refugee problem through diplomacy.
- August 13* It was reported that talks between the ruling Nepali Congress and the Nepal Communist Party—United Marxist and Leninist (NCP-UML) aimed at heading off a nationwide general strike failed.
- 25 Prime Minister Girja Prasad Koirala called on the acting President Wasim Sajjad and discussed with him matters of bilateral interest. During the meeting, the two leaders expressed the desire to further improve bilateral cooperation in all fields, particularly economic and commercial.
- 26 The Prime Minister of Nepal, Mr. Girja Prasad Koirala, left here after a four-day visit to Pakistan.

SRI LANKA

- July 7* Government troops shot dead four more Tamil guerrillas in separate attacks in North Eastern Sri Lanka.

- July 7* Sri Lanka's ruling party had authorised President Dingiri Banda Wijetunga to hold unity talks with a group of dissidents who once attempted to impeach his slain predecessor.
- 8* Foreign Affairs Minister Harold Harst announced that Sri Lankan Government would appoint a parliamentary select committee to examine possible changes to the constitution.
- 31* Opposition leader Sirima Bandaranaike demand that Sri Lanka be placed on a 'war footing' to deal with separatist Tamil rebels.
- August 17* The Sri Lankan Army plans to raise ten more infantry battalions to fight Tamil separatist guerrillas in the Island's North and East.
- 18* Sri Lankan Tamil guerrillas said they were determined to fight on for an independent homeland if the government persisted in suppressing their 2.5 million minority community.
- September 2* It was reported that Sri Lanka's President would be elected by Parliament and not, as currently done, by the people, under constitutional amendments being considered.
- 11* Tamil politicians had strongly protested against remarks made by Sri Lankan President Dingiri Banda Wijetunga that there was no ethnic issue but only a terrorist problem in the State's North and East.
- October 17* Government troops killed at least nine more Tamil guerrillas in two separate attacks in Eastern Sri Lanka.
- November 1* Sri Lankan Tamil rebels are preparing for a full-scale war with a major recruitment drive as their leaders say the Government had closed the doors for peace.

SAARC

- September 28* It was reported that Japan had agreed to grant 300,000 dollars as a special fund to finance selective programmes of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
- December 4* The SAARC Foreign Minister's two-day conference began with an appeal from its Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia to 'create an environment of peace to promote harmony and tolerance and counter the forces of bigotry, communalism, drugs and terrorism.'
- 18* The three-day SAARC Ministerial Meeting resolved that the existing laws relating to the welfare of the persons with disabilities 'be reviewed and amended to improve the quality of life'.

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Journal (Bi-Annual)

Rafique Ahmad (Editor) :

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
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